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ABSTRACT
THE POLITICS OF CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: THE SEARCH FOR
RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATION IN GREAT BRITAIN
AND THE UNITED STATES
David L. Dillman, B.S., Abilene Christian University
M.A., University of Houston
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Lewis C. Mainzer
This dissertation is concerned with the problem of
securing and maintaining a responsible public administration.
Its focus is civil service reform, particularly reform
directed at the top levels, which is a primary expression of
changes in the notion of administrative responsibility.
Civil service reform is viewed as fundamentally a political
debate between individuals and groups holding alternative
notions of the nature of responsible government.
It is argued that civil service reforms in democratic
polities are complex webs of responses to social and
economic forces, reactions to changing political values and
intellectual trends, and initiatives by interested groups.
v
Reform represents a temporary political consensus. To
illustrate this thesis an examination is made of the politi-
cal dynamics of reform in Great Britain and the United
States. A brief discussion of the Northcote-Trevelyan
Report and Pendleton Act is followed by a more detailed
examination of the reform efforts associated with the Fulton
Committee, Second Hoover Commission, and Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978,
Although important differences may be noted between
British and American reform proposals, the similarities of
the reform processes are more striking. Each of the reform
efforts studied is characterized by a high degree of
interest group politics. Each reform has attempted to make
the higher civil service more representative of the outlook
of the reform leaders. In the twentieth century reformers,
concerned with the growth of bureaucratic power, have
emphasized the need for responsiveness to political leader-
ship. Reform proposals have placed stress on managerial
competence and market incentives.
The Fulton and Carter reforms made important contri-
butions to problems specific to each civil service, yet both
wandered off the track to a responsible administration. By
stressing political responsiveness, the independence and
initiative of the senior civil service may have been compro-
mised. More importantly, their emphases on external
controls and economic incentives may have a negative impact
VI
both performance and public service attitude
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INTRODUCTION
In the process of researching and writing a disserta-
tion, inquiries are made frequently by well-meaning friends
and acquaintances about the topic that has distracted one
from normal social intercourse. The very mention of the
topic here—civil service reform—usually evokes a cavernous
yawn or a glassy stare. Yet in the political arena, an
institution so seemingly dull— the civil service—generates
a surprising amount of interest and even passion. It is
perpetually being condemned, reformed, and condemned. Each
successive round of condemnation typically points out a vice
contrary to that earlier alleged and the later reform
response is likely in a direction contrary to or at least
distinctly different from that earlier essayed. Why so much
attention to this supposedly anonymous, routine, deadly
boring institution?
In short, the answer is that civil service reform is
fundamentally a political debate between individuals and
groups holding alternative notions of the nature of respon-
sible government. The outcomes of these debates are of
crucial significance for establishing a civil service which
is politically neutral and yet responsive to executive
leadership, accountable and yet capable of initiative, pro-
fessionally competent and yet representative and sensitive
to public ethics. The outcomes of these debates are
1
significant for deciding who rules and to what effect.
As the British civil service enters the 1980s it finds
itself in the midst of such a political debate. Much of the
condemnation flows from Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's
war on waste and inefficiency led by the Prime Minister's
adviser on government management. Sir Derek Rayner, the
joint managing director of a chain of large department stores.
Thatcher and Sir Derek want to cut almost 100, 000 jobs by
1984 and streamline the service by abolishing the rank of
under-secretary and "hiving-off" functions currently per-
formed by the public sector to the private sector to realize
huge savings in expenditures on the civil service. Yet at
the same time, it is not so clear to many observers that the
civil service deserves to be attacked nor is there full
agreement that economy and efficiency are the proper criteria
to apply to it.
The 1980s, of course, is not the first attempt to
reform the British civil service. In the mid-nineteenth
century a concern for civil service reform became a passion
for a small number of public officials and informed citizens
and progressively grew to become an item on the political
agenda. Yet by almost all accounts. Great Britain by the
1850s had developed a civil service that was loyal to the
Crown, a career service, and in some departments reasonably
competent. It is also clear that the post-World War II
higher civil service in Britain could be characterized as a
reer
corps of well-educated, honest, politically neutral car.
officials capable of being moved quite freely throughout the
top jobs of the civil service. Why then did Britain
experience criticism of the civil service, beginning just
after the war and reaching its zenith in the late 1960s?
And what were the new standards, criteria, or values by
which the civil service of the 1960s was being judged?
It is clearer why civil service reform was placed on
the political agenda in the United States in the late nine-
teenth century. Yet it is not so clear why the American
civil service assumed the shape that it did nor why in the
1950s an attempt was made to change this shape to resemble
the image of the British civil service. Indeed, why, in the
1970s, when the British have found the strengths of the
American higher civil service to lie in its professional com-
petence, political responsiveness, and openness, did the
Carter Administration bring the efforts of past Democratic
and Republican Presidents to change the civil service to
fruition? Who, besides the President, has found the civil
service wanting and how have they brought about reform? And
further, what are the new criteria or values that underpin
the reforms of the 1970s? The answers to these questions
form a complex web of pressures, interests, motivations, and
values that can be said to characterize the process of admin-
istrative reform.
ljie_ProbLem_of
_the Higher CiviJ_Servino
Why is civil service reform so often the object of
attention? Why is reform of the higher civil service
habitually a key target for those groups advocating a more
responsible administration? According to Brian Smith,
"reform originates in a belief that ... the adaptation of
existing structures, expressed in terms of functions and
responsibilities, to new objectives, technology, resources
and environmental factors" and, it might be added, to new
concepts of responsible administration, "cannot take place
given the existing methods of recruiting, training,
deploying and managing the organization's human resource. "^
In other words, civil service reform is motivated by the
belief that the type, quality, and structure of the organi-
zation's personnel does make a difference in achieving
organizational objectives and in establishing and main-
taining a responsible organization. Yet this does not answer
the question of why the focus of reform is so often on upper
levels of the civil service. Undoubtedly, part of the answer
lies in the observation that higher civil servants have
three main functions which put them at the center of concern:
first
, to keep the machinery of administration in good
order so that it is readily useful for the political
leadership of the departmental systems; second , to
operate the administrative machinery so as to accomplish
--Brian C. Smith, "Reform and Change in British Central
Administration," Political Studies 19 (June 1971) : 214-16
.
^Sf -^^""^K^f ^^"^ political leadership, and third to
In carrying out these functions, the top administrator
is concerned with the traditional "POSDCORB" activities of
planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating,
reporting, budgeting, and, it might be added, evaluating.
2
In carrying out these tasks, the administrator has a pivotal
role in translating political goals into administrative
practice, a role which calls for technical-managerial skills
In this pivotal capacity, "the importance of the higher
civil service springs from the fact that collectively the
upper ranks represent the bureaucracy's outlook for most
purposes." Top civil servants influence the attitudes and
work patterns and habits of those below them, and, "indeed,
the characteristics of the top group have generally formed
the model for the civil service at large. "-^ Furthermore, in
the execution of these administrative functions the scope of
discretion is broad and the exercise of responsibility takes
^Fritz Morstein Marx, The Administrative State
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), footnote
p. 38
.
"^In "Why Does Public Administration Ignore Evaluation,"
Public Administration Review 31 (March/April 1971) : 201-202
,
Orvile F. Poland suggests adding an "E" for evaluation, to
the traditional POSDCORB functions of the administrator.
Marx, The Administrative State, pp. 11, 46.
on real meaning. 1 Although it is not always clear that
higher civil servants have more discretion in the implemen-
tation of policy than mid-level and "street-level" bureau-
crats, it is generally the case that their use of discretion
has a wider impact—in terms of the effect on people,
finances, or area. The potential for disaster or for benefit
that comes through their use of discretion and their
influence on the administrative machine gives political
leaders and the public cause for concern as to the nature of
the higher civil service.
Being pivotal officials, the top permanent bureaucrats
not only translate policy choices into administrative action,
but they also have a fourth function of making policy
choices through giving political and technical advice and
initiating and formulating public programs. Certainly the
top civil servant, if any public administrator, does not
work in a purely administrative environment. On the con-
trary, he or she operates in the politicized atmosphere of
interest groups, political executives, congressional leaders,
opinion polls, political parties, and the press. Thus, in
addition to managerial skills, indeed, before managerial
^George A. Graham, "Essentials of Responsibility," in
Elements of Public Administration
, 2nd ed., ed . Fritz
Morstein Marx (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1959)
, p. 474
.
skills, the top administrator requires political sense. 1 As
the top civil servant performs these political functions,
his personal and organizational perspectives are brought to
bear on policy-making.
Carrying this notion of the higher civil servant as a
pivotal actor further, Hugh Heclo contends that "the rela-
tionship between political and administrative officials
persists as one of the linchpins of effective government per
formance" and therefore "goes to the heart of a modern
democratic government 2 Heclo 's view, democratic govern
ment depends not only on a supply of competent politicians
and administrators, but more importantly on developing and
maintaining a relationship between the two sets of actors
that facilitates political control of the bureaucrats while
at the same time allowing them to exhibit individual initia-
tive and positive performance. To achieve this kind of
balance requires that political leaders and civil servants
be closely linked so that bureaucratic power can serve
political ends and be controlled by political leaders. At
the same time, the two groups must maintain a degree of
separation so that bureaucratic leadership will not become
Isee K. C. Wheare ' s discussion of the impact of party
politics on the British higher civil servant in The Civil
Service in the Constitution (London: The Athlone Press,
1954), p. 27ff.
^Hugh Heclo, A Government of Strangers (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977), pp. 3, 6.
8ascendant over political life and so that personal political
power will not become entrenched in the machinery of govern-
ment. ^ For Heclo, the search for the proper balance raises
two questions: "First, what sort of central authority, if
any, should guide the civil service system as a whole?
Second, how should responsibility for protecting the civil
service from political partisanship be organized? " 2 Thus,
for Heclo, achieving a responsible administration requires
structural reforms of the higher civil service which reflect
the constantly changing political balance between executive
leadership, political responsiveness, and neutral competence.
Similarly, Peter Self argues that it is the nature of
the blend between the top political and administrative
elements of the public service which determines its effec-
tiveness.^ Like Heclo, Self points to the structure of top
management—the dividing line between the political execu-
tives and career executives, its rigidity as well as the
sharpness and clarity with which these roles are differen-
tiated—as a key to securing a responsible administration.
For Self, the classic problem of responsible administration
in democratic societies is the tension between the
^Ibid., p. 8.
^ibid., p. 24.
Peter Self, Administrative Theories and Politics, An
Enquiry into the Structure and Processes of Modern Govern-
ment
, 2nd ed. (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1977),
pp. 162-63.
requirements for an administration accountable to political
executives and an administration which can take effective
act ion. 1 Part of the resolution of this tension focuses on
the relations between top political and bureaucratic offi-
cials. In Britain, the line between the two sets of offi-
cials "is marked most clearly and rigidly, and associated
with a definite and well understood differentiation of roles.
Moreover, each of the groups principally concerned is highly
cohesive." American government, on the other hand, "pro-
duces neither a clear differentiation of politics and admin-
istration, nor a cohesive pair of political and administra-
tive elites." Each approach to defining the nature of the
higher civil service contains its own special problems since
that nature is a political accommodation over the rules of
access to the top positions, the kind of individuals in these
positions, the political values which are stressed, and the
higher civil servants' relationship to political executives.
Both Heclo and Self, then, correctly point out that the
nature of the higher civil service and the appropriate mech-
anisms for changing its nature are central concerns for the
reformer attempting to make administration more responsible.
^Ibid., pp. 277-78 .
^Ibid., p. 163.
^Ibid., p. 173.
The Problem of Power
Perhaps the crux of the problem of the higher civil
service and responsible administration is the issue of admin-
istrative power. For example, in Great Britain in the early
1960s, many members of the Labour Party observed that admin-
istrators exerted an enormous amount of power in the
initiation and formulation of public policy through their
continuity, expertise, and control of information. Many of
these Labourites believed that bureaucracy should be held
responsible primarily through reducing the preponderance of
Oxford and Cambridge graduates in the top administrative
positions, politicizing top appointments, and decreasing the
anonymity of administrative advice. Others in the Labour
Party who perhaps shared the assessment of the source of
power but who disagreed on its extent, continued to hold to
the view that the bureaucracy's actions could be made respon-
sible by the strict anonymity of politically neutral,
competent (Oxbridge) civil servants. More recently, the
concern for the civil servants' alleged power to thwart the
goals of Conservative Party manifestos is behind the Thatcher
Government's attempt to cut and reorganize British central
administration. Thus it is that differing explanations of
the source or amount of bureaucratic power give partial
impetus and content to the reform debate.
The theme of administrative power is ubiquitous. For
instance, common to the elite perspective of C. Wright Mills
who argues that power resides in the very few interlocking
corporate, military, and state leaders; ^ the ruling class
perspective of James Burnham who claims that modern managers
control access to the instruments of production and therefor
form a ruling class; 2 and the pluralist perspective of
J. Leiper Freeman who contends that bureaucrats share power
with interest group leaders, congressional leaders, and
political executives, 3 is a concern for the problem of power
But to ask, "do bureaucrats really have power?," and "what
is the nature of the power they possess?," involves an
investigation into philosophical and theoretical issues of
real complexity. For example, emerging from the despair of
Robert Michels, who concludes that bureaucracy is inevitably
undemocratic,^ and F. A. Hayek who believes that public
bureaucracy necessarily restricts liberty; ^ the ambiguity of
Max Weber who, on the one hand, claims that bureaucracy is a
-^C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford
University Press, Inc., 1956).
2James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution (London:
Putnam Publishers, 1942) . Also see Milovan Djilas, The New
Class (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1957) for
this ruling class perspective.
3J. Leiper Freeman, The Political Process: Executive
Bureau-Legislative Committee Relations (New York: Random
House, 1965) .
^Robert Michels, Political Parties. A Sociological
Study of the Oligarchic Tendencies of Modern Democracy (New
York: The Free Press, 1962)
.
F. A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1944).
tool subservient to its owners, but, on the other hand,
believes it is indispensable and thus omnipotent; ^ and the
optimism Of Alvin Gouldner who posits that bureaucracy is not
inevitable, 2 is a hint of the complexity that surrounds dis-
cussions of bureaucratic power. Complexity arises from the
writer's own ideology as well as the historical, economic,
and social context of the bureaucracy under consideration.
In his review of the fundamental approaches to
achieving administrative responsibility. Arch Dotson shows
the complexity of bureaucratic power through assessing the
sources, nature, and extent of that power. He argues that
administrative officials have "an extensive and vast politi-
cal power" which is derived from five major areas: 1) the
origination of legislation, 2) the collaboration with legis-
lators and legislative committees, 3) the collaboration with
pressure groups and special clienteles, 4) the influence upon
the chief executive and his assistants, and 5) the interpre-
tation of law. Beyond this, the nature of bureaucratic power
is that it is conferred, "not merely in a formal, but in a
substantive sense, [by] the representative assembly, the
chief executive, the courts, and other parts of the political
-"See H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, ed.. From Max
Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Ltd.
,
1948)
.
2Alvin W. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy
(New York: The Free Press, 1954) and his "Metaphysical
Pathos and the Theory of Bureaucracy," American Political
Science Review 49 (1955) : 496-507
.
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system" due to the "role of the ^t^t^ -inux n s a e m economic and social
affairs" and "the inadequacy or unsuitability of the rest of
the political system to that role."l Thus the source of
bureaucratic power may be located more precisely in the
bureaucrats' specialized knowledge or expertise. 2 Dotson
concludes that given the nature of bureaucratic power,
attempting to control it and attain administrative responsi-
bility is a problem for the entire political system.
In a rare instance of bureaucratic candor. Lord William
Armstrong, after his retirement as Head of the British Civil
Service Department, gave credence to Dotson 's conclusions.
Lord Armstrong confessed.
Obviously, I had a great deal of influence. The biggestand most pervasive influence is in setting the framework
within which the questions of policy are raised.
We set the questions which we asked ministers to decide
arising out of that framework and it would have been
enormously difficult for my minister to change the frame-
work so to that extent we had great power.
3
But not only does the ability to set the framework
provide administrators with power, power is also claimed by
the default of legislators and executive leaders. Lord
Armstrong went on.
We were very ready to explain it to anybody who was
interested, but most ministers were not interested.
'-Arch Dotson, "Fundamental Approaches to Administrative
Responsibility," Western Political Quarterly 10 (September
1957) :720-21.
2See Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and
Public Policy , 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1976) for a discussion of bureaucratic expertise.
^The Times (London), November 15, 1976.
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^Zl ^ t prepared to take the questions as we offeredthem, which came out of that framework without goinqback into the preconceptions of them.l ^ ^
Finally, Armstrong suggests that expertise and conti-
nuity are sources of bureaucratic power. in choosing top
civil servants, "I wouldn't say to the Prime Minister 'there
is A, B, C, D and it's up to you to choose' because I think
I knew them better than he did and so in that area I reckon
I had greater power in that sense. "2 Lord Armstrong
naturally assumes a well-intentioned, reasonable use of the
power that fell to the civil service. Other observers are
not so charitable.
Tony Benn, Labour M.P. and former minister, confidently
asserts "that the power, role, influence and authority of
the senior levels of the civil service in Britain
. . . have
grown to such an extent as to create the embryo of a cor-
II 3porate state." This power is seized by bureaucrats through
intentionally misleading ministers, maintaining a veil of
secrecy, withholding information, delaying decisions, and so
on to maintain their own elite positions. Benn's critique
receives support not only from the political left but from
the right as well, and juxtaposed to Lord Armstrong's more
Ijbid.
^ibid.
^Tony Benn, "The Case for a Constitutional Civil
Service," lecture given by Tony Benn to the Royal Institute
of Public Administration (Nottingham Institute for Workers'
Control, 1980)
, p. 1
.
pluralist view exemplifies the widely varying views with
respect to administrative power.
Frederick Mosher's premises, as outlined in De^ocracx
and the Public,^ervice, provide working assumptions regarding
administrative power.
1. governmental decisions and behavior have tremendousinfluence upon the nature and development of oSr sSc?etvour economy, and our policy; o i y,
2. the great bulk of decisions and actions taken bygovernments are determined or heavily influenced bv
not'el'ectedr^
officials, most of whom are appointed,
3. the kinds of decisions and actions these officialstake depend upo.n their capabilities, their orientations,and their values; and '
4. these attributes depend heavily upon their back-grounds, their training and education, and their current
associations
.
Thus, the existence of administrative power in contem-
porary democracy may properly be taken as a given without
specifying the precise extent and nature of that power. Yet
its very existence suggests that with few exceptions "the
most important social question we face today is that of the
conditions of bureaucratic responsibility."^
It is clear then that one's perception of the power of
the higher civil service is closely interwoven with one's
assessment of the direction reform should take. Those who
'Frederick Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 1.
2J. Donald Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy
(Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1944), pp. 263-64.
believe that civil service power should be reduced may
question the predominance of higher civil servants with an
education in the classics, for example. In political dis-
putes over civil service reform, the view of administrative
power that each group holds is part of the background that
shapes that particular group's orientation with respect to
securing a responsible administration.
Civil Service Reform and the Nature
of Responsible Administration
Responsible administration is a political concept
widely shared in democratic society. And yet it is a con-
cept often at the center of political disputes because it
is shared imperfectly. Among its varied meanings particular
political participants in particular disputes may find just
that connotation which best serves their purposes. Thus, it
may be that when "responsible administration" is invoked
differing connotations and values are being expressed.
For example, in both the United States and Great
Britain, differing notions of responsible administration have
been alternatively stressed according to the social and
political context. Herbert Kaufman has shown the cyclical
nature in the United States of three administrative values-
representativeness, politically neutral competence, and
executive leadership."^ He argues that while one value is
See Herbert Kaufman, "Administrative Decentralization
and Political Power," Public Administration Review 29
(January/February 1969) : 3-15, and "Emerging Conflicts in the
)rms
.
.s
being stressed, political discontent associated with the
neglected values grows until enough political pressure has
been generated to support a change in institutional fo.
NO political value is totally achieved and no value i:
totally neglected. m this way, a constant movement in
political values and institutional reform is taking place.
Frederick Mosher has identified the evolutionary
character of the American governmental administration.
Dividing American administrative history into six periods-
government by gentlemen, government by the common man, gov-
ernment by the good, government by the efficient, and in the
post-World War II period, government by administrators and
government by professionals—he has shown how each turn of
the evolutionary cycle emphasized different values of respon
sible public administration. Mosher has also pointed out
that in European countries, since World War II, reform
efforts have emphasized three values: first, representative
ness, through democratizing "their higher civil service by
opening its gates of entry to larger segments of the popula-
tion"; second, competence, through strengthening "their
capacities to deal effectively with the social, economic,
political, and technical problems in a period of acceleratin
change" through professionalizing the civil services; and
third, executive leadership, through enlarging "their
Doctrines of Public Administration," American Political
Science Review 50 (December 1956 ): 1057-1073
.
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capabilities in the areas of administration, management, and
broadly, politics. "1 The point that both Mosher and Kaufman
make is that administrative values are shaped by changing
societal, intellectual, and political trends.
Similarly, James Q. Wilson identifies five goals or
values which characterize a responsible government.
First, there is the problem of accountability or con-trol-getting the bureaucracy to serve agreed-on
national goals. Second is the problem of equity-getting bureaucrats to treat like cases alike and on thebasis of clear rules, known in advance. Third is theproblem of efficiency—maximizing output for a given
expenditure, or minimizing expenditures for a given out-put. Fourth is the problem of responsiveness—inducingbureaucrats to meet, with alacrity and compassion, thosecases which can never be brought under a single national
rule and which, by common human standards of justice orbenevolence, seem to require that an exception be made
or a rule stretched. Fifth, is the problem of fiscalintegrity
—
properly spending and accounting for public
money
.
^
It is clear that the values Wilson mentions may contradict
each other. For example, the goal of responsiveness or
making compassionate exceptions may conflict with the desire
for equity or treating everyone the same. Likewise, the
problem of efficiency may contradict efforts to pursue
national goals. Because the various values which fall under
the rubric of responsibility may work against each other,
political debates about the meaning of responsible adminis-
tration are complicated and ambiguous.
•^-Democracy and the Public Service, p. 37.
James Q. Wilson, "The Bureaucracy Problem," The
Public Interest 6 (Winter 1967) :4.
If the values that embody
"administrative responsibil-
ity" are political, it is also the case that the administra-
tive reforms that institutionalize these values are
political. indeed, Dwight Waldo persuasively argues that
"administrative devices are relative to the economic and
social composition and ideological complexion of the
societies in which they exist. And the British student of
public administration, c. H. sisson, asserts that administra-
tive techniques and procedures "are essentially not solutions
to administrative problems-if indeed such things as purely
administrative problems may be said to exist at ail-but
responses, more or less slow, coming from sources more or
less deep in the histories of the countries concerned, to
particular political problems of a more or less enduring
sort. "2 Likewise, his British colleague, Brian Smith, argues
that "reform aims to make administrative structures and
practices compatible with broader political goals.
Institutional reform of public bureaucracy, therefore,
is a response to changing political values and goals. It
should be added, however, that to view reform as the well
coordinated pursuit of agreed-on goals would be too
^ ^Dwight Waldo, "Development of Theory of Democratic
Administration," American Political Science Review 46 (March
1952) :91.
2C. H. Sisson, The Spirit of British Administration
(London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1959), p. 147.
^Brian C. Smith, "Reform and Change in British Central
Administration," p. 217.
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simplistic. Civil service reform "is not necessarily a
developmental one towards a clearly defined goal known in
advance, but a complex matter of acceding to pressures, com-
municating and discussing ideas, stimulating comments from
groups with potential interests, and making judgments within
the administrative system about tactics and timing for the
introduction of particular changes. Reform, then, is a
complex web of reactions to changing political values and
responses to political pressures from groups outside and
inside bureaucracy as well as initiatives by interested
groups. It is only by identifying these deeper pressures
and values that one can explain the moral fervor and politi-
cal turbulence which often surrounds civil service reform
movements
.
Looking Ahead
The chapters which follow will examine several signif-
icant reforms of the British and American civil services
beginning with the Northcote-Trevelyan Report and Pendleton
Act. Particular emphasis will be placed on the post-World
War II reform periods associated with the Fulton Committee,
the Second Hoover Commission, and the Carter Presidency. An
attempt will be made to identify and describe the assortment
of factors contributing to a reform environment, the
'"Richard A. Chapman and J. R. Greenaway, The Dynamics
of Administrative Reform (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1980),
p. 183.
interests that participate in reform, the recoi^endations of
the reforming bodies and the problems of implementing those
recommendations, and the political, economic, and social
values that characterize the reform period. in essence,
then, an attempt will be made to identify and describe the
political dynamics of administrative reform and the problem
of securing and maintaining a responsible public administra-
tion in two contemporary democracies.
Chapter I will examine the creation of career civil
service systems in both Great Britain and the United States.
The focus will be on the political, economic, and social
dynamics of the reform process which resulted in the
Northcote-Trevelyan reforms and the Pendleton Act.
Chapters II and III will investigate the great post-
World War II American reforms. The creation and recommenda-
tions of the Second Hoover Commission and its implications
for a responsible civil service will be the focus of Chapter
II. Chapter III brings the presidential fascination with
higher civil service reform up to date. This chapter is a
case study of the Carter Administration civil service reform
and asks why this presidential fascination continues, what
forces or pressures have stimulated and shaped the reform
process and proposals, and how the Carter reforms have
affected the nature of the higher civil service.
Similarly, Chapters IV and V will examine the post-war
British civil service, with a primary focus on the work of
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the Fulton Committee. Specifically, Chapter IV will discuss
the political, social, and economic dynamics that played a
role in the creation of the Fulton Committee, chapter V
will discuss the work of the Fulton Committee, its recom-
mendations, the response of the government, the civil
service, and the press and the impact of the Fulton reforms
on the higher civil service.
Chapter VI pulls together the threads running through
the various reform efforts in the hope that such an assess-
ment may contribute to a better understanding of the nature
of reform in democratic polities. Finally, it asks whether
the reforms that are investigated here are on the right
track to a more responsible civil service in the belief that
thinking about such a question may provide insight into the
nature of a truly responsible public administration in
contemporary democracy.
CHAPTER I
CREATING THE CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAINAND THE UNITED STATES
The reform movements in Great Britain and the United
States which resulted in the creation of unified, career
civil service systems were marked more by their similarities
than by their differences. For although the pressures which
stimulated the reforms and the practices which characterized
the civil service in each country can be in some ways sharply
distinguished, nonetheless both reform efforts were fathered
by a concern for politically neutral competence and mothered
by a concern for responsible civil service subject to demo-
cratic control. It is also true that administrative prac-
tices in both the United States and Great Britain were
shaped by external social, economic, and political pressures
as well as by internal administrative pressures and initia-
tives. Immediate causes of reform may differ, but the
similarities lie in the fact that in both countries civil
service reform processes and the consequent administrative
structures are responses to these pressures. This chapter
will trace the pressures leading to the creation of civil
service systems in the mid-nineteenth century in Great
Britain and the United States and discuss the implications
for administrative responsibility.
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Pressures fqr_change in Britain
unlike the Genesis account of creation, a unified Ho.e
Civil service based on career employment was neither created
ex nihilo nor was it the work of one creator. For while the
Northcote-Trevelyan Report of November 23, 1853, stands as a
Significant landmark, its historical antecedents along with
the social, political, and administrative post-Northcote-
Trevelyan developments form a continuous web of creative
activity
.
As England entered the 19th century its civil service
was neither unified, permanent, nor much of a service. At
best there existed a departmental service, not a unified
public service. 1 "Each public office carried on its business
in its own way, using whatever methods of organization its
traditions or its necessities dictated and the public
2tolerated." Thus, each office determined its own criteria
for selection and tenure. There was not a clear distinction
between the civil service and the political service to the
Crown; even low-level officials had political tasks to per-
form. Nor was the civil service permanent in the sense
^Henry Parris, "The Origins of the Permanent Civil
Service, 1780-1830," Public Administration 46 (Summer 1968):
143. Also see J. Donald Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy
(Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1944), chapter 1,
for description of the British civil service in the early
19th century.
•^Emmelme W. Cohen, The Growth of the British Civil
Service, 1780-1939 (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1965),
p. 33.
that officials enjoyed tenure for good behavior.
The result of this state of administrative affairs was
that attempts to provide services were not coordinated, and
there was no "supervision of public offices, and therefore
no means of ensuring that the public business was performed
at as low a cost as possible. "1 There were no examinations
or other "objective" selection standards; positions were
secured through patronage, either political or personal, and
positions often degenerated into sinecures. Patronage was
largely in the hands of Parliament, although the Treasury
was exercising more and more control over the appointment
and promotion of patrons.
One late 19th century American student of British gov-
ernment, Dorman Eaton, was led to conclude that it was
inevitable that "grave abuses" existed. Patronage "caused a
vicious activity and rewarded demoralizing intrigues in
Parliamentary and even municipal elections.
. . . The prac-
tice was also fatal to economy and disastrous to the charac-
ter and efficiency of the public service."^ Misappropriation
of public funds for private use was prevalent and bribery
was common. Yet, by the 1830s an administration had devel-
oped that was to a great extent distinct from Parliament and
'Cohen, The Growth of the British Civil Service
, p. 33.
2 ...Dorman B. Eaton, Civil Service in Great Britain, A
History of Abuses and Reforms and their Bearing Upon
American Politics (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers,
1880)
, p. 145.
)rce
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the crown.
..And, at the sa.e ti™e, it had, by the force of
public opinion, without any law on the subject, co.e to be
the rule, almost universally acted upon, that those in the
civil service below cabinet ministers and a few political
assistants should not be removed except for causes other
than political opinions...! Whether due solely to the foi
of public opinion or to some help from top administrator,
who found a spoils system a hindrance to their attempts to
provide services, it is the case that a spoils system, on
the American model, had vanished from British administration
early on.
Permanent tenure of officials during good behavior
became the normal practice, although this did not preclude
the use of political and party considerations to fill vacan-
cies. In addition, reformers, motivated largely by a desire
to introduce probity and economy into government finances,
and department heads, looking to make their own job easier,
had secured an end to the practice of sinecures. For the
same reasons, opportunities for embezzlement and conflicts-
of-interest had been closed through establishing new auditing
and accounting procedures in the Treasury and subordinate
offices.
Following these developments which were aimed at pre-
venting corruption and waste, pressures continued to grow
-^Ibid., p. 146.
2Cohen, The Growth of the British Civil Service, p. 69.
during the 1830s and 1840s, slowly, but steadily, against
the use of political patronage as the sole vehicle for
access to the civil service. The new focus on political
patronage signaled a change in the reformers' perspective of
a responsible civil service. By mid-century, many reformers
were confident of the civil servant's character or at least
convinced that checks had been instituted to protect the
public purse against officials of weak morals. And although
economy continued to be the focus of many members of Parlia-
ment, the emphasis of some reformers was shifting to a con-
cern for administrative efficiency through improving the
quality of the personnel selected. Requiring a candidate to
demonstrate fitness for public service through competitive
examinations was emphasized as the best approach to securing
competent officials. Eaton points out that the demand for
examinations as a condition for admission to the service was
so great during the Melbourne administration (1834-1841),
from both higher officials and thoughtful public opinion,
that Lord Melbourne "yielded so far as to allow pass exami-
nations to be instituted in some of the larger offices.""^
The number of departments requiring some type of examination
"'"Eaton, Civil Service in Great Britain
, p. 157. In the
pass examination system each candidate is examined against
some prescribed standard and does not actually compete with
anyone. The candidate merely has to meet a standard which,
incidentally, can be manipulated to select the desired
appointee or lowered to a point that no barrier really
exists. The pass examinations instituted by the Treasury in
1836 tested the candidate's ability to read, write and do
simple arithmetic.
to be taken or standard to be ™et increased steadily up to
1853.
Thus by 1853 the character of British administration
was such that:
e^'^'^l^^^t^?-^^ for. Of
piac°s"L^ro%f:er:;":L-:r!o^nra%^^lf?cSriu?^-^^"'
K:-:iL?ca1°co:d^Itio°n?"^ was^roscribedVre^L^^of
^eveLV^Jnr^fa^L^-e^":S: H T^^t^^^^^^departments also)
,
the higher places were fili;d bvpromotions from the lower. ^xxxea
h^.^^^.^^Y °f Q^^^^ Anne, which prohibits post office
Geora^^T?T ^^i^^"""
influence elections, and the laws ofge III, which prevented them and nearly all others
^nd ^Lf'-'^iJ
service from voting, were still in force,a they effectively protected the freedom of electionsfrom invasion by executive officers.
5. There were pass examinations ... and very gener-
ally, a six-months probation. In addition, competitive
examinations were being enforced (in mere self-protection) by the heads of some of the offices..
6. Personal corruption in office had, for a consider-
able period, been of very rare occurrence.-^
It should be pointed out that Eaton's generous assessment
was from the perspective of an American reformer seeking a
model for reform of the United States public service.
Yet, even by Eaton's admission, all was not well. The
growing use of pass examinations did not prevent positions
being awarded on the basis of the needs of the incumbent
Ibid., pp. 182-83.
political party or an individual member of Parliament or the
political opinions or family name of the candidate for gov-
ernment service. Since the Reform Act of 1867, which
extended the electoral franchise, had not yet appeared, it
is clear that for the Prime Minister and Parliamentary
leaders patronage still played a part in controlling the
House of Commons and holding electorates . ^ Patronage was
the single, most important "defect" that reformers of the
mid-nineteenth century were out to remedy. For in the
estimation of reformers, patronage allowed position in the
civil service to be filled by the unambitious, the indolent,
and the incapable, rather than those with superior qualifi-
cations. As a consequence, the efficiency of the public
service suffered; there were "complaints of official delays,
official evasions of difficulty, and official indisposition
to improvement. "2 That such complaints were not unanimous
throughout the civil service was an indication that some
departments were reasonably competent. Thus, the task of
unifying the civil service departments under a single system
also lay before the reformers. For not only were some
departments setting quite high examination standards while
^K. C. Wheare, The Civil Service in the Constitution
(London: The Athlone Press, 1954), p. 15.
'^Great Britain, Report on the Organization of the Per -
manent Civil Service , C. 1713 (1854) . Reprinted in Great
Britain, Committee on the Civil Service, The Civil Service y
Cmnd. 3638 (June 1968), Vol. 1, "Report of the Committee
1966-1968," Appendix B. Hereinafter cited as N-T Report.
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others were adminic;tp>r-T nrr ,,^-,1uministeri g weak pass exams or none at all,
there was also a diversity of pay scales in the different
departments and differing age limits for entering and
retiring from the service.
^ For example, examination prac-
tices ranged from none in the Home, Colonial, and Foreign
offices to simple arithmetic examinations to a real quali-
fying examination in the Admiralty. 2 m most departments,
promotion was based on seniority or political criteria.
Whether or not it was entirely justified, the charge of
administrative inefficiency, in the form of patronage,
departmental fragmentation, and incompetent officials, was
the rallying cry of the reformers.
The Northcote-Trevelyan Report
It should be noted again that the reforms of the mid-
nineteenth century, and indeed reforms at the beginning of
that century and those to come later, were initiated by exec-
utive officials, primarily from the Treasury, rather than
members of Parliament. For while the department leaders had
much to gain in terms of facilitating their day-to-day jobs,
if the patronage system were dismantled, the elected politi-
cians, until after later electoral reforms, had much to lose
'Cohen, The Growth of the British Civil Service
, pp.
93-95. Also see Robert Moses, The Civil Service of Great
Britain
, Vol. LVII, No. 1, Studies in History, Economics
and Public Law, Columbia University (New York: Longmans,
Green and Co., Agents, 1914), pp. 24-33 for a discussion of
the condition of the British Civil Service in 1853.
^Moses, The Civil Service in Great Britain, p. 72.
in terms of political power to reward supporters. However,
if Members of Parliament were not interested in securing
efficiencies through abolishing patronage, they were inter-
ested in securing economies in public expenditure. Thus it
was that "frequent Parliamentary expressions of dissatis-
faction with the rising cost of administration led in 1848
to the appointment of a Select Committee on Miscellaneous
Expenditure to seek economies."^ In April 1853, W. E. Glad-
stone, Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Aberdeen Adminis-
tration, appointed Sir Charles Trevelyan, assistant secretary
to the Treasury, and Sir Stafford Northcote, Secretary at
the Board of Trade, to prepare a report on the organization
of the permanent civil service to present to the Select
Committee. The report appeared on November 23, 1853.
Where the Select Committee sought to reduce the cost
of the civil service through lowering salaries and reducing
the number of positions, the Northcote-Trevelyan report,
citing a, by now, familiar litany of defects and abuses,
argued that patronage was the root cause of inefficiency and
waste. To remedy the defects of the service, Northcote and
Trevelyan advocated the general principle,
that the public service should be carried on by the
admission into its lower ranks of a carefully selected
body of young men, who should be employed from the first
upon work suited to their capacities and their education,
and should be made constantly to feel that their pro-
motion and future prospects depend entirely on the
^Brian C. Smith, "Reform and Change in British Central
Administration," Political Studies 19 (June 1971): 217.
dutie^''^h^f "hich they discharge theira s, t at with averaqe abilihip<3 an^ J?
applicpation they ™ay IoIk ^o^^rd 'onmently"?o Icertain provision for their lives that w?;; •powers they may rationally hope to a^tlinprizes in the Service ,.,>,( i„ -« t a to the highest
This guiding principle of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report is
often termed a radical departure from the past; more accu-
rately it appears to be a rather long step in a direction
the civil service was already moving.
To implement its general principle the report called
for six innovations: 1) a system of open competitive exami-
nations before appointment. The key to eliminating patron-
age was to make the examinations competitive. Those finally
selected must score higher than their competitors, not simply
pass a minimal educational standard. At the same time the
examinations were "to be open to all persons, of a given age,
subject only ... to the necessity of their giving satis-
factory references to persons able to speak of their moral
conduct and character, and of producing medical certifi-
2cates." There was to be no test of political loyalty.
2) Academic examinations. The examinations themselves were
designed to "test the intelligence, as well as the mere
attainments, of the candidates."^ Although the subject
••-N-T Report, p. 111.
^Ibid., p. 113.
matter of the examinations was to be as numerous as possible
to secure a varied amount of talent for the service, it was
also recommended that the examination ought to include some
problems directly related to the official's work. Yet the
emphasis was on recruiting officials of university age with
general ability who could be trained. For the "superior
situations" or higher positions in the service, the examina-
tions were to be on a level equivalent to the highest levels
of education in the country. 3) Division of the service into
higher and lower divisions. To insure that only men of the
highest quality reached the top positions, the Report recom-
mended "establishing a proper distinction between intellec-
tual and mechanical labour. Not only would this type of
distinction prevent the unqualified from reaching the top
but it would encourage those below to do their best to reach
the top levels. 4) Promotion by merit. In order to
encourage initiative and ambition, Northcote-Trevelyan advo-
cated the use of merit as a criterion for promotion from
class to class rather than seniority or favoritism.
5) Probation. Although the use of a probationary period was
already common, the Report reiterated the need to take pro-
bation seriously if a competent service was to be achieved.
6) Creation of a central examination board. To provide
unity to the fragmented nature of departmental examinations,
Northcote-Trevelyan recommended an independent, central
^Ibid., p. 115.
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board to develop and conduct examinations and to certify
those candidates having passed.
Though it has been emphasized that these remedies were
recommended in the pursuit of efficiency, it would be wrong
to suggest that the reformers' concern was merely technical.
Eaton makes it clear that the question of civil service
reform in 1853 "was not regarded as a mere question of admin
istrative details or as having its greater interest in its
probable effects upon a general election, but as a vital
issue of principle and national policy, of which the influ-
ence would be felt to the very foundation of government and
of social order. "1 Northcote and Trevelyan were products of
a nineteenth century liberal philosophy that prescribed not
only limited government activity but government that is
capable of attaining a high degree of internal efficiency
through reason and one that thrives on competition. Cer-
tainly there is much of this flavor in the Report. Beyond
this there is also in the Report a notion of responsible
administration that reflects the liberal political ideals of
the late 1800s, "namely the political supremacy of the House
of Commons, ministerial responsibility to Parliament, and
electoral politics determined by issues rather than vested
2interest."
•'-Eaton, Civil Service in Great Britain
, p. 175.
2Richard A. Chapman and J. R. Greenaway, The Dynamics
of Administrative Reform (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1980),
p . 16 .
A factor of equal magnitude in shaping the reform
environment of the 19th century was the displacement of the
old landed aristocracy by the middle and commercial classes
as the predominant political force. in Kingsley's interpre-
tation, the Northcote-Trevelyan Report was but one in a
series of measures which "destroyed the aristocratic
monopoly and cut away the roots of aristocratic power. "1
in particular, the Report's emphasis on open competition
reflected the desire of the growing middle class for entry
into the civil service. Given the influence of these forces,
one aim of Northcote and Trevelyan "was the purification of
political life, in particular the heightening of the tone of
Parliament and the conduct of elections, and the furthering
of meritocratic as opposed to hereditary values. "^
In its opening paragraphs, the Report asserts that
"the Government of the country could not be carried on with-
out the aid of an efficient body of permanent officers,
occupying a position duly subordinate to that of the
Ministers who are directly responsible to the Crown and to
Parliament, yet possessing sufficient independence, char-
acter, ability, and experience to be able to advise, assist,
and to some extent, influence, those who are from time to
time set over them."^ Thus for Northcote and Trevelyan, a
-'-Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy
, p. 48.
2Chapman and Greenaway, The Dynamics of Administrative
Reform
, p . 16 .
^N-T Report, p. 108.
responsible civil service was one that is efficient or in
some sense technically competent, politically neutral though
representative of emerging middle-class values, and account-
able to Parliament through the Ministers. Yet at the same
time, the authors saw a policy role for administrators
through influencing Ministers. Responsible administration,
then, to some extent, must be able to take initiative and
provide leadership. it was in this notion, if in no other,
that the Report was far ahead of its time.^ The Report
embodies a notion of responsible government that both
reflects its authors' particular historical circumstance and,
at the same time, envisions enough of the future to make the
Report a significant document.
Reaction and Change
Reaction to the Northcote-Trevelyan Report was predict-
able; early support from Parliament and London society was
almost nonexistent. Naturally members of Parliament were
reluctant to give up their prerogatives of filling vacancies
in the civil service. Furthermore, "the House of Commons
could find little enthusiasm for measures which promised no
savings at once, were of doubtful value in producing large
economies later, and might give rise to chaos in Government
-^See Wheare, The Civil Service in the Constitution
,
pp. 16-19 for a discussion of the significance of the
Northcote-Trevelyan Report along these lines.
offices during the interim period of reorganisation. "1 Thus
in Parliament, those who benefited by patronage or who saw
change as an attack on privilege were united against the
Report.
In the Cabinet, support was scarcely higher, chancel-
lor of the Exchequer Gladstone, although sponsor of the
Report, believed that the importance of patronage had been
exaggerated. 2 gome Cabinet members were concerned about a
radical republicanism that a board of examiners would
exchange for the Crown, believing that a board would substi-
tute talented, but discontented, middle-class bureaucrats
for officials with character and loyalty to the aristocracy.
Others feared that the examination system would result in
more and more recruitment from the middle classes and make
the civil service unattractive to the higher classes. Simi-
larly, the Queen was concerned about the "Victorian respect-
ability of appointees."^ However, due to Gladstone's persis-
tence the Cabinet acquiesced to the Report, without any
immediate result.
Copies of the Report were widely disseminated. Much
of the public comment that was generated was opposed or only
grudgingly supportive of the Northcote-Trevelyan version of
^G. A. Campbell, The Civil Service in Britain
, 2nd ed.
(London: Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd., 1965), p. 42.
2Moses, The Civil Service in Great Britain
, p. 84.
^Ibid., p. 85.
reform. The_^Spectator labeled the Report Utopian, ^ while
The_Westnar^^
,3,,,,^
^^^^^^^
lished an unenthusiastic artiole. in which it was pointed
out that, although competitive examinations were preferable
to patronage, they might be expected to fill the civil Ser-
vice with conservatively minded men, clever rather than
able. "2 Many observers believed that securing first-class
officials for the higher levels through open competition
would bestow upon the service too much power and threaten
constitutional democracy, other critics held the Cabinet's
view that open examinations would result in men from the
lower social classes holding civil service jobs, while others
criticized the Report on the grounds that academic examina-
tions would give preference to aristocratic education.
Others merely doubted that competition would attract first-
class minds.
Many civil service officials, too, withheld their sup-
port for one reason or another. Many officials refuted the
charges of inefficiency made against the service, others
merely claimed the charges were exaggerated. Civil servants
also questioned the efficacy of examinations for securing
the best officials or emphasized the uselessness of highly
educated men for routine work. Finally, the notion of pro-
tion by merit was attacked on the basis of its conflictmo
^Ibid., p. 74.
2Cohen, The Growth of the British Civil Service, p. 109.
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with the principle of seniority.
Even Trevelyan recognized the unpopularity of his
recommendations. For as he wrote in a letter to Eaton, the
"early supporters of it might_be^ounte^^^
and if the matter had been put to the vote in London society
or the clubs, or even in Parliament itself by_secret_vo^
the new system would have been rejected by
majority."! Given such firm opposition, the Aberdeen Govern-
ment was reluctant to push a bill embodying the reforms in
the House of Commons; for the moment the Northcote-Trevelyan
Report lay severely wounded. Implementation of the proposed
organizational changes did not follow automatically from the
logic or persuasiveness of the Report itself.
But the political, social and economic environment out-
side the immediate debate over the Northcote-Trevelyan Report
was changing rapidly, with important consequences for civil
service reform. Giving unexpected aid to the supporters of
reform was the outbreak of the Crimean War toward the end of
1853. Uncensored reports from The Times correspondent,
W. H. Russell, told of mismanagement, confusion, and gross
inefficiencies in the administration of the war effort.
'Eaton, Civil Service in Great Britain
, appendix p. 4 30.
Indeed, unqualified supporters were few. As Moses points
out. The Times alone was a supporter of reform from the
beginning. On the other hand, support for the Report was
qualitative with J. G. Shaw Lefevre, Rowland Hill, J. S.
Mill, and Edwin Chadwick "unstinted in their praise."
E. N. Gladden, "An administrative century; 1853-1953,"
Parliamentary Affairs 6, No. 4 (1953) :320.
Readers were also shocked by accounts fro. Plorence Nightin-
gale of the inadequacies of the Government
• s provision for
the troops. 1 The ir^ediate effect of the war was the fall
Of the Aberdeen Ministry in February of 1855 to a new Govern
ment under Lord Palmerston and the creation on May 5, 1855
of the Administrative Reform Association. The avowed
purpose of the Administrative Reform Association was to
expose the incompetence brought on by patronage and demand
civil service reform on the Northcote-Trevelyan model.
Other societal changes during the middle years of the
century also helped create a climate for civil service
reform. Among other activities was "the establishment of
factory inspection by the government, the establishment of
an education office and grants and inspectors, the estab-
lishment of the metropolitan police force in 1829, of the
municipal police forces in 1835, and the county police
forces in 1856, the establishment of the poor law commis-
sions, local boards of health, and other reforms of local
government, partly depending upon grants in aid."^ These
reforms were placing indirect pressure on leaders to make
changes in the civil service. But two reforms which had a
"'See Cohen, The Growth of the British Civil Service
,
p. 110; and Enid Russell-Smith, Modern Bureaucracy: The"~Home
Civil Service (London: Longman Group Limited, 1974), pp. 14-
15 for interesting accounts of the effects of the war on
civil service reform.
^Herman Finer, "Better Government Personnel,"
Political Science Quarterly 51 (December 1936) :574-75.
direct impact on the Northcote-Trevelyan Report were those
concerned with the administration of India and university
education.
Thomas Macaulay, later Lord Macaulay, had taken a long
time interest in creating a unified civil service in India
based on the principle of competitive examinations over the
subjects that composed the liberal education at Oxford and
Cambridge; his report to Parliament recommending such a
scheme appeared in November, 1854. Macaulay's plan had had
a major impact on the thinking of Trevelyan, who had spent
fourteen years in India and was married to Macaulay's sister
At the same time changes were taking place at Oxford and
Cambridge in the dispensing of university fellowships and
awards. Under the influence of Benjamin Jowett, a famous
Balliol Master, competitive examinations were introduced to
make awards on the basis of merit rather than patronage.
This scheme was not without its influence on Northcote, him-
self a product of Balliol.
Given the momentum of these reforms, the growing
criticism from the Administrative Reform Association and
general public opinion concerning the mal-administration of
the Crimean War, and the continued interest and discussion
of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report among civil servants, Lord
Palmerston, knowing the strength of the opposition to civil
service reform in Parliament, issued an executive Order in
Council on May 21, 1855. Palmerston 's action began the
implementation of the Northcote-Trevelyan proposals.
Through the Order in Council a Civil Service Commission was
established to administer a system of limited competition.
That is, the Commissioners' responsibility was to certify
that candidates satisfied the minimal requirements of being
within the age limits set by the department, of adequate
health, and of possessing basic knowledge to do the job.
The authority of nominating and appointing remained with the
department heads. In effect, then, appointment remained a
political gift. Yet, at the same time, the Commissioners
"were able to introduce a more uniform standard and a cer-
tain degree of co-ordination into the tests ... to survey
all those nominated to the Service" and to issue "an annual
report which contained detailed analysis of the results of
their work."-"" it was through this report that the Commis-
sion and civil service itself could keep pressure on the
Government to continue the movement toward a real competi-
tive system.
Indeed, within a year. Parliament had perceived so
much favorable support for the new method that it resolved
by a vote of 108-87 that limited competition did eliminate
the serious defects and recommended to the Queen that open
2competition be made a condition of entrance to the service.
^Cohen, The Growth of the British Civil Service
,
pp. 111-12.
^Eaton, Civil Service in Breat Britain, p. 211.
The vote was symptomatic of a changing attitude in Parlia-
ment, the public, and the press. It is to some extent
possible to hold the power of ideas responsible for these
changes in attitudes. Jeremy Bentham, Thomas Carlyle, and
J. S. Mill were leading advocates of reform ideas and their
advocacy was undoubtedly influential among the political
cognoscenti, if not the middle class. The popular fiction
of Charles Dickens, Anthony Trollope, and others telling
stories of bureaucratic red tape and incompetence found wide
audience among the middle class. In addition, Trevelyan,
Jowett, Gladstone, and Robert Lowe, Chancellor of the
Exchequer under Gladstone, campaigned tirelessly for reform
seeking support from every important segment of the commu-
nity.
By 1860 support for reform had grown to such an extent
in Parliament that a select Committee on Civil Service
appointments was established to enquire into the possibility
of expanding selection of lower positions by competition.
After the Select Committee's recommendation for a qualified,
but significant, extension of the competitive system. Lord
Palmerston approved the Select Committee's report. Thus,
between 1855 and 1870 opinions regarding open, competitive
exams were almost reversed from widespread opposition to
widespread support.
See Richard E. Titlow, Americans Import Meri t
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, Inc., 1979),
pp. 68-88.
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Th^re are a number of factors contributing to this
perceptible change in opinion in addition to those already
mentioned. Pirst, the decade of the 1860s saw the electoral
changes of 1832 extended in the Reform Act of 1867 with
working and middle class enfranchisement. Not only did the
1867 Act make patronage less important as a tool for control-
ling Parliament and the electorate, but the Act also made it
possible for upper-middle class families without political
influence to support electorally members of Parliament who
advocated competitive examinations as the route to the civil
service for their well-educated sons.^ Yet this point must
not be overdrawn, for it is true that the competitive exami-
nations for higher civil service positions were designed for
the products of Oxbridge. At the same time, the newly
enfranchised middle class was unified with their more fortu-
nate neighbors in believing in the virtues of free competi-
tion and progress—commercial, scientific, and administra-
2tive. Undoubtedly, the Reform Act of 1867 had an impact of
such force that patronage was a victim of its wake.
Second, it is Herman Finer 's contention that the civil
service reforms of this period came into existence due to
-'R. K. Kelsall, Higher Civil Servants in Britain, From
1870 to the Present Day (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Ltd., 1955), p. 3. Also see Kingsley, Representative
Bureaucracy
, pp. 60-61.
2Herman Finer makes this point in both his "Better Gov-
ernment Personnel," p. 575, and The British Civil Service
(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1937), p. 37.
^In "Better Government Personnel," pp. 573-74.
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the need to be economical. There was economic pressure
because the aristocratic statesmen of the period believed
that a Government's expenditures should be measured like the
expenditures in their banks and factories. m addition,
"there was economic pressure, because England was not a rich
country compared with the exacting and passionate demands of
social reformers." Hence, not only a laissez-faire philos-
ophy but the objective economic condition of society as well
provided pressure for civil service reform.
Third, Leonard White suggests that it was the struc-
ture of the political system which facilitated the change in
public opinion. For example, during this period in British
history there was "no strongly organized political party
with local branches scattered over the country and maintained
in order and discipline by the expectation of mass distribu-
tion of patronage." Thus not only were the number of people
affected by the change from patronage not large, but, at the
same time, the changes primarily affected leaders of two
centralized parties who could tacitly agree that the reforms
were desirable.^ This centralization of leadership favored
acceptance of reform.
Finally, it is necessary to point to the interaction
of educational and societal changes as a contributor to the
^Leonard D. White, "The British Civil Service," Civil
Service Abroad, Great Britain, Canada, France, Germany
, Com-
mission of Inquiry on Public Service Personnel (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1935), p. 6.
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acceptance of reform. Many proponents of the Report,
including Gladstone, advocated open competition and the
separation of routine work from higher levels as a way to
secure top administrative positions for the upper classes.
In a letter to Lord Russell, Gladstone wrote that these
reforms would "open to the highly educated classes a career,
and give them command over all the higher parts of the civil
service, which up to this time they have never enjoyed."^
Thus, it is interesting to note that although the Report
itself spoke in tones of a meritocracy and presented the
hope of upward social mobility to the middle-class, some of
those responsible for implementing the Report held a differ-
ent concept of responsibility on this issue. In the late
1800s when university education was to a large degree a
guarantee of social status, it was possible for aristocrats
to support reforms of the civil service which made university
education a prerequisite for higher positions. Proponents
of Northcote-Trevelyan had a ready response for those who
feared that competition would be a leveling force in society;
competitive examinations were heavily based on the classical
subjects taught at the elite universities, particularly
Oxford and Cambridge. At the same time, one must not over-
look the strong argument set forth by Kingsley that reform
'Quoted from E. Strauss, The Ruling Servants, Bureauc -
racy in Russia, France—and Britain? (London: George Allen
and Unwin Ltd., 1961), pp. 241-42. H. Finer in The British
Civil Service
, p. 45, also makes this point.
of the civil service was part of a middle-class bid for
power that "aimed essentially to bring about a harmony of
outlook between the permanent officials and the new governing
class.
. .
...l From such disparate factors, it is necessary
to conclude that reform was the result of the interaction of
complex forces and motives.
The culmination of this period of reform occurred in
1870, during Gladstone's first administration, with an Order
in Council issued on the fourth of June. It will be remem-
bered that Gladstone had, as Chancellor of the Exchequer,
commissioned the Northcote-Trevelyan Report. As Prime
Minister he was able to secure the support of his Cabinet
for an Order "which directed that for the future all vacan-
cies in a given list of offices should be filled by open
competitive examination. " ^ rphe Order was followed by
Treasury regulations which provided for a higher and lower
division in the civil service, with candidates for the
higher division to be tested by examinations of a university
standard. Thus it was some seventeen years after the issu-
ance of the Northcote-Trevelyan Report, that its recommen-
dations were accepted substantially intact, a result of
growing political pressure, changing social conditions, and
strategically located reformers.
^Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy
,
p. 188.
2Cohen, The Growth of the British Civil Service,
pp. 121-22.
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Lessons From the Creation
That the order in Council of 1870 was not implemented
fully and immediately is not of crucial importance. Its
importance lies in the fact that, in principle, the notion
of open competitive examination and of a distinctive higher
division for the civil service had been accepted and made
authoritative by the Government of the day. Full implemen-
tation and consolidation of the reforms awaited a series of
committees and commissions—the Playfair Committee of 1874,
the Ridley Commission of 1886-1890, the MacDonnell Royal
Commission of 1912-1914, the 1918 Gladstone Committee, the
Tomlin Commission of 1929-1931, the Assheton Committee of
1944, and the Priestly Royal Commission of 1953-1955—each a
response to its own set of political and social pressures
and administrative needs.
Herein, of course, lies the significance of the period
of reform from 1853 to 1870--that the British Civil Service
was not pulled from the proverbial magician's hat, but was
the product of a complex assortment of factors that merged
into a consensus for reform. It is clear that the reformers
were not unified in their purposes or approaches, but that
the reform process incorporated a number of different
-^For a history of these reform bodies as well as
earlier reforms, see Moses, The Civil Service of Great Brit-
ain ; Cohen, The Growth of the Civil Service , 178 0-1939;
G. A. Campbell, The Civil Service in Britain ; Kingsley, Rep -
resentative Bureaucracy ; and Great Britain, Committee on the
Civil Service, The Civil Service , Cmnd. 3638 (June 1968),
Vol. 3, "Survey and Investigations," chapter 10.
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perspectives of what the purposes of reform should be and
what a reformed civil service should look like. The
Northcote-Trevelyan Report itself grew out of a concern for
economy but its authors craftily adapted it to their concern
for more efficient administration through neutral, competent
officials. Theirs was a political intent to purify a "cor-
rupt" society and further "meritocracy at the expense of
vested interests" in politics and education. ^ Some of those
who had a hand in implementing the Report, notably Gladstone,
were less concerned about economy and efficiency than in
using administrative reform to achieve political advantage
by bringing together the interests of the aristocracy and
the middle class. ^ The emerging middle class saw in the
reforms an opportunity for increased access to government
and more jobs. Others, like department heads, were more
narrowly concerned with the administrative convenience that
reform would offer. Each of these perspectives of reform
was woven into a fabric richly embroidered by nineteenth
century liberal, laissez-faire ideology and ongoing social
and economic changes.
The Northcote-Trevelyan period left a deep impression
on the character of public administration in Britain. The
Report's emphasis on politically neutral civil servants of
•^Chapman and Greenaway, The Dynamics of Administrative
Reform
, p . 51
.
^Ibid.
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high intellectual and social calibre, who had studied clas-
sics at the traditional universities of Oxford and Cambridge,
and its role in creating higher and lower classes of the
civil service are felt over one-hundred years later. But
because the reform process is a continuous bolt of cloth,
these same emphases were the objects of attack when new
political and social pressures arrived on the scene. in
large measure, then, the creative act in Great Britain was a
political attempt to make responsible a public service that
was perceived by political and opinion leaders to be irre-
sponsible. To what extent this was the case in the creation
of the American civil service is the subject to which we now
turn
.
The Seedbed for U. S. Reform
By the early 1870 's the United States had already
passed through, what Frederick Mosher terms, "government by
gentlemen" and was experiencing reaction to "government by
the common man" in anticipation of "government by the good."-^
The public service during the Federalist period had been
characterized by its honesty,^ competence, and permanent
^Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1968)
, p. 54ff
.
2Carl Russell Fish in The Civil Service and the Patron-
age (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1905), p. 26 notes
that "the best proof of the general integrity of the service
is that [Secretary of State] Gallatin, when directed by
Jefferson to conduct a searching investigation of the
Federalist financial administration, was able to find no
evidence to its discredit."
SI
tenure. Washington, Adams, and Jefferson adhered to a rule
of "fitness" for office that was defined as possessing com-
petence to perform one's duties and the "correct" political
philosophy. Yet during this early period civil servants
were spared the obligations to political parties that were
soon to follow. The Federalist service was staffed by a
decidedly upper class aristocratic caste many of whom held
high political and moral ideals regarding public service.
Such was the character and reputation of American adminis-
tration during this period that it was the envy of many
British observers."^
But by 1829, with the benefit of an enlarged elector-
ate, the balance of political power had shifted from the
Federalists to the Jeffersonian Republicans and again to the
Jacksonians. Accompanying this shift were changed notions
regarding the preferred nature of the civil service. Suscep-
tible to charges of being aristocratic, exclusive, and unre-
sponsive to the new political leaders, the Federalist service
•'-For detailed histories of American civil service from
which this chapter draws, see Fish, The Civil Service and the
Patronage ; Paul P. Van Riper, History of the United States
Civil Service (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Com-
pany, 1958) ; Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1961) ; Leonard D. White, The
Jacksonians (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1956); Leonard
D. White, The Republican Era: 1869-1901 (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1958) ; Frank Mann Stewart, The National
Civil Service Reform League (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1929) . For a more concise treatment of civil service
history, see Herbert Kaufman, "The Growth of the Federal
Personnel System" in The Federal Government Service , 2d ed.,
ed. Wallace S. Sayre (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
Inc.
, 1965) , pp. 7-69.
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was attacked and reshaped to reflect the Jacksonian values
of equality of opportunity, social mobility, individual
freedom, and popular government. ^ Nowhere were these values
more clearly seen than in the practice of spoils.
Rooted in democratic theory as expounded by the
Jacksonians,2 ^poUs politics was based on the proposition
that long tenure in office resulted in indifference to the
public and the promotion of individual interests; that any
person of average intelligence could perform the duties of
public office; and that government office was not a right of
^Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service
, p. 55.
2Jackson's famous defense of rotation in his first
annual message to Congress in part read:
"The duties of all public offices are, or at least admit
of being made, so plain and simple that men of intelli-gence may readily qualify themselves for their perfor-
mance; and I can not but believe that more is lost by
the long continuance of men in office than is generally
to be gained by their experience. I submit, therefore,
to your consideration whether the efficiency of the
Government would not be promoted and official industry
and integrity better secured by a general extension of
the law which limits appointments to four years.
"In a country where offices are created solely for the
benefit of the people no one man has any more intrinsic
right to official station than another. ... No
individual wrong is, therefore done by removal, since
neither appointment to nor continuance in office is
matter of right.
. . . The proposed limitation would
destroy the idea of property now so generally connected
with official station, and although individual distress
may be sometimes produced, it would, by promoting that
rotation which constitutes a leading principle in the
republican creed, give healthful action to the system."
Quoted from White, The Jacksonians, p. 318.
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any single person or group. i„ practice, these spoils con-
cepts were institutionalized by the systematic application
Of limited tenure, rotation in office, and personnel appoint-
ments and promotion based on party or factional affiliation
and loyalty.
The period between 1845 and 1865 was the high-water
mark for the spoils system. Officials often were placed on
the government "payroll because they had influential politi-
cal connections, or worked for a partisan newspaper, or dis-
tinguished themselves in local politics. "1 Appointment of
illiterate clerks as a reward for party service was common.
Rotation of offices became "ruthless partisan removals"2
every few years when clerks, messengers, customhouse weighers
and measurers were removed along with department heads and
second level officials identified as policy makers. Rota-
tion reached into the fringes of the absurd when Democratic
President Buchanan replaced Democrats appointed under Demo-
crat Pierce whom he succeeded in 1857. Rotation and parti-
san appointment "imposed political obligations and duties
upon government employees, particularly obligations to pay
party assessments, to do party work at election time, and to
•vote righf."^ From 18 29, federal employees increasingly
became dependent upon local political machines and
-'-White, The Jacksonians
, p. 327.
^ibid., p. 329.
^Ibid., p. 332.
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congressional patrons for their survival.
The harmful consequences of the spoils system for
administrative efficiency and the prestige and morale of the
public service were manifest, with removals ranging from
10% of the civil service during Jackson's tenure to even
higher during Lincoln's, advantages of administrative conti-
nuity and expertise were lost.^ At the same time, incumbent
officials were filled with apprehension over the next elec-
tion and harassed and burdened financially by demands to pay
political assessments. Undoubtedly, the service lost its
attractiveness for the individual who possessed a degree of
professional competence. In addition, "the chief executive's
appointment and removal burden often reached intolerable
proportions, "2 creating personal and political anguish.
Finally, associated with the spoils system was a decline in
moral standards, as fraud, kickbacks, bribery and other forms
of corruption were widespread.
The deficiencies of spoils politics resulted in some
few attempts at reform before 1865. The most significant
was the Classification Act of 1853 which established a sys-
tem of pass examinations for departmental clerks, a scheme
-'-It was only after Lincoln's Presidency and certainly
during and after World War I when government functions
became more and more complex that continuity became a crucial
factor in administration. Thus, one must not overdo the
negative impact of high turnover during the late 1800s and
early 1900s.
^Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service, p. 50.
ere
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to classify clerks according to type of service rendered,
and the equalization of salaries in each of four classes.
^
The rigor of the examinations was dependent upon the dis-
cretion of the department head; while a few departmental
examinations did establish minimum competency criteria, most
were merely window-dressing. m one sense it is remarkabl
that reform was attempted at all, since before 1865 the
existed little or no public pressure for reform, the parties
were silent on the issue, and there had been no particular
scandal to trigger legislative action. 2 What passage of the
1853 Act does show is that reform was demanded by the
bureaucracy itself; administrative action required a minimal
level of competence and systematization.
Indeed, a balanced assessment of the pre-reformed
civil service must show that the service was never as incom-
petent as the critics claimed. "The burden of administrative
work was carried on by a nucleus of permanent clerks who
knew what had to be done"^ and who were relied upon by
department heads. Neither was the unreformed service as
ineffective as critics claimed. First, it is "extremely
probable" that public services were adequately supplied
because "the party leaders were only too glad to multiply
-'A. Bower Sageser, The First Two Decades of the
Pendleton Act, A Study of Civil Service Reform (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska, 1935), p. 12.
^White, The Jacksonians
, p. 374.
^Ibid., p. 329.
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offices. "1 second, the spoils system was effective in
accomplishing the social purposes of the Jacksonian era.
2
Spoils politics successfully made the public service of the
late 1800s more representative of the Jacksonian egalitarian
spirit.
Nonetheless, as the United States entered the recon-
struction period after the Civil War, the civil service sys-
tem as a whole was in a primitive state. There was no uni-
formity in personnel policy; appointment of clerks, assign-
ment to duties, conduct in office (e.g., hours of work),
transfers, promotions, pay, discipline, removals were
entirely at the department head's discretion. The Classifi-
cation Act of 1853 provided a skeletal structure for
classification, pay, promotion, and selection but was largely
a farce. Training was unknown, efficiency ratings were in
an experimental state, and retirement policies were non-
existent. In personnel matters presidents had very little
actual influence. For although in theory they had authority
to advise and direct heads of departments, "there is scanty
evidence that they did so."-^
Indeed, the civil service reform movement in the late
nineteenth century must be seen against a backdrop of a
""Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage
, p. 151.
^Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service
, p. 535.
White, The Republican Era
, p. 347.
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congressional-presidential power struggle. ^ The Civil War
had increased the power of the President and heightened the
distrust Of the Congress. With Lincoln's death the Radical
Republicans in the Senate acted quickly to address the
imbalance by attempting to control President Johnson's
patronage power through the Tenure of Office Act. when
Johnson tested the Act by removing Secretary of War Stanton
without Senate approval and survived impeachment by one vote,
the constitutional integrity of the presidency was saved,
but it nevertheless limped along in a subordinate position
to Congress until Theodore Roosevelt. During this post-
Civil War period Congress participated directly in the admin-
istrative process—attending to constituent problems as well
as to the details of personnel administration. With a
Congress that was looking to exercise its political muscles
and a series of presidents unable and/or unwilling to exer-
cise presidential prerogatives, personnel patronage became
the domain of Congress. Control of patronage by the Congress
was perceived by party leaders as essential to the cohesion
of the party organization and ultimately to the survival of
the local party machines and their bosses. The exercise of
presidential power, on the other hand, depended to some
extent upon "wresting control of appointments from Senators,
-^See Ibid., pp. 17-45, and Fish, The Civil Service and
the Patronage
, pp. 186-99, for a detailed discussion of this
power struggle.
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congressmen, and local machines. civil service reform,
therefore, because it had to a large extent the effect of
redistributing appointment power from the local machine and
a decentralized Congress to central leadership, became an
integral part of the struggle between the post-Civil War
Congress and President,^
In addition to the congressional-presidential power
struggle, there were social forces that shaped the civil ser-
vice reform of 1883. Post-Civil War America was a society,
like nineteenth century Britain, that held dear the doctrines
of laissez-faire economics, individualism, and political
liberty. It was a society congenial to the growth and pros-
perity of business, particularly big business. In a society
growing more complex and pursuing the prosperity of the
American industrial revolution, business methods (which,
ironically, were more primitive than government personnel
and budgeting methods) were seen as solutions to problems in
public administration. Yet the post-Civil War era was also
characterized by widespread agrarian unrest under the Granger
movement and the Farmer's Alliances, recurrent economic
depressions, hostile labor-management relations, and popular
distrust of powerful railroads and big business, all of
which provided counter-points to the predominant laissez-
llbid., p. 278.
'^See E. E. Schattschneider
,
Party Government (New
York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1942)
, pp. 137-40 for a
discussion of this point.
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faire philosophy.
The postwar period was steeped in the old Puritan
ideals of morality, yet it was a period that was rocked by
one scandal after another. it was a time when many Americans
were turning from a divil conflict to look at the world.
And many of these observers saw what they perceived to be
the efficient public services of Europe. Indeed, when
Senator Charles Sumner, a student of the British civil ser-
vice and in correspondence with English friends, introduced
his civil service reform bill in 1864 it bore very close
resemblance to the British model. America of the 1860s to
1880s was an age in which intellectual and social forces
were conducive to reform."'"
Overcoming Inertia, A False Start
,
and Building Support
Although the seeds of reform had been sown and were
fertile, the spoils system in 1865 remained the dominant fac-
tor in American public administrative life. Not only did
spoilsmen see any effort to reduce spoils as un-American, but
most Americans saw spoils as necessary and proper.^ The
task that lay before the reformers was monumental; the years
•^Indeed, the 1880s were years of ballot reform, regu-
latory reform of business, and municipal reform as well as
civil service reform.
^Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service
, p. 62,
and White, The Republican Era
, p. 291. Stewart, in The
National Civil Service Reform League
, p. 7, points out that
the "public conscience seemed dulled to the enormous abuses
of patronage."
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between 1865 and 1871 were spent in overcoming the intertia
created by a system grown conservative. The Sumner bill had
hardly caused a stir, but the effort to control patronage
was continued by Republican Congressman Thomas A. Jenckes of
Rhode Island who introduced reform bills in 1865 and every
year from 1867 to 1871. Jenckes, the archetypical civil
service reformer of the period, a man of wealth, a lawyer,
from a prominent New England family, brought leadership to
the nascent reform movement. Like many other reformers,
Jenckes was a student of civil service systems in other
countries. Particularly impressed by the British approach,
he carried on correspondence with Northcote, Trevelyan, and
other British figures and regularly received British news-
papers.
^
Not surprisingly, his bills, patterned on the Brit-
ish approach, called for open competitive examinations at
the entry level, upper level vacancies to be filled by pro-
motion based on merit, and a board of commissioners to
administer exams and formulate rules.
Jenckes' legislative efforts were never successful,
but his agitation eventually forced a discussion in Congress
and stimulated public attention. By the late 1860s, Jenckes
and other reform leaders, including Julius Bing, Carl Schurz,
Dorman Eaton, George W. Curtis, Everett P. Wheeler, and
Charles J. Bonaparte were receiving broad public support
194 .
'Richard E. Titlow, Americans Import Merit, pp. 192-
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from newspapers such as the Chicago Tribune, the Bostor^Post,
and the Newjrork_E^^ magazines such as ^JT^I^'
the NorU^Ainerica^^ Putnam^^jlag^ businessmen
such as the National Manufacturer's Association and the
Boston Board of Trade; federal civil servants; and civic-
minded citizens. 1 From 1867 until 1883 editorial and public
support for reform increased dramatically. Even in Congress,
Jenckes' proposals received some support. However, at this
early date, there was no organized, concentrated, persistent
pressure on Congress to effect passage of reform legislation.
Yet, in an amazing turn of events, "on the last day of
the last session of the 41st Congress,"^ in 1871 Congress
passed a civil service reform bill which authorized the
President to make rules and regulations for admitting people
into the civil service and to appoint people to administer
the rules. The bill came in the form of a rider to a civil
appropriations bill. It was briefly but hotly debated, with
the reform supporters able to come together long enough to
pass the appropriations bill with its rider. Thus, unable
to agree on a legislative mechanism to control patronage.
Congress grudgingly allowed the President to proceed. Such
a concession was less an acknowledgment of Grant's leader-
ship than an indication of the impact of outside pressure
'-See Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service
,
p. 66; White, The Republican Era
, p. 270; and Hoogenboom,
Outlawing the Spoils
, pp. 41-45.
^White, The Republican Era, p. 281.
and Jenckes- and the other reformers' agitation. 1 Undoubt-
edly, the widespread belief that Grant would not pick up the
gauntlet helped ease the bill's passage.
But to. the surprise of many. Grant did appoint an
advisory board, later to become a Civil Service Commission,
and named George W. Curtis, a leading reform spokesman, as
its chairman. Perhaps "part of Grant's surprising personal
interest in civil service reform stemmed from the fact that
he, too, was feeling the pressure of patronage. curtis
was quick to issue a set of rules and establish the machiner;
to administer them. The rules, which applied to Washington
departments and federal offices in New York, provided for
competitive examinations, a probationary period, and the
prohibition of political assessments. It was Curtis' view,
as well as that of most reformers during this period, that
patronage could be controlled by requiring competitive exams
with the ability to fill vacancies by patronage eliminated,
the regulation of tenure would not be necessary. The reform
ers' approach, then, was to close the front door to public
service appointments, but to leave the back door open.
The Grant Civil Service Commission soon found itself
in trouble. Grant found it impossible to live by the stan-
dards set by the Commission and Curtis resigned when Grant
made an offensive appointment. Passage of the reform bill
'Ibid., p. 282 .
^Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service^ p. 69.
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appeared to be a moment of temporary insanity for the Con-
gress as during the next session in 1872 opposition to reform
and the Commission was as hostile as ever. Making matters
worse was a lack of unity among reformers on a number of
issues peripheral to civil service reform, with opponents
eager to dismantle Grant
• s Civil Service Commission and pro-
ponents less than unified. Congress withheld funding for the
Commission in 1874. Grant, unwilling and unable to fight
Congress, withdrew his support for the Commission. The
examining boards were abolished in 1875.
Despite this false start toward reform, the establish-
ment and operation of the Grant Commission was important for
future reform efforts. It provided evidence that the reform-
ers' concepts were practicable and it gave reformers experi-
ence in fighting later legislative battles.
For nearly a decade after the defeat of the first
Civil Service Commission, the reform forces and their
opponents were at a stalemate, nevertheless it was an active
stalemate. In 1876 both Republican and Democratic Party
platforms called for civil service reform. President Hayes
brought a favorable attitude toward reform to the White
House in 1876 and showed reformers his good faith by applying
merit principles to the New York Customs House and the New
York Post Office and appointing Carl Schurz as Secretary of
Interior. He also commissioned Dorman Eaton to write a
history of the British civil service reform movement which
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was submitted to Congress in 1879. Published as a book the
next year,l Eaton's report had a favorable influence on pub-
lic opinion. Yet Hayes' administration ended in disappoint-
ment for reformers as nothing was accomplished in the way of
legislative action.
Nonetheless, opinion was continually stirred by the
relatively small, but well-educated and committed, contingent
of reformers. Working at both the municipal and national
levels to secure new laws and administrative reorganization,
^
the New York Civil Service Reform Association was formed in
May 1877, followed in 1881 by the National Civil Service
Reform League with Curtis as president. Using their state
societies in large cities across the country, these two
associations were extremely effective in educating the pub-
lic through every available form of propaganda . 3 The reform-
ers repertoire was fundamentally the delivery of speeches to
professional or business clubs, editorials, and pamphlets in
which spoilsmen and the evil consequences of spoils politics
-'-Eaton, Civil Service in Great Britain, A History of
Abuses and Reforms and their Bearing Upon American Politics
(New York: Harper and Brother, Publishers, 1880). For a
detailed discussion of the Eaton Report and the influence of
his book, see Richard E. Titlow, Americans Import Merit
,
pp. 248-56.
o
'^See Martin J. Schiesl, The Politics of Efficiency
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977) , for a dis-
cussion of municipal civil service reform from 1880 to 1920.
3 Sageser, The First Two Decades
, pp. 34-35. See
Stewart, The National Civil Service Reform League for a
history of the New York Association and of the National
Civil Service Reform League in particular.
were denounced. The reformers, by and large, products of a
New England Protestant background, college educated, club
men, entrenched in late nineteenth century society, ^ empha-
sized what they perceived to be the moral bankruptcy of
public life and party politics brought on by spoils.
In this approach they were greatly aided by the expo-
sure of the political scandals of the Grant and later
administrations. The Credit Mobilier scandal, the Whiskey
Ring fraud, the Indian Ring and Belknap frauds, the Tweed
Ring, and the Star Route frauds were laid before a shocked
public. "Each scandal was eagerly caught up by the reform-
ers and published in detail, always with the moral that such
fraud could never occur under a reformed civil service."^
The reforms that were to emerge in 188 3 cannot be
attributed entirely to the work of the Batons and the
Curtises. The reform process is too complex for that simple
analysis. Other groups in society had a stake in a reformed
civil service. For example, "as agriculture, labor, com-
merce, and industry came more and more under the regulation
of the federal government, these great pressure groups became
increasingly insistent upon regulation by competent personnel
divorced from the worst ravages of partisan politics.""^ In
Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils
, pp. 191-96. See
Stewart, The National Civil Service Reform League
, pp. 10-18
for brief biographies of reform leaders.
2Sageser, The First Two Decades
, p. 35.
^Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service, p. 133.
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addition, public employees were themselves interested in
reform-department heads who required competent workers^ as
well as employees who were about to be replaced due to a
change in administration. Finally, most presidents in that
period, though constrained by party obligations, desired
civil service reform and acted to see it extended, if only
to be relieved of the pressures of patronage.
Though the reformers had potent allies and live ammu-
nition with the scandals, the final assault on spoils
required a spark. It was provided by the assassination of
President Garfield on July 2, 1881 by Charles J. Guiteau, a
Chicago lawyer who had apparently haunted the capital for
weeks searching for a job. Garfield alive had been a dis-
appointment to the reformers. Though a supporter of reform,
his actions generally belied his support. Wounded and, two
months later, dead, Garfield became a martyr for the cause
of reform. "Reformers quickly transformed their concept of
Garfield from a weak, spineless fool of [then Secretary of
State Jages G.] Blaine's to a fearless crusader for civil
2service reform." They immediately seized the opportunity
to extend their organization and poured forth the message
that spoils was responsible for murder. Public indignation
'Hoogenboom, in Outlawing the Spoils
, p. 69, notes
that Secretary of the Treasury Boutwell, whom reformers
regarded as an enemy, was in 1870 the first official to
administer a competitive exam in the Treasury in order to
secure competent workers.
^Ibid., p. 212.
was raised by the assassination and reformers across the
country became intent on channeling that emotional outrage
to the reform cause.
If the final assault had begun, Congress remained bar-
ricaded. Democratic Senator George H. Pendleton, had submit-
ted a reform bill in December 1880. Convinced by Dorman
Eaton that his bill contained a number of weaknesses,
Pendleton, with the consent of the Senate, substituted a
bill drafted for the New York Civil Service Reform Associ-
ation by Eaton, John Jay, and William Curtis. The new bill
was modeled closely on British example. It provided for a
commission to administer open competitive examinations for
initial appointment and promotion to higher levels, entry at
the lowest levels only, and political neutrality of offices.
Resubmitted on January 10, 1881, before the attack on
Garfield, the bill predictably died. Pendleton reintroduced
his substitute bill on December 6, 1881, four months after
Garfield's death, but this bill too was left to die at the
end of the session. Throughout most of 1882 the spoilsmen
in Congress withstood the barrage of public pressure.
The barricades were finally brought down by the Novem-
ber elections in 1882, in which civil service reform had
been perceived as the key issue in a number of states. The
Republican majority, after suffering a loss of seats in
Congress and fearful of losing the Presidency in 1884, were
ready to approve civil service reform. Republicans reasoned
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that support of refor. now would salvage Republican victories
in 1884; if Republicans lost a majority in 1884 a merit sys-
tem would blanket-in many Republican appointees at high
administrative levels. Democrats, on the other hand, smelled
blood, but were put in a dilermna. Support of reform perhaps
would help make them the majority party, yet, at the same
time, passage of the Pendleton bill would remove a large
portion of patronage from their control.^ With the 1882
electoral results in mind the Congress debated the Pendleton
bill in December 1882. m Congress the tenor of debate
turned from the reformers' moral argument to concerns for
partisan advantage and political expediency.
In the House, there was little debate at all; the
Pendleton bill sailed through by a wide margin, undoubtedly
because the entire House was facing re-election in 1884.
^
In the Senate also, debate was relatively swift and highly
partisan, but it did not overlook matters of less partisan
concern. Perhaps the Congressional critics' most serious
concerns were that competitive examinations would result in
a civil service composed of an aristocratic class and that
the merit system was not an American product.^ Supporters
•^Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils
, p. 237 .
2^Van Riper, "Adapting a British Political Invention to
American Needs," Public Administration 31 (Winter 1953): 318.
^See the remarks by Senator Woodbridge of Vermont
arguing that the merit system is aristocratic and Senator
Schenck of Ohio claiming that selection based on merit is
democratic, in Hoogenboom, ed.. Spoilsmen and Reformers
(Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1964), pp. 20-22.
argued, to the contrary, that selection based on competence
was democratic and demonstrated that where competition had
been used as the basis for selection, appointment of college
educated persons remained a small percent of the total. The
competitive principle also came under fire because many
critics believed that examinations were not adequate as a
test of fitness for office. In addition, with entrance
limited to the lowest positions, older men and outsiders
could not afford to enter the service making it a closed
service. While undoubtedly it is true as Hoogenboom argues
that "members of each party sought partisan advantage
through proposing a number of amendments that would retain
or secure offices for its own partisan use,""*- it also
appears to be the case, and not inconsistently so, that many
members of Congress were concerned about broader political,
democratic consequences
.
But the focus of the debate appears to have been on
partisan matters. At issue for many critics, particularly
Democrats, was the fear that "the in-coming party could
only secure the insignificant positions while members of
2the out-going party would be promoted." Appealing to his
fellow Democrats, Pendleton argued that Democrats ought to
support his bill because reform is what people want. "I
"'"Hoogenboom, ed.. Spoilsmen and Reformers
, p. 37.
2Sageser, The First Two Decades
, p. 48. Also see
Democratic Senator Brown's comments on this possibility in
Hoogenboom, ed.. Spoilsmen and Reformers, p. 38ff.
nis-
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believe," he said, "that the adoption of this policy
will hasten the day of the victory of our party and
. .
.
fill many offices with Democrats."''"
Attempting to address both the political and admi
trative concerns, the British-modeled Pendleton bill
adjusted to "American patterns of thought and action. For
example, while accepting the idea of open competitive exam-
inations for testing the fitness of applicants, the American
examinations were to be "practical in their character"
3
rather than academic as the British examination tended to be
Rather than permitting entrance into the service at the
lowest grades only, the Senate deleted this provision from
the Pendleton bill, allowing lateral entry. Congress
accepted the British notions of security of tenure and polit
ical neutrality. At the same time, the Act left the
President in control of removals, subject to the provision
that failure to render political service or contribute to a
political fund was not just cause for removal. In the same
way, the issue of where to draw the line between politics
and administration was left to Presidential discretion.
-'-Hoogenboom, ed.. Spoilsmen and Reformers
, p. 37.
2Van Riper, "Adapting a British Invention to American
Needs," p. 318. See also Van Riper, History of the U.S .
C ivil Service
, pp. 98-110 for discussion of how Pendleton
Act was adapted from British system to fit the American
political and social climate.
^22 U.S. Statutes , 403 (1883) . Reprinted in Sageser,
The First Two Decades, Appendix A.
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congress did not establish an administrative class, but left
the President's appointees unprotected.
Yet despite important differences between the British
and American approaches, these distinctions can be over-
drawn. ^ The Pendleton Act provided for a three member Com-
mission, appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate, to assist the President in making
rules, supervising examinations, and conducting investiga-
tions. The British commission consisted of three commis-
sioners with similar duties and conditions of office. The
rules prescribed by the Pendleton Act included the fair
apportionment of Washington appointments among the States;
establishment of health and age requirements; exclusion of
drunkards from the Service; prohibition of political assess-
ments; and a probation period for new appointees. Similarly,
the British Civil Service Commission monitored the distri-
bution of appointments between England, Scotland, and Ireland;
established rules denying employment to persons habitually
intoxicated, prohibiting political information to be used as
a basis for employment, and requiring health and age stan-
dards; and designated a period of probation for new employ-
ees. Through the Pendleton Act only about ten percent of
civil service positions were placed in the classified ser-
vice. Significantly, the Act authorized the President to
'See Richard E. Titlow, Americans Import Merit
,
pp. 314-18, for a more detailed discussion of similarities
between American and British reforms.
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include in the merit system previously unclassified posi-
tions. It has been through Executive Order, therefore, that
the size of the classified service has expanded and,
occasionally, declined and the line between career and polit-
ical appointees has been pushed upward and, occasionally,
downward. Van Riper correctly notes that British civil ser-
vice development differed from American development in that
British growth occurred through Orders-in-Council
, which
are in reality Cabinet or legislative mandates. Neverthe-
less, at least in early British development, the initiative
for Orders-in-Council was taken by the Prime Minister who is
head of the civil service. In other words, civil service
extension in both countries appears to have been at the
initiative of the chief administrator. Thus, as the Pendle-
ton bill was signed into law by President Arthur in January
1883, the strong influence of the British model is evident.
Reaction, Consequences, and the
Nature of Reform
Eighteen eighty-three marked the end of a political
skirmish for civil service reform, but not the end of the
battle. For passage of the bill "betrayed a fundamental
opposition to the civil service reform movement . If
reform is a continuous web it is important briefly to examine
the reaction to the passage of the Pendleton bill. From the
-^Ibid., p. 238. See also, Stewart, The National Civil
Service Reform League, pp. 171-75, for an account of
opposition of spoilsmen.
reformers' perspective passage of the Act had mixed conse-
quences. On the one hand, the new law applied only to
Washington and to custom houses and post offices in the lar-
gest cities. On the other hand. President Arthur appointed
Dorman Eaton as the new chairman of the Civil Service Com-
mission and two other members who had the support of the
reformers. In the 1884 Presidential election, reformers
supported the winner, Grover Cleveland, but at the same time.
Senator Pendleton was defeated for re-election and in the
new Congress bills were introduced to repeal the Pendleton
Act. Although these bills were unsuccessful. Congressional
hostility to reform remained vigorous for years to come.
Consequently, expansion of the new merit system was left to
the initiative of Presidents, not Congress. Arthur set the
pattern for the next few Presidents by adding positions to
the classified service at the end of his term.
From a longer term perspective, the Pendleton Act
planted the seed for future political concerns. While most
observers agree that the introduction of competitive exams
led to a different type of individual entering the service,
there is disagreement over the nature of the new civil ser-
vice. White, for example, argues that examinations helped
replace political and personal favorites with citizens
capable of demonstrating their fitness and ability for
office—a thoroughly democratic principle."^ Fish contends
'White, The Republican Era, pp. 351-52.
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th^t examinations resulted in replacing opportunities for
"clever, sometimes brilliant, men" with a service which
attracted "the steady-going and unimaginative."! Hoogenboom
stresses the view that competitive exams resulted in the
recruitment of persons of a higher social status and were
thus, by implication, less democratic.^ At the same time.
Van Riper claims that the reform, given the political and
social conditions of the late nineteenth century, made " the
civil service more representative . ^ whether less represen-
tative or more representative, less democratic or more
democratic, the representative nature of the public service
was changed in a way that left it open to future political
questioning
.
The character of the civil service was affected in
another way. As White notes, for decades the ideal of the
administrative system "had been a system political in char-
acter, serving the interests of party at an admitted cost in
competence and integrity.
. . . This ideal was challenged
and gradually subdued to the ideal of a 'businesslike' gov-
ernment."^ A number of consequences ensued. For one, more
businessmen were brought into the government. Secondly,
•'Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage
,
p. 233.
^See, for example, Hoogenboom, "The Pendleton Act and
ivil Service," American Historical Review LXIV (1958-
: 312.
^Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service
,
pp. 101-111, 538ff.
^ The Republican Era, p. 387.
the C
1959)
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business methods and the new disciplines of economics and
statistics were introduced to government activities.
Thirdly, with the prohibition of assessments, politicians
turned for financial support to businessmen who in turn
gained political power. ^ And fourthly, civil service pro-
tection was pushed to higher and higher levels in the
bureaucracy. Thus, while the civil service perhaps became
more efficient, the seeds were sown for later reformers to
ask whether it had grown politically unresponsive.
But the web of reform is not only continuous, it is
also woven out of a complex variety of motives and interests.
The predominant view among students of American administra-
tive history is that reformers, motivated by moral outrage,
were intent on purifying political life and public adminis-
tration. Reformers, in the words of Schurz, were attempting
"to restore ability, high character, and true public spirit
once more to their legitimate spheres in our public life,
and to make active politics once more attractive to men of
self-respect and high patriotic aspirations."^ At the same
time, Schiesl persuasively argues that reformers were
motivated by a commitment to administrative efficiency.
'-See Hoogenboom, "The Pendleton Act and the Civil Ser-
vice," pp. 316-17, and Matthew Josephson, The Politicos
,
1865-1896 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938)
,
pp. 322-23 on this point.
2Quoted in David Rosenbloom, "Public Personnel Policy
in a Political Environment, " Policy Studies Journal 9
(Winter 1980) :449-50
.
^Schiesl, The Politics of Efficiency
,
passim.
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Stewart concludes that it was those reformers who entered
the reform movement later, as it began to be drained of its
leadership in the 1890s and early 1900s, who were "inclined
to stress reform as an instrument to improve the efficiency
of the administration as well as a moral force for the puri-
fication of politics."^
If the reformers were concerned with restoring morality
to politics, it was partially because they were individuals
imbued with a sense of personal morality and integrity, a
desire for liberty from the tyranny of political parties,
and an impatience for democratic government wherein "offices
must be open to all citizens according to their fitness to
2fill them." Thus, one must question Hoogenboom's view that
the reformers were attempting to return government to pre-
Jacksonian attitudes and standards. For, "on the contrary,
civil service reformers accepted the principles of egalitar-
ianism and of equal opportunity in the public service."-^
The standard they were seeking to apply to the public ser-
vice was a mixture of "Federalist" competence and "Jackson-
ian" democracy. Yet the reformers were political men
motivated by more than a moral crusade. For example, it is
probably correct that Jenckes, a political foe of President
'Stewart, The National Civil Service Reform League
,
p. 258.
^Carl Schurz, Civil-Service Reform and Democracy
(Washington, D.C.: Press of Good Government, 1893), p. 14.
^Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service , p. 64.
Johnson, first introduced his civil service reform bill in
1865 in an attempt to weaken the powers of the President.
Furthermore, Hoogenboom's class interpretation lays less
stress on the reformers' moral motivation and more on the
view that the movement "had resulted primarily from loss of
political power. "1 He is undoubtedly correct that seeing'
themselves and others like them gradually overshadowed by
spoils politicians, the reformers attacked the politicians'
source of power. One must remember, however, that the
reformers never sought to destroy the political party, but
to regain their standing in them or to purify them, depending
on one's perspective . ^ Whether the primary motive was
morality, efficiency, or power, the reform movement was not
intended simply to make technical improvements, "rather it
sought fundamental political change."^
Congressional motives were perhaps as complex. A few
'Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils
, p. 67.
2While it may be true, as Schiesl argues, that reform-
ers sought the destruction of political parties at the local
level, there is no indication that this approach was taken
at the national level.
^Rosenbloom, "Public Personnel Policy in a Political
Environment," p. 4 50. Jay Shafritz's wisdom is worth noting
here. "It is difficult if not impossible to separate the
moralistic from the political motivations of people. One
can never truly know where moral indignation over patronage
abuses ended and a not disinterested concern for denying a
power base to the incumbents began. It is a question that
lends itself to extensive and pointless philosophic debate."
Public Personnel Management, The Heritage of Civil Service
Reform (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 32.
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congressmen were perhaps concerned with the moral argument,
a few were seeking revenge or redress at being overlooked in
the scramble for patronage. Many, maybe most, were troubled
by their perceptions of the imminent 1884 election and
responded to their political instincts. President Arthur's
support for reform apparently proceeded from this source as
well as a desire to rid himself of the nightmare of dividing
the spoils, rather than from an interest in strengthening
Presidential leadership. it is clear that the Congress
neither expected nor wanted power to accrue to the President.
Although department heads and appointing officers lost their
discretionary appointment power, indications are that many
were willing to give it up in return for more competent
employees. E. L. Godkin, a leader in the civil service
reform movement, notes that reform was not "the result of
clear national policy."^ It was, one might add, the result
of the coalescing of a number of external pressures, personal
and political motives, and administrative needs into a com-
promise that momentarily served a variety of purposes.
Britain and America ;
Summary and Conclusions
The creation of civil services in both Great Britain
and the United States was a response to multiple forces and
events: political and social pressures, intellectual
trends, and events external to the immediate reform context.
'Hoogenboom, ed., Spoilsmen and Reformers , p. 50
In each case the reform process was characterized by interest
group pluralism. That is, in both countries public opinion,
interest groups, civil servants, reform associations, polit-
ical parties, legislatures, and heads of government were
important actors in the creation. The reformed civil ser-
vices were the products of the application of political
skills by intensely committed reformers in specific social
and political contexts. To a large degree the reform
processes resulted in civil service systems that reflected a
consensus among the major actors and that remain largely
intact. In both countries representative bureaucracy was a
central concern. In Britain, advocates of reform hoped to
replace a hereditary aristocracy with a meritocratic elite,
which for many meant an increasingly powerful middle-class.
In the United States, Eaton, Schurz, and other reformers
sought to make public office more representative of middle-
class morality and business competence. Reformers in each
country sought to purify government, to secure civil ser-
vices which reflected their values and attitudes by changing
its representative character. Both sets of reformers were
extremely successful.
The pursuit of efficiency by both British and American
reformers was related inextricably to the effort to make
administration more representative. Northcote and Trevelyan
perhaps were more clearly concerned with increasing effi-
ciency than the American reformers but, nonetheless, both
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sets of reformers believed improved government performance
delivered with more economy would result when merit prin-
ciples were applied to civil service selection.
Thus in the latter part of the nineteenth century both
Great Britain and the United States began measuring their
civil services by new standards. In both countries reformers
were attempting to assert a new democratic doctrine that
repudiated the practice of appointment to the public service
based on political privilege. Both British and American
reformers believed that their reform proposals would enhance
democratic government.
Yet, it is clear that the civil service structures and
procedures that were created in both countries were not
identical. The foundation laid by the Northcote-Trevelyan
Report resulted in a higher civil service characterized by a
relatively closed, elite corps of liberally educated gener-
alists who were committed to deep-rooted principles of
anonymity, nonpartisanship, and public service. The higher
civil service that emerged from the Pendleton Act was charac-
terized by its openness, professional-technical competence,
and commitment to particular policies and programs. Yet
these differences only further suggest that civil service
reform in both countries went to the very heart of politics
and government.
CHAPTER II
THE SECOND HOOVER COMMISSION:
REPUBLICANISM RENEWED
After its creation, the U.S. Civil Service developed
through a series of incremental victories and defeats. By
the end of World War II the civil service largely had met
its basic goal—selection by examination, tenure for good
behavior, and political neutrality. It had closed the front
door to the service; in its enthusiasm to protect personnel
from political pressure and provide security it also had
closed the back door, a move the creators of the merit system
had not desired. By effectively restricting department
heads' discretion to fire, discipline, and manage, the now
rule-bound system had become, many critics argued, overly
centralized, burdened with complexity, and inflexible. It
was criticized through the early 1950s for rigidity with
respect to position-classification, the lack of a systematic
wage policy, the absence of training programs particularly
for higher levels, and weaknesses in other "personnel man-
agement" areas such as promotion and transfer, separations
and removals, efficiency ratings, and appeals and grievances.
•'See, for example, Paul P. Van Riper, History of the
United States Civil Service (Evanston, Illinois: Row Peterson
and Company, 1958), especially pp. 425-40, 453-55, 528-31;
and Bernard L. Gladieux, "Civil Service Versus Merit,"
Public Administration Review 12, No. 3 (Summer 1952) : 173-77
.
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In Short, most critics agreed that the system which now over-
emphasized employee protection and administrative continuity
was unable to adequately respond to the stress of depression,
war, and public pressure for increased services.
From a managerial perspective, the reams of personnel
regulations in place by the early 1950s were contributing to
many of the problems they were designed to prevent or remedy.
Of particular concern was the shortage of qualified individ-
uals for top executive positions and the related problems of
how to secure and retain competent persons in these key
positions and the low prestige of the civil service. Even
before the second world war many of these problems had
received attention from official sources concerned with the
chief executive's inability to control and manage the govern-
ment machinery. The President's Committee on Administrative
Management reported in 1931-^ and the Ramspeck Act was passed
in 1940 giving the President increased authority over person-
nel management. The problems continued to receive attention
in the postwar period in numerous Congressional studies, the
1949 Classification Act, and from the Commission on Organi-
zation of the Executive Branch of the Government (First
Hoover Commission, 1946-1948). That the energies of many
-'-President's Committee on Administrative Management,
Report With Special Studies (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1937) .
^Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government, Personnel Management (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1949), hereafter referred to as First Hoover
Commission
.
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academics, businessmen, and professionals were attracted to
the stubborn problem of recruiting and holding competent
higher civil servants is suggested by the stream of studies
that emerged between 1935 and the early 1960s. ^ Binding each
of these studies together had been the common concern for
strengthening the managerial or leadership capacity of the
President by giving him responsibility for personnel manage-
ment and increasing his control of top executive personnel.
Important as these administrative concerns were and
are, they cannot be separated from the social and political
milieu that existed in the late 1940s and early 1950s. It
was a time when a large segment of the public, although just
experiencing the benefits of big, positive government, was
reasserting the ingrained philosophy of laissez-faire.
Despite the fact that (or perhaps because) governmental
bureaucracy had come to play an increasingly important role
in society, it was a period in which the dominant public
mood was conservative, wanting reduced public expenditures
for foreign aid but not to homeowners and veterans, less
-'-For example, Leonard White, Government Career Service
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935); William
Carpenter, The Unfinished Business of Civil Service Reform
(Princeton University Press, 1952); John J. Corson, Execu -
tives for the Federal Service (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1952); Paul T. David and Ross Pollock, Executives for
Government (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1957); David
T. Stanley, The Higher Civil Service (Washington: Brookings
Institution, 1964); American Assembly, Sixth, The Federal
Government Service: It's Character, Prestige, and Problems
(New York: Columbia University, Graduate School of Business,
1954)
.
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government regulation of business and more of unions, and
increased attention to the threat of communism abroad and at
home
.
Ignoring the successes of public administration in the
depression and war years, many people in the postwar popula-
tion evidenced a renewed acceptance of the goodness and
efficiency of business and scientific management. Government
was denounced as wasteful and inefficient while big business
was efficient and economy-minded. Public officials were
denounced as lazy and timid and, at the same time, intent on
securing power. Thus, unlike the Populist period of the
1880s, the public was not just anti-bureaucracy, it was
specifically anti-government bureaucracy. The Whitten Amend-
ment of 1951 limiting the size of the career service exem-
plified the predominant legalistic, simplistic views of the
nature of the problems of the public service.^ The loyalty
and security programs gave clear evidence of the prevailing
mood of suspicion and distrust of public administrators.
The public service was under attack and for many of
the attackers the issue was the growth of administrative
power at the expense of other governmental bodies.
See Herbert. S. Parmet, Eisenhower and the American
Crusades (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1952) for
description of 1950s political environment.
o
See Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service ,
pp. 464-66 for description of Whitten Amendment and pp. 468-
469 for other examples of the negative approaches taken to
control bureaucracy.
particularly Congress, business, and the individual. The
mood of those persons moving into positions of power after
the election of 1952, and of much of the public putting them
there, was caught by MacNeil and Metz.
This vast and rapid [post-war] expansion of Government
it str^iLr^%'° extravagance. EspSaUy^"^"^ ^""^ expanded the executive branch of theFederal Government and weakened the others Itencouraged the trend toward collectivism . '
. . and itwent far to discourage and weaken the free enterprisesystem It has greatly weakened the position of theindividual m relation to his Government. Thus therelong has been a crying need for a group of competentpublic men to resurvey the Government's activities forthe purpose of bringing them back into conformity withthe principles of the American Constitution.!
The Second Hoover Commission was just that group of public
men to renew what conservatives considered the lost princi-
ples of the Republic, to make the now unresponsive public
bureaucracy responsive—responsive to standards and philos-
ophies enunciated by leaders in the Republican Party.
From a social perspective, then, the early postwar
years were troubled by tensions that reflected uncertainty
and disagreement over the proper role of government in
society. Was government to be used as a positive force to
solve social problems or was it merely a mechanism for
social control? The civil service took the main brunt of
the tension, uncertainty, and anger, becoming a victim to
the lack of consensus in the public policy debate.
Neil MacNeil and Harold W. Metz, The Hoover Report
,
1953-1955 (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1956), p. 7.
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"The^^oj^i tics of Revenge "
The outcome of the Presidential election of 1952 was,
to some extent, a reflection of the concern among the public
for the growth of administrative power. Eisenhower had cam-
paigned on promises to "clean up the mess in Washington," to
reduce government spending and size, and to restore honesty
to government. Thus, a central political issue confronting
the new Eisenhower administration concerned its relationship
to the bureaucracy. Perhaps to a greater degree than in any
previous transition, the Republican Party in 1952 was faced
with this recurring question: to what extent does an
incoming administration need to control higher and middle
level personnel who are largely protected by civil service
rules and procedures in order to effectively direct the
agencies that will carry out its policy?^ Stated more suc-
cinctly, "What is the proper balance between change and
continuity in the context of our system?"-^ For partisan
Republicans, this question took on added significance due to
several interrelated developments.
-'-This phrase is taken from Van Riper, History of the
U.S. Civil Service
, p. 485, who credits it to Samuel Lubell's
chapter 3 in Revolt of the Moderate (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1956)
.
^Leonard D. White in The Republican Era: 1869-1961
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1958), p. 317 posits the
question as one integral to the issue of extension of the
merit system by executive order.
^Herman Miles Somers, "The Federal Bureaucracy and the
Change of Administration," American Political Science Review
48, No. 1 (March 1954) :137. See also Frederick C. Mosher,
Democracy and the Public Service (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1968), p. 85 for the application of this question to
the Eisenhower election.
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Of both utmost joy and concern for Republicans was the
fact that their capture of the White House came after a
twenty-year absence. During this time the Federal service
had increased in size from 583,196 to 2,603, 267 of which 85%
were under a merit system, a large percentage of the
remaining employees, "although not under civil service had
been given the protection accorded classified employees" by
President Truman's Executive Order 9712 in 1947.^ The order
provided that an employee in the merit system who left to
take an excepted position was still protected from removal.
In addition, during the last years of the Truman administra-
tion a large number of top positions had been "blanketed-in"
the classified service. Van Riper indicates that under
Truman patronage consisted of 50,000 plus Post Office
positions for attorneys, U.S. marshals, collectors of cus-
toms and internal revenue and another 5,000 to 25,000
positions at lower levels for approximately 70,000 positions
for patronage purposes. Yet when Eisenhower came into
office in 1953 probably only 15,000 positions were immedi-
ately available, due to tenure restrictions, though another
50,000 could be anticipated when the incumbents died or
2
retired. At the same time, the federal service was con-
tracting, and Republicans had contributed to the patronage
^Louis L. Friedland, "The Career System Revisited,"
Personnel Administration 18, No. 1 (January 1955) :19.
"^Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service
,
pp. 443, 490.
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squeeze by promising to reduce the national government even
further.
TO make matters worse, the twenty-year Republican
famine had created a situation where "few Republican leaders
with any federal experience were available and many of those
who had worked with the Democrats were suspect in the new
administration."^ Republicans it appears had extraordinary
reasons to complain of a dearth of political leadership.
Thus not only did Eisenhower and Congressional Repub-
licans have relatively few patronage appointments, but the
career civil service had been stocked over twenty years with
New Deal-Fair Deal Democrats. Many of these individuals had
entered government service because of their commitment to
particular policies or programs and, even after attaining
permanent status, had remained spokesmen for those programs.
Over twenty years close relationships had developed between
bureau chiefs, interest group leaders, and congressional
committee chairmen that gave bureau chiefs a degree of
policy-making autonomy from their department heads. To the
incoming Republicans most of the top level civil servants
were policy-makers protected by civil service tenure; to
Republicans civil service rules had gone too far. In addi-
tion, new Republican political appointees found some hold-
over Democrats in the career service to be overtly partisan.
For example, "many career people had attended the $100
^Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service, p. 85.
89
Jefferson-Jackson Day dinners of the Democratic Party.
Although the Hatch Act did not specifically prohibit such
activity, it was certainly highly questionable from a Repub-
lican perspective. it is not difficult to understand, then,
that the Republican Administration entered office carrying a
heavy load of suspicion and mistrust—a "built-in bias"^
against top level bureaucrats in addition to an ideological
mistrust of governmental bureaucracy in general. A Washing-
ton Post and Times Herald article by Walter Trohan in
January 1953 expressed the widely held perception,
A powerful fifth column of New Dealers and FairDealers will operate in key posts under the incomingRepublican Administration. ...
Republicans will take over the top departmental jobsas Cabinet officers, under-Cabinet officers, agencyheads, and various chief deputies, but these offices arelargely fronts and top-policy posts.
At the level where policy is carried out and infor-
mation is supplied for policy making, the New Dealers
and Fair Dealers are wired in civil service. The vast
majority of these plan to remain under the Republicans
to work underground for the Democrats.^
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service, Administration of the Civil Service System
,85th Congress, 1st session. Committee Print No. 2, 1957,
Report of Special Consultant, James R. Watson, to the Com-
mittee, p. 39.
2See Emmerich and Lyle, "The Federal Career Service
—
What Next?", Public Administration Review 14, No. 1 (Winter
1954): 3; and Martin Packman, "Government Jobs," Editorial
Research Reports 1, No. 19 (May 18, 1955) :363.
3
-^U.S., Congress, House, Sub-Committee on Manpower and
Civil Service, History of Civil Service Merit Systems of the
United States and Selected Foreign Countries , Part I, by
Virginia A. McMurtry, Committee Print No. 94-29 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 268.
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Fearing that the "Democrats" in the merit system would delay,
if not sabotage, the implementation of Republican policy,
the new Administration began to search for means to take^
control of the bureaucracy
.
It should be noted that the distrust that was generated
was mutual. With the civil service itself in a state of
turbulence due to the anti-bureaucratic character of the
1952 campaign, the continued loyalty attacks, reductions-in-
force, almost continual Congressional investigations into
the economy and efficiency of the service, and lists of
career persons who had attended Democratic fundraisers being
actively circulated as blacklists, ^ the morale of the
service reached a low point with the 1952 election and the
succeeding few years.
The Eisenhower Administration entered office in 1953
with the largest popular majority up to that point in the
^Herbert Emmerich and G. Lyle Belsley in "The Federal
Career Service—What Next?," p. 2, add some perspective to
the Republican picture of the bureaucracy.
There are no factual bases for believing that there
was a preponderance of Democrats in the civil service in
the District of Columbia at the close of the Truman
Administration. On the contrary, there is strong reason
to believe that if one could determine how these civil
servants would have voted in the 1952 election, it would
be found that they did not vary greatly from the rest of
the population. It is significant that the two counties
in Virginia and the two in Maryland adjacent to the
District of Columbia which are populated by a heavy pro-
portion of federal employees voted overwhelmingly for
Eisenhower in 1952.
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Post Office,
Administration of the Civil Service System
,
p. 39.
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nation's history and with a slim Republican majority in the
House and Senate. 1 Eisenhower, of course, "brought to the
Presidency the conviction that the country had had its full
measure of new programs during the past twenty years and that
it wanted consolidation without undermining past achieve-
2ments." His was a moderate view when laid beside that of
many Congressional Republicans. To win the campaign for
less government and for what Republicans hoped would be more
competent, honest administration, Eisenhower and his sup-
porters directed much of their attention to the higher civil
service. Believing that "administrative talent would have
to be found in men with a different social orientation than
that which presumably had dominated the executive branch
during the previous two decades," the new administration set
off to replace the "planners," the "idea men," the "intel-
lectuals" with efficiency engineers, business management
experts, and pragmatic business executives.^ From the
Republican perspective, the civil service had become unrep-
resentative of the values of postwar America; only by an
infusion of carriers of the conservative creed could its
representative character be restored.
-^Eisenhower had a Republican Congress only in his
first two years of office (1953-1955) . In the 83rd Congress
Republicans held a one-vote majority in the Senate, and a
seven-vote majority in the House.
2Parmet, Eisenhower and the American Crusades
, p. 359.
Somers, "The Federal Bureaucracy and the Change of
Administration," pp. 131, 146.
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The Administration also opened with much uncertainty
about just how a more representative bureaucracy could be
attained. Eisenhower himself was repelled by partisan poli-
tical fighting and showed himself to be rather naive by
agreeing with his political rival. Senator Taft, that he
would not discriminate against supporters of Taft in the
making of high level appointments In addition, Eisenhower
instructed his staff that friendship with him was not a
qualification for office. Thus "Eisenhower early put him-
self on record as willing to abstain from using one of a
president's prime political weapons for the forging of
party unity—namely
,
the manipulation of the patronage."^
Though it is clear that Eisenhower opposed manipulation of
the merit system, it is apparent that he realized the need
to control it through appointments. His ambivalence left
the issue as to where to draw the line between the career
civil service and political administrators in a state of con-
fusion and the civil service, to a large extent, leaderless.
Three Administration actions contributed to the
blurred line between the permanent and political executive
positions. In 1953 Philip Young, Chairman of the Civil Ser-
vice Commission, was given the dual title of Presidential
Advisor on Personnel Management. In this capacity, the
Chairman became a personnel advisor to the President in the
^Van Riper, History of the U.S. Civil Service , p. 478.
2lbid.
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White House Office. Although this was a move recommended by
the First Hoover Commission, many critics saw it as compro-
mising the oversight responsibilities of the Commission.^
Confusion was further visited upon the politics-
administration dichotomy by Eisenhower's attempt to control
policy-making jobs by creating a new schedule for positions
excepted from the merit system. Schedule C, created by
Executive Order 10,440 on March 31, 1953, was to encompass
all positions of a confidential or policy determining char-
acter and remove them from civil service protection. At the
same time, the Executive Order partially reversed President
Truman's 1947 Order which gave job security to policy-makers
who, although no longer formally in the merit system, had
been protected at one time by civil service tenure. The
principle behind Schedule C—that policy-making positions
ought to be controlled by a new administration—was good.
However, as the Second Hoover Commission's Task Force on
Personnel and Civil Force found. Schedule C was based on an
oversimplified "policy-determining" criterion
—
just what is
"policy-determining"? Because an answer to this question
lacked clear criteria, the use of Schedule C resulted in a
confusing scattering of political executives up and down the
hierarchy. In addition. Schedule C resulted in the conver-
sion to political status of some positions held by career
-'-See Ibid., pp. 495-98, for a discussion of the Young
appointment
.
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officials at lower levels in the hierarchy, many of them "at
levels where expertness and continuity are essential."!
Indeed, the Task Force concluded that Schedule c contributed
to "the most significant cut-back of the competitive service
in its history."^
Democrats, of course, were quick to charge the Repub-
licans with undermining the merit system, yet the quantita-
tive importance of Schedule C was not high. For example,
out of the total of 1098 positions placed in Schedule C by
September 1954, 269 had been transferred from the competi-
tive service, 559 from Schedule A, 2 from Schedule B, and
only 268 were new positions. ^ The Civil Service Commission
had turned down a large number of agency requests for
Schedule C jobs. Thus, most Schedule C jobs were filled by
transfer from within the service, perhaps a recognition of
the need for continuity or the result of a few qualified
U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government, Task Force on Personnel and Civil
Service, Report on Personnel and Civil Service (Washington:
Government Printing Office, February, 1955), pp. 35, 37.
Hereafter cited as Second Hoover Commission Task Force,
Report .
^Ibid., p. 192.
3Schedule A includes a wide variety of miscellaneous
positions which have never been placed in the competitive
service or have been expected for various reasons, in par-
ticular, positions that were judged by the Civil Service
Commission to be not feasible for either competitive or non-
competitive examination. Schedule B includes a small number
of positions filled by noncompetitive examination, for
example, technical and professional positions.
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outsiders.^ Nevertheless, many Republican Congressmen were
highly critical of the Civil Service Commission and Chairman
Young. Some even requested Young's resignation on the
grounds that by rejecting such a large number of Schedule C
requests "he was not supporting 'the Administration in
helping to remove those who would sabotage the very Adminis-
tration who gave you a job'."^ Republican complaints
throughout 1953 and early 1954 that Democrats in the execu-
tive branch continued to obstruct policy and leak information
to the press led to the issuance of the "Willis Directive"
in 1954.
The Willis plan, the third Administration action to
blur the relationship between political and administrative
executives, was an effort to subject all career appointments
and promotions at GS-14 levels and above to political clear-
ance through the Republican National Committee. The plan,
otherwise knows as Operation People's Mandate, was the
product of Charles F. Willis, Jr., then assistant to Sherman
Adams, President Eisenhower's Chief of Staff. According to
James R. Watson, Executive Director of the National Civil
Service League,
The new plan established a special assistant in each
department and agency for the purpose of maintaining
touch with appointments among the agency, the White
'•R. N. Spann, "The Eisenhower Civil Service and the
Reformers," Public Administration 34 (Summer 1956): 146.
^Somers, "The Federal Bureaucracy and the Change of
Administration," p. 14 3.
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House and the Republican National Committee t^-opurpose was to control vacancies, not only in'the*Do?^real offices, but also in career posts in the top Irl^llof the career civil service. It attempted to esLbUsh
iob'^of'thf clearing appointments. ''^'^Lp of the special assistant was to see that Republican^were appointed to the upper five grades, includingrecognized career jobs, on an unmitigated partisan
Though the publication of the Willis Directive was an embar-
rassment to the Eisenhower Administration, there is no
indication that it was ever rescinded. Republican partisans
were bent on revenge
.
The Creation and Work of the
Second Hoover Commission
• It was out of this environment that the Second Hoover
Commission was born. When the 83rd Congress convened early
in 1953, many Republican members were motivated by a
"politics of revenge" to create a Commission on the model of
the popular First Hoover Commission to help restore the
"American way of life." At the same time, the impression
should not be left that there were no Republican members of
Congress who saw a Second Hoover Commission as the best
approach to solving serious problems. Yet the evidence is
clear that partisan gain was an important motivation.
It is important to note that the idea for and the
force behind the Commission were Congressional in origin.
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Post Office and
Civil Service, Administration of the Civil Service System ,
pp. 29, 31. For details and examples from the Willis plan
see the Appendix of the Committee print, pp. 83-144.
Shortly after his inauguration Eisenhower had appointed a
President's Advisory Committee on Government Organization
(PACGO) to provide him with "immediate advice and action on
reorganization during his first year in the White House.
The Committee, composed of Nelson Rockefeller, Arthur S.
Flemming, and Milton Eisenhower, and later Don Price who
replaced Rockefeller, apparently operated quite effectively
through both of Eisenhower's terms of office. Beyond PACGO,
Eisenhower was backing a bill to establish a Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations which he believed would overlap
with the work of the Second Hoover Commission. Hence
Eisenhower was able to say in his diary, "I personally doubt
the need for its [the Second Hoover Commission] organization
because of the simultaneous authorization of another commis-
sion which will have to do with the division of functions,
duties, and responsibilities between the federal government
and the several states."^ Despite his lack of enthusiasm
for another Hoover Commission, Congressional pressure forced
Eisenhower to give his support. His diary continues, "Never
theless, and in spite of the fact that these views were
carefully explained to congressional leaders, two or three
individuals on the Hill were so determined to have a new
-'-Herbert Emmerich, Federal Organization and Administra
tive Management (University, Alabama: The University of
Alabama Press, 1971), p. 174.
^Robert H. Ferrell, ed.. The Eisenhower Diaries (New
York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1981), p. 249.
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'Hoover' commission that I had to accept the Hoover Commis-
sion in order to achieve the other one, from which I expect
much." Indeed, Senator Homer Ferguson of Michigan and Rep-
resentative Clarence Brown of Ohio, seeing an opportunity to
reduce the role of government, were the chief sponsors of a
bill to create the Second Hoover Commission.
The Ferguson-Brown bill passed Congress on July 10,
1953 with surprisingly little opposition or debate, ^ which
is rather remarkable in view of two major provisions of the
bill. The first noticeable provision, or lack thereof, was
its failure to require an equal number of Democrats and
Republicans as did the bill authorizing the First Hoover Com
mission. This failure tended to confirm the partisan pur-
poses of the sponsors of the Commission. Like the First
Hoover Commission, the bill did provide for twelve members,
four each, two from public life and two from private life,
to be chosen by the President, Vice-President, and the
Speaker of the House. ^ But because partisan equality was
llbid.
^67 U.S. Statutes 142 (1953), created the Commission
of Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government,
known as the Second Hoover Commission.
3Members of the Second Hoover Commission were:
Eisenhower appointments: Attorney General (Rep) Herbert
Brownell, Jr.; former Civil Service Commissioner (Rep)
Arthur S. Flemming; former President of the United States
(Rep) Herbert Hoover; former Postmaster General (Dem) James
A. Farley. Nixon appointments: (Rep) Senator Homer
Ferguson replaced by Republican Senator Syles Bridges;
(Dem) Senator John L. McClellan; Dean of the College of
Engineering at Cornell University (Rep) Solomon C. Hollister
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not required, the Commission was composed of seven Republi-
cans and five Democrats. Only after the Commission reported
did Democrats raise much objection to this arrangement. For
example. Representative Holifield in a dissent to the Final
Report to the Congre ss argued that the value of the Commis-
sion was seriously nullified because it lacked a statutory
requirement for bipartisanship . ^ However, as Hoover was
wont to declare, there was never a split among the committee
based on strictly party lines.
Going beyond the legislative requirements of the Com-
mission's membership, it is clear that as a group those
finally selected were most conservative, certainly more so
than the members of the First Commission. There were five
returnees from the First Commission, none of whom were among
the more vocal dissenters on that First Committee. More
telling is Eisenhower's testimony regarding Hoover's state
of mind: "I was a bit nonplussed to find that the only
individuals he wanted on the commission were those whom he
knew to share his general convictions—convictions that many
of our people would consider a trifle on the motheaten
Dean of School of Law at Southern Methodist University (Dem)
Robert G. Storey. Speaker Martin: (Rep) Representative
Clarence J. Brown; (Dem) Representative Chet Holifield;
Former Ambassador to Great Britain (Dem) Joseph P. Kennedy;
Business executive (Rep) Sidney A. Mitchell.
^Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government, Final Report to the Congress (Washington:
Government Printing Office, June 1955), p. 27. Hereafter
Second Hoover Commission, Final Report.
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side."^ The membership of the Commission Task Forces was
heavily composed of representatives of free enterprise and
the corporate sector-65 business executives, 40 lawyers, 37
engineers, 8 bankers, 8 CPAs, 3 insurance executives, and 6
public administrators 2-many of whom had been exempted from
conflict of interest laws by special legislation requested
by Hoover. Critics have little trouble supporting their con-
tention that the Task Forces were padded to provide the
recommendations that the Commission desired."^
The second aspect of the Ferguson-Brown bill which
later provided canon fodder for attacks on the Commission
was the explicit authority the Commission received to make
recommendations with broad policy implications. Where the
First Hoover Commission, largely for political reasons, was
limited to examining approaches to reduce expenditure,
eliminate duplication and waste, consolidate services, and
hieve efficiency,"^ the Second Commission was charged toac
^Ferrell, ed.. The Eisenhower Diaries
, p. 247.
2MacNeil and Metz, The Hoover Report
, p. 19.
3Most observers, however, are more generous with the
Task Force on Personnel and Civil Service. Chaired by Harold
Dodds, President of Princeton University, it also included
such notables as Chester I. Barnard, author of Functions of
the Executive , Leonard D. White, Professor of Public Admin-
istration at the University of Chicago, and Robert Ramspeck,
former Chairman of the U.S. Civil Service Commission, along
with six business executives. George A. Graham, Professor
of Political Science at Princeton, was its Staff Director.
^Emmerich persuasively and, I believe, correctly
argues in Organization and Administrative Management , p. 105,
that the First Hoover Commission had the authority to examine
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eliminate "nonessential services, functions, and activities
which are competitive with private enterprise" and to define
"responsibilities of officials."^ The latter two charges
made the intent of its sponsors clear. The Commission was
not to limit itself to questions of organizational arrange-
ments and efficiency, but to broaden its inquiry to what
government should and should not do . ^ That the Second Com-
mission was given such a wide scope is clear from the Senate
testimony of its authors. Ferguson pointed out that the
terms of reference were
and make recommendation in substantive policy areas and wasprepared to do so at the time of its creation in 1947
. How-
ever, with Truman's unexpected election in 1948, Chairman
Hoover restricted the scope of the inquiry to organizational
structure, efficiency, and economy questions. The scope was
limited to examining means to make government work better,
rather than questioning whether a particular government
function was needed. The Second Commission was under no
such political constraint to limit itself to questions of
structure. James W. Fesler in "Administrative Literature
and the Second Hoover Commission Reports, " American
Political Science Review 51, No. 1 (March 1957), p. 148,
also takes this position. The distinction between the scope
of the two commissions is instructive for what it reveals
about the climate of the Second Hoover Commission, yet the
dichotomy between structure/efficiency questions and policy
questions is a bit forced. That is, one may argue that the
study of efficiency and organizational structure is not
neutral with regard to policy as the Emmerich and Fesler
arguments imply. As Harold Seidman, in Politics, Position
,
and Power , 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980)
,
p. 29, asserts, issues of organization and structure are
essentially questions of power—who shall control and to
what ends?
'"Second Hoover Commission, Final Report, p. 1.
^See comments regarding this efficiency-policy
dichotomy in footnote 4, page 100.
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•Sht fn"":"."'^
standpoint of polt^y"^?^ inq"re°°'""-ould the Government be performing this aoTiviti orservice, and if so, to what extent?! ^^^ y
That Ferguson's question was not without bias is apparent as
he continues,.
the cost and the size of our Government can best bereduced by cutting down the things which Governmentdoes. The mere process of reorganization
. . . cannotreduce the size of Government or its burden on the ?ax
nnr^t^v'"°''! lu^"" ^ percent. Reorganization can-ot strike at the heart of the problem of big Govern-
ment.'^ ^
The means to strike at the heart of the problem lay in the
Commission's "power to recommend a complete elimination or
abolition of an activity. "3 m his dissent in the Final
^Qpo^t Commissioner Holifield made the first of the Demo-
crats' rather late responses by pointedly declaring that
such a sweeping mandate was an "unwise departure from repre-
sentative government" where the people's elected representa-
tives determine policy.'^
Any doubt that the assumptions and purposes of the
Commission were grounded in a political philosophy of con-
servatism were dispelled by Hoover himself. The Final
Report announces that "the primary purpose of the Commission
^U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Oper-
ations, Senate Report No. 216, 83rd Congress, 1st Session,
1953, Senate Reports 1, p. 4.
^Ibid.
'^Second Hoover Commission, Final Report, p. 28.
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was to recommend methods by which savings could be made in
the expenditures of the agencies of the executive branch."^
"But more important than savings." Hoover declared in a New
York_Times interview, "was the realization that the whole
social and economic system is based on private enterprise ."
2
The creation, organization, and operation of the Hoover Com-
mission of 1953-1955 was motivated by a desire to return
government and its relationship to business to pre-New Deal
days
.
Findings, Recommendations, Assumptions
It is possible that a small miracle could have trans-
formed the work of this ideologically committed, conserva-
tively-biased Commission and its Task Forces into a thought-
ful, skeptical analysis. In general, such was not the case.
The Commission's studies on public versus private production,
mortgage guarantees, agricultural credit, medical services
reflected the philosophical position from which it started.
However, by almost all accounts, the Commission's report on
Personnel and Civil Service ^ was competent and distinguished,
an outcome that must be accounted for by the strength of its
llbid., p. 19.
^New York Times , 26 June 1955, Sec. 1, p. 63.
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government, Personnel and Civil Service, A Report to the
Congress (Washington: Government Printing Office, February
1955) . Hereafter cited as Second Hoover Commission, Civil
Service Report.
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Task Force. And yet, given the political tenor of the
second Hoover Commission one must ask, what purposes and
assumptions lie behind the findings and recoMnendations on
the civil service? is there any reason to believe that
these purposes were out of character relative to the over-
riding concerns of the Commission?
The centerpiece of the Commission's (and its Task
Force's) report was an argument for changing the topmost
levels of the administration, by creating a distinctive
career senior civil service sharply separated from an
enlarged political executive corps. The Commission found
that the greatest weakness in the area of personnel and civil
service was in "expert managerial direction." Indeed,
"increasing the supply of managerial talent available within
the Government ... is the heart of the Federal personnel
problem today. "^ The source of this deficiency was to be
found, according to the Commission, in the high rate of turn-
over for political or noncareer executives, the confusion of
functions among career administrators and political execu-
tives, the lack of systematic recruitment and assignment
procedures, low salaries, political executives who are un-
prepared for their political tasks, conflict of interest
laws that discourage competent persons from entering govern-
ment, and a system which emphasizes positions, not people,
at the higher levels.
^Second Hoover Commission Task Force, Report, p. xxi.
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TO address these problems the Commission made nineteen
wide-ranging recommendations, only a few of which need be
examined here. As the Commission's report to Congress
states, its primary purpose was to reach a balance between
the need for competent, politically responsive non-career
executives and the need for skilled, non-partisan career
administrators. in the Commission's view that balance could
best be reached by increasing the number of political appoin-
tees from 750 to 5,000,1 concentrating these political exec-
utives at the department level, and clearly separating their
responsibilities and duties from the career officials below.
At the same time, officials with civil service protection
were to be restricted to the bureau level and below where
they would be relieved of all policy-political duties and
would carry out solely technical, administrative responsi-
bilities. The cornerstone of this new relationship was the
Commission's recommendation for a Senior Civil Service.
Reportedly the proposal nearest to Hoover's heart,
^
the Senior Civil Service was to be a corps of senior career
officials, 1500 to 3000 strong, who were to be nominated by
department heads and selected by a Senior Civil Service Board
^MacNeil and Metz, The Hoover Commission
, p. 34. The
Hoover Commission Report leaves the amount of increase
indeterminate. MacNeil and Metz indicate the 5,000 figure
—
a seemingly fantastic increase from 750. As the Report's
editor and Director of Research they obviously were privi-
leged to some of the Commission's discussions.
^Ibid., p. 29.
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solely on the basis of competence. its putative purpose was
"to have always at hand in the Government a designated group
of highly qualified administrators whose competence, integ-
rity, and faithfulness have been amply demonstrated" and "to
make the civil service more attractive as a career."^ The
members of the new service would have their status, rank,
and salary vested in them as individuals rather than in their
job. At the same time, they would be obligated to serve
where needed most. These features would provide the top
civil service with flexibility. Senior civil servants would
be required to refrain from political activity, making state-
ments or speeches of a political nature, contributing to
political campaigns, testifying before Congress on political
questions, or identifying publically with a political party.
Indeed, the political neutrality of the senior administrator
must be such that he avoids "emotional attachments to the
policies of any administration."^ His incentive would come
in the form of higher base salaries and pay increases for
satisfactory performance. Though never used explicitly as
an example by the Task Force or Commission, undoubtedly the
Administrative Class of the British civil service had some
influence in the development of the Senior Civil Service
Second Hoover Commission, Civil Service Report
,
p. 39.
2lbid., p. 41.
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idea.l The rank-in-the-man idea (as opposed to the rank-in-
the-job) also pointed to American experience in the military
and foreign services, where a "corps" model seemed to exist.
Other recommendations of significance include the pro-
posal to allow managers greater discretion to select person-
nel at middle and upper levels by adopting a "rule of five"
rather than the "rule of three." m addition, the Commis-
sion recommended opening the back door to the service by
limiting appeals of dismissal to one appeal to higher
authority within the agency and to tightening the veteran's
special right of appeal. Finally, the Commission recommended
replacing the then current performance appraisal system with
a new system that would make the rating of performance an
aid to management rather than end in itself.
That the recommendations of the Commission reflected a
particular political ideology can be seen at first instance
by noticing those few areas where the Commission disagreed
with its Task Force. First, the Task Force proposed ending
veterans preference in reductions-in- force and as a factor
for appointment to positions above the GS-12 level. The
-'Leonard White in "The Senior Civil Service," Public
Administration Review 15 (Autumn 1955) : 237-43
,
briefly dis-
cusses the history of the senior civil service corps concept
in the U.S. Suggested first in 1935 by the Commission of
Inquiry on Public Service Personnel, White himself provided
details in his Government Career Service (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1935). The idea was revived in 1937
in a report to the President's Committee on Administrative
Management and recommended again by the President's Commit-
tee on Civil Service Improvement (Reed Committee) just before
World War II.
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Conunission failed to support either proposal, and reco^ended
a much less severe change in veteran's preference. Second,
the Task Force made a strong statement rejecting all forms^
of political clearance for appointments to the career ser-
vice; the Commission made almost no mention of this issue.
Third, the Task Force recommended an official inquiry into
the Government's personnel security programs while the Com-
mission made no reference to the loyalty issue and its nega-
tive effects on morale. Finally, the Task Force was critical
of the dual position of the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission, but the Hoover Commission disagreed. in each
case, the position taken by the Hoover Commission appears to
have been in conformity with conservative thinking.
And what of the nature of political implications of
the recommendations themselves? Most decidedly, the recom-
mendations were aimed at securing a greater degree of polit-
ical control of policy-making by the party in power.
Certainly this was the intent in proposing an increase in
the number of top political appointees. By drawing a clear
line between nonpolitical and political officials and
rigidly separating their functions, the Commission hoped to
reduce the power of a bureaucracy which was perceived to be
under Democratic control. Politically neutering the bureau
chief would leave the Congressional committee in firm con-
trol of the policy subsystem. As David and Pollock point
out,l the commission's analysis is based on a concept of
responsible party government that the party in power will
translate its platform into programs. indeed, the Cormnis-
sion Report on personnel makes very little reference to the
President and his needs to control, apparently being more
concerned with strengthening the Congressional party's
policy^role than the President's. Increasing the number of
political appointees at the department level rather than
just in the President's executive office tends to confirm
this view. In addition, MacNeil and Metz, the Commission's
editor in chief and director of research, note that "as a
creature of the Congress, set up by it and reporting to it
alone, the Hoover Commission in examining every activity of
the executive branch was conscious of the rights of the
legislative branch and never ceased to protect them. "2 in a
very real sense, the Second Hoover Commission, ingrained
with the traditional Republican distrust for executive
leadership, broke with the predominant administrative doc-
trine held by the President's Committee on Administrative
Management and the First Hoover Commission. From the Com-
mission's perspective, responsible administrators would
reflect the views of the party in control of the Congress.
In terms of administrative doctrine, the Commission
'-David and Pollock, Executives for Government
,
pp. 158-66.
^MacNeil and Metz, The Hoover Commission, p. 302.
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made a number of controversial assumptions. First, of
course, was the assumption that politics and administration
could be rigidly separated-a major criticism made by the
academics who by and large labeled the notion as unrealistic.
Wallace Sayre argued that "the political executive who is
all policy and politics, the career executive who is all
competence and neutrality, are not portraits from real
life." In particular, the Commission's claim that the
senior civil Service would be a politically neutral corps,
devoid of all emotional attachments was described by many
critics as nonsense. The Senior Civil Service would make
career officials out to be "more neuter than neutral, a
pallid creature resembling a hybrid of Little Lord Fauntleroy
and an elderly clerk. "^ if the Commission's concern was
bureaucratic inertia, Harlan Cleveland noted that "it is not
neutrality but vigorous advocacy that overcomes inertia in
our big government. Too much emphasis on neutrality would
shift the whole government into neutral."^ In addition,
Somers pointed out that neutrality would likely result in
^^New York Times
, 3 March 1956, p. 36. Also see Stephen
K. Bailey, "The President and His Political Executives," The
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 307 (September 1956):24-36; Harlan Cleveland, "The
Executive and the Public Interest," The Annals of the
American Academy of Political Science 307 (September 1956)
:
37-54; Everett Reimer, "The Case Against the Senior Civil
Service," Personnel Administration 19, No. 2 (March-April
1956):31-40.
^Ibid.
^Ibid.
government attracting fewer competent administrators not
more. "To identify
-good management' in the civil service
with indifference to the objects of management and unconcern
with the social consequences of policies is to make of public
administration a barren, if not nihilistic, affair which
seems unlikely to attract the kind of imaginative competence
which the Report hopes for."^ Thus, in the eyes of these
academics a responsible public administrator must have
qualities of leadership and political savvy. He or she is,
in Arnold Meltsner's terms, 2 an entrepreneur-an individual
who possesses both technical competence and political skills.
If this is so then public administration is characterized by
more bargaining, competition, and compromise in policy-making
than a strict politics-administration dichotomy allows for.
Separating political from administrative functions,
the Commission believed, and then increasing the number of
political executives, would result in a bureaucracy more
susceptible to change. Such a consequence is not fore-
ordained. As Heclo warns, simply adding more political
appointees in an effort to control the bureaucracy may "fur-
ther bureaucratize the political layers and accentuate
Herman Somers, "Some Reservations About the Senior
Civil Service," Personnel Administration 19, No. 1 (January-
February 1956) :11. Louis L. Friedland, "The Career System
Revisited," Personnel Administration 18, No. 1 (January
1955) :20, also makes this point.
Arnold Meltsner, Policy Analysts m the Bureaucracy
(Berkeley, California: University of California Press,
1976) .
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initial distrust and the mindless compulsion to change per-
sonnel with each new administration, as well as create more
nonelected entrepreneurs trying to cut their own swath
through Washington. "1 Further, Presidents, to their dismay,
have found their political appointments often too willing to
take up life with the "natives."
The Senior Civil Service proposal also assumes that
there are "broad areas of government activity reaching into
and across a cluster of departments and agencies within any
part of which a senior civil servant would feel at home."^
Like the British Administrative Class, the Senior Civil
Service is predicated on the notion that an administrative
generalist can be transferred from one post to another with-
out a loss in effectiveness.^ Yet this assumption not only
overlooked the technical value of continuity and program
specialization, but the reality, in the American system,
that administrators (with the support of their colleagues in
Congress and interest groups) become attached to particular
programs (a reality the Commission hoped to change)
.
Finally, many academics were critical of various
details of the Senior Civil Service, arguing that the career
^Hugh Heclo, A Government of Strangers (Washington:
The Brookings Institution, 1977), p. 243.
2Leonard White, "The Case for the Senior Civil Ser-
vice, " Personnel Administration 19, No. 1 (January-February
1956) :7.
•^Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service , p. 87, dis-
cusses this doctrine.
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concept woul. clash with othe. i.po.tant ,oals. Po. example
It was Claimed that the Senior civil Service would li.it
lateral entry and thereby create a closed, elite service;
that a rank-in-man system would create tensions when placed
along side the ran.-in-job system and, further, goes against
the concept of social egalitarianism; and that the notion of
a generalist corps is impractical in a system which produces
and rewards specialists ,
^ But perhaps the more important
criticism of the Hoover Con^ission was aimed at its assump-
tion that a career service is built on correct technical
arrangements and monetary incentives. Van Riper 's observa-
tions regarding the First Hoover Commission continued to
hold true for the Second;
the problem of our national public service can atbest be met only temporarily and partiaUy wi^h'recom-mendatrons which stress merely financial Ld proceduralsolutions to difficulties which are really the reflectionof deep and underlying political considerations At the
^2n^T-° .^^^ personnel problem of the Federal Govern-
no ^^f-^.^i 1"'''''^
fundamental considerations of nationalp litical policy, and it will take political as well asadministrative invention to solve them.
2
To attract and hold quality public servants requires more
than just applying personnel techniques; rather it is a mat-
ter of creative political leadership and creating a consensus
on the purpose of administration.
'•See Stanley, The Higher Civil Service, pp. 123-25 for
a discussion of the pros and cons for a career corps of top
civil servants.
2Paul P. Van Riper, "The Hoover Commission and Omis-
sion," Personnel Administration 14, No. 6 (November 1951) :38.
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While much Of the criticise of the Cor^ission's report
on personnel and civil service focused on its public admin-
istration doctrine and administrative assumptions, the
future of its recommendations rested on the responses of
those groups whose interests would be affected by its imple-
mentation, in short, the factor determining the disposition
of Hoover's proposals was power. For the supporters of a
renewed Republicanism, the 1954 mid-term election came as a
blow. The Republicans lost their majority in the House and
the Democratic majority, reacting partially to the earlier
Republican transgressions of "playing partisan politics
with our civil service, "1 gave a cold shoulder to the Hoover
Commission proposals when they were reported in early 1955,
including those dealing with personnel and civil service.
With the 1956 election just around the corner, the Democrats
looked forward to using the big business bias of the report
to campaign successfully again against "Hooverism" and hoped
to tie Eisenhower to the report by pointing out that he had
appointed three Republicans that included Hoover and only
one Democrat. 2 Eisenhower responded by trying to distance
^Former President Truman quoted in Packman, "Govern-
ment Jobs, " p. 360 .
2Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 13, No. 24(June 17, 1955), p. 692. See also "The Second Hoover Com-
mission Abandons Reform for Revolution," Democratic Digest 3,
No. 2 (September 1955):25-31, for partisan Democratic state-
ment accusing the Commission of "turning back the clock."
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himself fror. the Co^ission, and many Congressional Repub-
licans indicated that they also found some of the reco^aen-
dations "too hot to handle." Even Republican Senator
Bridges, a Commission me^er, suggested that the Congress
Should "not do a hurried job in putting (the recommendations)
into action.""^ a*^ ^ y-a.c,^,n- 4-uAS a result the proposals fared badly in
Congress
.
But beyond the strictly partisan electoral interests
of Congress was an institutional concern that cut across
party lines. The personnel proposals of the Commission were
a two-edged sword. On closer examination, some members of
Congress saw in the proposals for a Senior Civil Service and
an increased number of political appointees the potential
for a reduced role for Congress in the administrative
process. This consequence could be avoided if Congress were
to confirm all political and Senior Civil Service appoint-
ments but, among other things, this would result in an
unacceptable politicization of the career service. ^ The
relationship between bureau chief and committee chairman
acting in a policy-making subsystem is one of mutual depen-
dence, and important to a congressman's influence over
policy implementation. To force congressmen to deal
•-Quoted in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 13,
No. 24 (June 17, 1955) :691. ~
2See David and Pollock, Executives for Government
,
p. 84, for a discussion of Congress vis-a-vis the Senior
Civil Service.
strictly with political executives would interfere with
their direct access at the program level. xt is perhaps for
these reasons that Republican Representative Brown, co-
sponsor of the bill establishing the Second Hoover Commis-
sion, submitted a strong dissent to the Senior civil Service
concept, arguing that such a corps would "strengthen and
further entrench the bureaucracy
.
Interest group reaction lined up on both sides of the
commission's report on personnel. Not surprisingly the
federal civil servants and their unions were skeptical. in
the first place the Commission report lacked any treatment
of the security-loyalty issue and made almost no mention of
employee-management relations. But beyond that, the American
Federation of Government Employees was quick to note that,
unlike the First Hoover Commission, the second one ignored
any role for employee participation "in the formulation and
improvement of federal personnel policies and practices. "2
In addition, top civil servants questioned the selection,
promotion, and transfer conditions of the Senior Civil Ser-
vice proposal and many found the uncertainties and risks not
worth the rewards. The Commission's emphasis on performance
evaluation was a particular sticky point with the public
employees. Others feared that the proposed Senior Civil
^Second Hoover Commission, Civil Service Report,
pp. 89-90. —
2The Government Standard 55, No. 7 (February 18,
1955):1. —
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service Board inevitably wouXa ™a.e selection ana promotion
decisions based on partisan or ideological grounds.^ «ot
least,
.any career officials questioned the mobility pro-
visions Of the Hoover proposal, not necessarily based on any
personal inconvenience but on the grounds that their profes-
sional commitments lie with specific programs or agencies.
Chester Newland concludes from his study of top federal
civil servants that very few were generalist managers; "many
were expert managers, but nearly all were confined to narrow
specializations in specific organizations. Thus again,
long established sub-system relationships would prove hard
to change
.
Other groups upset by the Hoover Commission and ones
with clout in congress were veterans' organizations. The
American Legion was opposed to forty-six Hoover recommen-
dations affecting veterans. ^ A number of these were from the
commission's report on Personnel and Civil Service , for
example, those limiting veteran's preference in appeals and
reductions-in-force. The veterans' groups played an
important role in shaping negative Congressional attitudes
-"-See the statement by James Campbell, National Presi-dent of the A.F.G.E. in The Government Standard 55, No. 8(February 25, 1955) :2, which questions the Senior CivilService concept and the role of the selection board inparticular
.
Chester A. Newland, "Professional Public Executives
and Public Administration Agenda," in Professional Public
Executives, ed
.
Chester A. Newland (Washington: American
Society for Public Administration, 1980), p. 12.
3New York Times
, 30 January 1956, p. 25.
the
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to the overall personnel report.
support for the Hoover proposals oa.e
.ro™ two primary
sources, besides a awindXing
„.^er of Congressional Repub-
licans: the Citizens Co™„ittee for the Hoover Report ana
political executives. The citizens Co™„ittee was a bipar-
tisan organization of businessmen, academics, university
presidents, bankers, and former Congressmen and Cabinet
members. Its Chairman was Clarence Francis, chairman of
board of General Poods Corporation, originally formed by
Hoover to develop outside support for the First Commission,
it continued to perform that function for the Second, its
prominent membership insured public attention to a message
that was carried in speeches, news releases, special school
courses, and its publication,
"Reorganization News." While
it claimed a major role in the broad acceptance of the pro-
posals of the First Hoover Commission, political conditions
in 1955 were not ripe enough for it to have much of an
1impact
.
The other major source of support for the proposals of
the report on Personnel and Civil Service came from the
President and top level political executives. Although
Eisen.hower showed relative indifference to most of the Com-
mission's recommendations in hopes of avoiding "issues
This paragraph depends on the New York Times
, 20 Feb-
ruary 1955, p. 29, and the Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report 13, No. 24 (June 17, "1955) :693.
pacea With political a^te,^
the senior ci.il Service proposals. maeea, as Oavia ana
Polloc. point out, it was in his interest to create a corps
Of top level careerists with a hroaa understanain, of govern-
ment goals ana responsive to the President rather than
particular interest groups.^ ^^^^
^^^^^^^
Sen.or corps concept because it wouia break up established
symbiotic relationships in the sub-system, the Presiaent
supported the concept for that very reason. Political heads
Of depart„,ents found grounds to support the plan in the hope
that they would obtain a group of more competent, neutral
career officials and greater managerial flexibility.
With mounting union and veteran opposition, wide dis-
agreement among academics, and a highly partisan Congress,
the congress failed to act on the Commission's personnel
recommendations. Basea on the recommendations of a Career
Executive Committee appointed by the President in 1957,
Eisenhower went as far as he could without legislation
toward creating the Senior Civil Service. 3 Through Executive
Order 10758 a Career Executive Service was establishea in
March 1958. The Order provided for a Career Executive Board
William R. Divine, "The Second Hoover CommissionReports: An Analysis," Public Administration Review 15No. 4 (Autumn 1955):268T ~ ~
2David and Pollock, Executives for Government
, p. 82.
3See Van Riper, "The Senior Civil Service and theCareer System," Public Administration Review 18 (Summer 1958):189—200.
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to prepare a roster of eli.iMe career executives
„.o were
to be available
.or flexible assignments,
.i.ite. though it
was, the House denied appropriations for the Career Executive
service in 1959, leaving a host of political issues and
administrative problems unresolved.
The Anatomy of a Failure
unlike the reform movement which culminated in the
Pendleton Act of 1883, the story of the Second Hoover Com-
mission is largely one of failure. Yet, like the prior
"successful" reform f^ffoT-i- i-u^r ef rt, the motives and forces that con-
tributed to the creation, the recommendations, and the
failure of the Second Hoover Commission are complex. The
initial impetus for the Commission came from a Republican
congress heady with a new found ally in the White House and
a public sympathetic with the goals of securing a smaller
government and a balanced budget. The 83rd Republican
Congress saw in the Commission's proposals for a clear sepa-
ration between career and political officials, more politi-
cal appointees, and the politically neutral Senior Civil
Service an opportunity to reduce the power of a bureaucracy
dominated by Roosevelt-Truman Democrats. The 85th Democratic
Congress, however, seeing in these same proposals a weakening
of Congressional influence in administrative decision-making
and a corresponding centralization of administrative control
in the Republican President, never let the proposals get off
the ground and withheld funding when Eisenhower unilaterally
trxed to initiate the™. Eisenhower, although trying to
ignore the bulk o. the Commission's proposals,
.ia and the
personnel recon^endations in his interests. Vet Eisenhower
had no investment in the proposals, no programs that would
gaxn from them and no commitment to institutional change
Thus he had no reason to fight with Congress over the Senior
Cxvxl service proposal. indeed, such a fight would have
been an uphill battle, confronting not only a partisan Con-
gress but also a highly skeptical group of top level federal
employees and veterans' organisations. His political ally,
the Citizen's Committee for the Hoover Co^ission, had by
now depleted its political capital. After all, it took the
murder of a President to catapult the original reformers to
success
.
There were real problems plaguing the civil service:
the difficulty of securing and holding competent career and
political officials; deficiencies in training programs, pay,
performance evaluation, and dismissal policies; the low
prestige and morale of the service; and the lack of agree-
ment upon the proper balance and relationship between polit-
ically appointed executives and career administrators. The
Hoover Commission did not approach these problems with the
advantages of the one-eyed man in the kingdom of the blind,
but viewed them between large partisan and philosophical
blinders. Thus, the standards that guided the Commission
were conditioned by its particular vantage point.
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created with the justification of reducing waste and
inefficiency, the Commission continued to justify its
activities in its Final^eport by the need to save money by
reducing government activity. Even at the end of its report
°^ ^™Hiel_and_Civ^^ the Commission claimed a
savings of $48,500,000 if its proposals were adopted.
But clearly economy was not the sole or even the
primary standard to which the Commission wanted the civil
service to conform. And, unlike its most recent predeces-
sors, neither was executive leadership. indeed, the Commis-
sion and its creators distrusted a strong executive.
Although its personnel proposals had implications for
executive control of administration—generally making it
stronger—these were implications that finally resulted in
the Commission's failure.
The primary criterion by which the Commission judged
the public service was whether or not it was politically
responsive. From the Republicans' perspective in 1953 it
was judged unresponsive to the political will of the American
voting public. Diagnosing that the source of the bureauc-
racy's irresponsibility was the presence of career officials
(who, moreover, were Democrats) functioning as policy-makers,
the Commission prescribed sharpening the separation between
the career and non-career administrators and neutralizing the
political and emotional attachments of the permanent bureau-
crats in a Senior Civil Service. The Commission believed
this remedy would allow an increased number of political
appointees to respond to the will of the people through the
political party. it has already been noted that simply
adding more political appointees might be counterproductive
in addition, serious problems also may arise from a reform
that emphasizes responsiveness to political leadership, m
Heclo-s words, "without a sense of the civil service's inde-
pendent responsibility to uphold legally constituted insti-
tutions and procedures, political control of the bureaucracy
can easily go too far. Any single-minded commitment to
executive energy is likely to evolve into arbitrary power. "1
Watergate is a clear example as are executive abuses ranging
from partisan involvement in the CIA and FBI to welfare
administration.
Accompanying this attempt to secure a more responsive
bureaucracy, was the perceived need for a bureaucracy more
representative of conservative values. Republican cries for
more patronage and Eisenhower's efforts to oblige by
ordering Schedule C and supporting the Willis Directive
indicate Republicans' perceptions of an unrepresentative
administration. Not only were Eisenhower's appointments
evidence of the desire for a new business orientation, but
the technical, managerial emphasis of the Commission's pro-
posals, such as that calling for a neat, clear line sepa-
rating politics from administration, also suggests an
^Heclo, A Government of Strangers
, p. 244 .
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unexamined faith in the application of business techniques
to public administrative problems.
Although it is manifest that the standards applied by
the commission were in response to the political conditions
of the time, there is no explicit acknowledgment in the Com-
mission's report of its political purpose. Undoubtedly, the
commissioners were well aware of the political implications
of their personnel report and one can only surmise that they
believed that restricting their analysis, conclusions, and
language to a managerial-technical orientation would give
the report an aura of objectivity. Yet, herein lie two
deficiencies: 1) it covers up the possibility that the
problem of obtaining and retaining competent public servants
is determined more by the larger political environment and
character of leadership than by the technical factors of
selection and organizational structure, ^ and 2) it withholds
from top administrators—both career and non-career—a clear
picture of just what the national policy is with regard to
the civil service. Even more devastating, the Commission's
Report completely ignored those values which are basic to
P^^^i^ administration. As a result, this major effort to
solve the key problems of the civil service in the 1950s~
selecting and holding competent higher public servants and
balancing administrative continuity with political respon-
siveness—was at odds with the goal of achieving a truly
^See Somers, "The Federal Bureaucracy and the Change
of Administration," p. 149.
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responsible public aa™inistration. Whether the efforts of a
new generation of reformers in the 1970s were any closer to
this ideal will be the focus of the next chapter.
CHAPTER III
THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE-
PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE
"I ca.e to Washington," President Jin^y carter reminded
Americans in 1978, "with a promise and the obligation to
rebuild the faith of the American people in our government."!
It was President Carter's diagnosis that the loss of faith
was attributable to "not enough merit in the .erit system.
There is inadequate motivation because we have too few
rewards for excellence and too few penalties for unsatisfac-
tory work." "The sad fact is," his diagnosis continued,
"that it is easier to promote and to transfer incompetent
employees than it is to get rid of them. ... You cannot
run a farm that way, you cannot run a factory that way, and
you cannot run a government that way." The Carter prescrip-
tion for these ills was government reorganization with civil
service reform as the "centerpiece." A large dose of this
"absolutely vital" medicine would, it was promised, "restore
the merit principle to a system which has grown into a
bureaucratic maze. It will provide greater management flex-
ibility and better rewards for better performance without
„
'"This and the next few quotes from Jimmy Carter,
Federal Civil Service Reform," address to National PressClub, Weekl y Compilation of Presidential Documents 14, No 9(March 2, 1978) :435-38. " ~
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compromising job security "1 Aft^v =, , ''^y. er applying this remedy
"and only then can „c have a government that is efficient
open, and truly worthy of our people's understanding and
'
respect. I have promised that we will have such a govern-
ment, and I intend to keep that promise. "2
Many people simply dismissed such promises flowing from
the mouths of mere do! i +-i =r,^p l t cians as mane rhetoric or vacuous
symbolism. Perhaps they were r„+- k,L-ue . But by granting Mr. Carter
the benefit of the doiih+- !->,=,+- u,-T.n a ubt that his promises were made in good
faith, more interesting questions are raised. Several
questions Shall be the concern of this chapter, others will
be discussed in Chapter Seven. Here we shall ask first what
administrative problems and political forces gave rise to
President Carter's promises and what were the political
dynamics that resulted in their putative fulfillment in the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Secondly, we shall ask
what assumptions its sponsors made and what values and stan-
dards are sought through this Act, particularly Title IV
s
provision for a Senior Executive Service. Finally, what have
been the political reactions to and what are the political
implications of the Senior Executive Service?
Jimmy Carter, "The State of the Union Address,"Weekly Compilat ion of Presidential Documents 14, No. 3(January 19, 1978) : 95 . ~
^Ibid.
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Ml?lini_strative^
£oiiti^a]_Answer|T
A fundamental administrative question that the Second
Hoover Cormnission had unsuccessfully attempted to solve was
how to reconcile the competing needs for continuity and
change. The Commission's failure was due primarily to its
inability to provide the correct political answers to those
individuals and groups that possessed political power, a
political consensus on how best to balance the President's
need to control the bureaucracy with employee rights and
merit protection proved to be elusive throughout the remain-
der of the 1960s and 1970s.
After Eisenhower's Career Executive Board was starved
out of existence by Congress, an Office of Career Development
was established in 1961 by the Civil Service Commission to
improve the selection and development of top executives,
primarily by maintaining a central listing of career offi-
cials at the highest levels. This effort was superseded in
1967 by President Johnson's Executive Order 11315 creating
an Executive Assignment System. The Executive Assignment
System established three types of positions within the super-
grades GS-16, 17 and 18: Career Executive Assignments,
Limited Executive Assignments, and Noncareer Executive
Assignments. It was designed to provide government-wide
^From a book with the same title by Claude E. Hawley
and Ruth G. Weintraub (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Co.,
Inc.
, 1966) .
career opportunities for executives and broaden senior civil
servants, identification with overall government objectives
rather than just one agency or program. The Executive
Assignment System also included a Career Executive Inventory
system Which provided biographical information on personnel
in grades GS-15 to GS-18, as an aid to agency heads in
filling executive vacancies.
^ The Executive Assignment Sys-
tem was only one approach used by Johnson to meet his staf-
fing needs. Less formally, the Kennedy-Johnson Administra-
tions attempted to establish political control of the
bureaucracy by placing politically loyal officials in key
senior positions, whether career or noncareer. Like Philip
Young under Eisenhower, John Macy under Johnson served as
both chairman of the civil Service Commission and Special
Assistant to the President for personnel. And following long
established tradition Johnson, just before leaving office,
blanketed-in a number of non-career appointees into the
career service and "cleared" some loyal Democrats for career
appointments. 2 Thus upon inheriting the Presidency in 1969
Nixon sought to tame a bureaucracy he perceived to be hostile
by continuing the trend of politicizing the higher career
^See Mel H. Bolster, "The Strategic Deployment of
Exceptional Talent: An Account of the Career Executive
Roster's Short History," Public Administration Review 21,
No. 5 (December 1967) :446-451 . ~~
2See the "Malek Manual" for a discussion of Kennedy-
Johnson manipulations of the merit system. Reprinted in The
Bureaucrat 4, No. 4 (January 1 976 ) : 4 31-3 3
.
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levels.
..e "Male./May Manual" is a testament to the Nixon
Administration's strategy to control executive branch person-
nel. A part Of this strategy was Nixon's proposal for a
Federal Executive Service patterned after the Second Hoover
Cor^ission's Senior civil Service. intended to give the
Administration the tools to insure that politically respon-
sive officials held key positions, the proposal evoked
intense opposition from federal employee unions and Congres-
sional Democrats and met disaster in 1972 in the House Post
Office and civil Service Committee after passing the Senate.
The abrupt end of the Nixon administration did not
reduce the pressures felt by chief executives to control the
bureaucracy. The long-term trend of increasingly politi-
cizing the civil service in order to prevent bureaucratic
"sabotage" continues.
^ At the same time, a trend traceable
to the Civil Service Act of 1883 persists. In the late
1950s Van Riper argued that the civil service system had
become overburdened with "red tape, greater procedural con-
trols, more restrictive dismissal procedures, and more and
more review and appeals boards—all in the name of justice,
security, and fair play for civil employees. "2 This emphasis
Ipor a discussion of the trend toward greater politi-
cization of the bureaucracy, see James L. Sundquist, "JimmyCarter As Public Administrator: An Appraisal at Mid-Term,"
Publ ic Administration Review 39, No. 1 (January/February
1979) : 3-11, and Hugh Heclo, A Government of Strangers (Wash-ington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977), pp. 68-76.
2paul P. Van Riper, History of the United States Civil
Service (Evanston, Illinois:" Row, Peterson and Company, I'gsf),
p. 529.
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on "neutral protectionism" and "legalistic complexity" was
invigorated following Watergate revelations of raids on the
merit system.l
.et the irony of these two trends-increased
politicization and merit protectionism-is that neither can
fully succeed without triggering intense pressure to
emphasize the other. Administrations arrive believing that
bureaucratic power constitutes a threat to their political
goals. The number of political executives is increased,
career executives are screened for their loyalty, and "dis-
senters" are banished. Almost simultaneously, efforts to
protect career officials from political influence and merit
abuse are initiated which encourage further politicization.
It is no wonder that the problem of accommodating both
continuity and change has proven to be tenacious.
When Jimmy Carter launched his White House career, he,
no less than his predecessors, was concerned about getting
control of a powerful federal bureaucracy. To an extent
never approached by prior occupants of the Presidency, Carter
made this concern the major platform of his campaign. His
campaign rhetoric seldom got beyond the level of promises to
clean up the "horrible bureaucratic mess in Washington" and
to institute "tight, businesslike management and planning
See Chester A. Newland, "Public Personnel Administra-
tion; Legalistic Reform vs. Effectiveness, Efficiency, and
Economy," Public Administration Review 36, No. 5 (September/
October 1976) : 529-3T^ ~~
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techniques" in governmeni- ^ rnu^ ^y ernment. The downpayment for such
promises was Carter's
..success" as government manager and
effrciency expert while Governor of Georgia. Vet, though
sparse on substance, Carter.s criticisms of bureaucracy and
promises to reorganize government touched a tender spot with
the voting public.
Public opinion polls since the mid-1960s have shown
that voters have little confidence in government to solve
problems and believe that government programs are not well
run, that they are inefficient and wasteful. 2 The breadth
and depth of public dissatisfaction with government is seen
in Proposition 13-type efforts from coast to coast and the
subsequent spending and tax-cutting fever which has overcome
congress. Both popular and academic literature have
reflected this public disenchantment by repeatedly criti-
cizing the civil service system for its contributions to the
"crisis in confidence...3 Seizing upon this widespread public
o V,-,
'^'^2^ Marshall, .'The Efficiency Expert,'. The New
.
Rgp"blic 175, Nos. 8, 9 (August 21, 28, 1976) lis .
2For a summary of recent public opinion polls seeJames L. Sundquist, "The Crisis of Confidence in Government,"getting National Priorities, Agenda for the 1980's, edJoseph A Pediman (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institu-tion, 1980), pp. 534-38, and Roger H. Davidson, "The Politics
of Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Compensation," inThe Rewards of Public Service , eds. Robert W. Hartman andArnold R. Weber (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1980),
pp . 55-66 .
3For specific criticisms of the civil service system,
see Nicholas Lemann, "Seats at the Banquet, " The New
Republic 177, No. 18 (October 29, 1977) : 16-20; "What's Wrong
With the Civil Service?", Washington Monthly 9 (April 1977):
agitation. Carter interpreted his election as a mandate to
do "something., about the bureaucracy,
.ot surprisingly, the
public's preference as indicated in the polls was "for „ore
restrictive rather than more permissive treatment of govern-
ment employees
.
once in office. Carter's concern for getting cc^ntrol
of the bureaucracy went beyond the level of a campaign theme.
The difficulties of persuading a large, professionally
oriented bureaucracy with loyalties to Congressional, state,
and local clients to respond to the policy directions of a
new President became real. One of the first steps for
Carter was to call for the implementation of zero-base
budgeting throughout the executive branch, ostensibly to
require the agencies to justify budget requests in terms of
their individual missions. When Congress allowed the
National Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life
to expire in 1978, Carter established a National Productivity
Council to replace it.^ The Council, charged with coordi-
nating federal productivity improvement activities, was an
attempt to indicate the Administration's seriousness about
50-61; E. S. Savas and Sigmund G. Ginsberg, "The Civil Ser-
vice: A Meritless System?", The Public Interest No. 32(Summer 1973): 70-85; and Robert G. Vaughn, Thi~SpoiledSystem (New York: Charterhouse, 1975)
.
-•-Davidson, "The Politics of Executive, Legislative,
and Judicial Compensation," p. 66.
2Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 37 (June 16,
1979):ll57:
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-proving
.anage^ent of government resources. The
.a„inis-
trat.on also established a Regulatory Council, designed to
review government regulations with an eye toward
.aking the.
cost-effective. In addition, a series of government reorga-
nrzatxon plans were set forth. But the centerpiece of the
carter administrative reform efforts was the civil Service
Reform Act of 1978.
Sorting out the Administration's real intentions
behind the vigorous pursuit of civil service reform is no
easy chore. They are a mixed bag; in one sense the purpose
was purely partisan politics; reform was merely cosmetic.
By 1978 the carter Administration was in desperate need of a
legislative victory, having been rebuffed repeatedly by an
alien, though Democratic, Congress. in the "nonpartisan"
issue of civil service reform. Carter saw the potential for
legislative success. From another vantage point, civil ser-
vice reform and the SES particularly would provide a
mechanism to shake-up the subsystem and make the bureaucracy
more responsive to future presidential initiatives. More-
over, relationships between career bureaucrats and political
appointees have grown more distant and less incestuous, a
product of the high turnover of political officials and the
growing tendency to get to Washington by running against it.
The Carter Administration did nothing to mitigate these
phenomena and came into office with a high degree of mutual
distrust and even hostilltyl marking the relationship
between bureaucrat and politician, it would be difficult
not to conclude that refer™ was intended to control the arn,y
Of "mutinous" bureaucrats,
.t the sa.e time, given Carter's
background as engineer and reputation as manager, one cannot
overlook the good-faith but naive intent to create an admin-
istrative process more on the model of the private sector as
a remedy for what was widely Derceiv^r^ i r.K^^j.y p eived as low government
productivity.
Indeed, Carter's stated purposes in pushing civil
service reform legislation were to increase governmental
efficiency, defined as increasing productivity with less
inputs while, simultaneously, increasing the protection of
employees against political abuse. 2 From the Administra-
tion's perspective the merit system was saddled with three
major problems: abuse of merit principles, disincentives to
^The story is told by James Sundquist of a top career
chie^ ^^01'?^^%"^^^^^^ entering the office of the'^bureau
u i • I
political appointee—and being greeted with: "Ihate It every time I see you walk through that door, becauseyou represent everything I despise most- the bureaucracy."Sundquist also quotes an assistant secretary as saying, "Iexpected on coming to Washington that I would be workingintimately with a career staff. But it's surprising, it
nasn t been that way. I meet only with other political
appointees. We talk to each other." From "Jimmy Carter AsPublic Administrator: An Appraisal at Mid-Term," Public
Administration Review 39 (January/February 1979) :8T
2Alan K. Campbell, "Civil Service Reform as a RemedyFor Bureaucratic Ills," in Making Bureaucracies Work
, ed.Carol H. Weiss and Allen H. Barton (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage
Publications, 1979), p. 157, and Jimmy Carter, "Federal Civil
Service Reform," Message to Congress, Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents 14, No. 9 (March 2, 1978) :444 .
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effective management, and lack of opportunities for women
and minorities. The third problem was attributed largely to
restrictive veteran preference rules while the first problem
was the product of a civil Service Commission charged with
the contradictory roles of advising presidents and protecti
the merit system. The emphasis was placed by the Carter
Administration on what Civil Service Coimnission Chairman
Campbell termed the "semi-paralysis in administration-^
referring to the inordinate length of time it takes managers
to fill vacant positions, resolve discrimination complaints,
fire employees, and settle adverse action appeals. The cul-
prit was identified as the tangle of rules, regulations, and
procedures that "impede the ability of top political appoin-
tees to select, motivate and manage their staffs," while
also failing to prevent merit abuses. ^ Thus the Carter
reforms were an attempt to re-open the back door of the
civil service. Perhaps most importantly to the Administra-
tion, outstanding performance was neither encouraged nor
expected by a system in which pay increases were automatic
and performance appraisals pro forma. Using broad public
dissatisfaction with government as leverage. Carter presented
-'-U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Post Office andCivil Service, Civil Service Reform, Hearings on H.R. 112 80,A Bill to Reform the Civil Service Laws 95th Congress, 2nd
Session, 19 78, p. 20.
2Alan K. Campbell, "Civil Service Reform: A New
Commitment," Public Administration Review 38, No. 2 (March/
April 1978) :1oT:
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congress in March 1978 a co^pIeK refo™ pac.a.e that incX.aea
the provision for a Senior Executive Service. The SES was
seen as the Key to the Administration's managerial crusade
Providing additional fuel for a major reform effort
were senior career staff and line administrators. Like
political appointees, many of these executives also found
their work lives governed by an overly centralized system
bound by self-defeating rules. ^ Many career officials with
managerial responsibilities agreed that the system weakened
their ability to do their work by making it impossible to
hold employees accountable and to reward outstanding execu-
tives or to penalize poor performance. Career and political
executives alike agreed that Congressionally imposed pay
caps and pay compression in the top levels from GS-16 to
GS-18 to Executive Level I provided little material incentive
to excel. Civil Service Commission executives were bothered
not only with the system's deficient management practices
and executive training and development programs, but they
also had a long-time concern for the growth in appointments
of political appointees to top positions that tended to put
a cap on career advancement. In addition, the Commission
hoped to bring order to the multiplicity of hiring authori-
ties in the supergrades and more control over the total
See Herbert Kaufman, "The Growth of the Federal
Personnel System," in The Federa l Government Service, 2nd
edition, ed. Wallace Sayre (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1965), pp. 58-59.
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numbers in the executive cadrs.^
career officials in the civil service Co™ission had
been working since the Nixon years on proposals to create a
corps of professional, government-wide managers in the
federal service. When Carter's policy staff made inquiries
Shortly after the election, C.S.C. personnel were ready with
an SES-type proposal. As one participant in the reform
process related, the SES Task Force that was charged with
developing a proposal had little to do since a well-developed
plan designed to meet the needs of career executives already
existed.
2 Another top civil servant noted regarding the
Carter reforra that "the whole damn thing was conceived by
civil servants.
... The proposals were developed by people
in the trenches like me and people who work for me who are
career civil servants. They're the ones who have seen what
is wrong with the system and proposed what should be done to
fix it." According to this view, career bureaucrats "are
not necessarily dedicated to maintenance of the status quo,
but often review programs and procedures to improve their
^For early thinking of C.S.C. staff, see PersonnelManagement Project, Task Force on Executive Personnel,Initial Option Paper," July 27, 1977, and Personnel Manage-
ment Project, Final Report
, Vol. II, Appendix II, "TaskForce Report on Senior Executive Service," December 1977.
2, . .interview with reform participant, Washington, D.C.,August 1981. "rl / • r
3Naomi B. Lynn and Richard E. Vaden, "Bureaucratic
Response to Civil Service Reform," Public Administration
Review 34, No. 4 (July/August, 1979):334~
effectiveness" and see. support of political leadership to
carry out their proposals.^
Prom the perspective of the professional personnel
Officials the primary purpose of the SES approach was to
"mandate management." Important but secondary goals were to
provide for more systematic executive development and mana-
gerial training and to bring more women and minority group
members into senior positions. Thus, as in earlier reforms,
the basic administrative framework was provided by the
bureaucracy itself. But it is important to note that the
initiative for reform was political in i-h^i- = ^ • •tj iticai, t at a decision was
made by the politicians to undertake reform "prior to a
detailed analysis and diagnosis of the problems. "2
In broad brush strokes, the Senior Executive Service^
created a corps of top government-wide managers, composed of
positions formerly in the General Schedule 16-18 and Execu-
tive Levels IV and V. it promised a compensation system
"designed to attract and retain highly competent senior
executives"; and to "recognize exceptional accomplishment";
^Sally H. Greenberg, "The Senior Executive Service,"The Bureaucrat 7, No. 3 (Fall 1978):16.
2Steven Knudsen, Larry Jakus, Maida Metz, "The CivilService Reform Act of 1978," in Public Personnel Management,
ed. Donald E. Klingner (Palo Alto, California: Mayfield
Publishing Company, 1981), p. 129.
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a performance appraisal system designed to ensure that pay
retention, and tenure are based on successful individual and
organizational performance and that executives are held
"accountable and responsible" for the performance of employ-
ees under them; flexibility to political managers "to
reassign senior executives to best accomplish the agency's
mission"; and protection to career executives from "arbitrary
actions" and "prohibited personnel practices." It promised,
in short, all things to all people.
Within the SES compensation includes base pay, perfor-
mance awards, and Presidential rank awards. Six SES pay
levels, ES-1 to ES-6, range from $54,755 to $58,500 per year
as of January 1, 1981. However, from 1979 until January
1981, executive pay had been frozen by Congress at $50,112.50
although the rate of executive pay established by the Pres-
ident as of October 1980 ranged from $52,247 for ES-1 to
$61,600 for ES-6. Career SES members (non-career SESers are
specifically excluded) are eligible for a lump sum perfor-
mance award of up to twenty percent of their pay. Under the
1978 legislation the number of awards presented were not to
exceed fifty percent of the SES positions in the agency. Up
to five percent and one percent of the SES members are
eligible for Presidential rank awards of Meritorious Execu-
tive and Distinguished Executive respectively. Recipients
of the former award received a lump sum payment of $10,000
while recipients of the latter award receive $20,000. In no
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case may SES members receive more in salary than that
authorized for Executive Schedule Level I, that is. Cabinet
members. As further incentive SES members are allowed to
accumulate annual leave without limit and upon retirement
substitute cash, and they are eligible for sabbatical leaves
of eleven months no more than once every ten years. The
details of compensation have been described here for two
reasons:
1) it will be argued that the Carter Administration
assumed that an economic model of behavior was appropriate
to apply to public administration and 2) it will be argued
that the emphasis on economic incentive has contributed to
severe problems in the SES implementation.
Closely tied to compensation is the performance
appraisal system. The heart of SES is the attempt to link
pay, promotion, and awards to performance. To be eligible
for an award the executive must receive a "fully successful"
rating. Any SES member receiving an "unsatisfactory" evalu-
ation must be reassigned or transferred. if a senior
executive receives two "unsatisfactory" ratings in any five
year period or two less than fully satisfactory ratings, for
example, "minimally satisfactory," in any three year period,
removal from the SES is mandatory. When removed because of
performance, the SES member has no right of appeal, but must
be placed at a GS-15 level or above. The Act specifies that
performance appraisal is to be based on both individual and
organizational performance and is to include such factors as
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in,prove.ents in efficiency, productivity, ana quality of
«ork, including reduction in paperworK; cost efficiency
timeliness of performance; and meeting affirmative action
goals
.
The SES provisions attempt to encourage mobility but
unlike the Hoover Commission proposal, do so in a way which
recognizes the realities of specialization and the benefits
of continuity. Career executives may be reassigned to any
position within the agency for which they are qualified, but
may not be involuntarily transferred to another agency.
Thus, executives may exercise their preference to remain in
their specialist fields when they move to another agency.
Yet, because the SES is based on the notion of rank-in-the-
person, in theory mobility is facilitated. Executives may
be appointed to positions as high as Cabinet rank without
losing their SES status. As Chester Newland notes, "SES
stops short of creating a government-wide generalist execu-
tive corps, but it provides a framework within which profes-
sionals with that sort of public service orientation may
have somewhat greater opportunities to create such a corps
through their own efforts.
The SES is protected from politicization in a number
of ways. Appraisal of performance is precluded within 120
-'-Chester A. Newland, "Professional Public Executives
and Public Administration Agendas," in Professional Public
Executives
,
ed. Chester A. Newland (Washington: American
Society for Public Administration, 1980), p. 24.
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days of the appointment of the head nfLiie n a ot the agency or the
appointment of the career executive's immediate supervisor
Who is a noncareer appointee. While removal from the SES
for unsatisfactory performance is not appealable, a member
xs entitled to an informal hearing before an official of the
Merit systems Protection Board (M.S.P.B.). if a career
official believes removal is occasioned by the political
executive's partisan preferences or is charged with miscon-
duct, the right of appeal to the M.S.P.B. exists. m
addition, the Act provides that the total number of noncareer
appointments in SES positions may not exceed ten percent of
all SES positions and the total number of limited term
appointees may not exceed five percent. Therefore, at least
85 percent of SES positions must be filled by career execu-
tives. Furthermore, under the Act, the Office of Personnel
Management is authorized to designate certain "sensitive-
positions as career reserved positions. The latter provi-
sions have moved beyond the attempt of the Hoover Commission
to establish a sharp politics-administration dichotomy. The
SES structure allows for a flexible intermingling of career
and noncareer appointments.
The above summary reflects the final shape of the
reform legislation. However, as regards the SES there was
surprisingly little amending of the original recommendations
of the Civil Service Commission's career staff by the Presi-
dent or Congress. Perhaps the most significant changes made
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by the Administration were to reduce the percent eligible
for perfor™ance awards from the recor^ended 75% to 50% to
add the Presidential rank awards, and exclude noncareer
appointees from eligibility for all awards.^ Thus again it
is notable that the career personnel ad^ninistrators had a
central role in shaping the SES
. changes made in the Con-
gressional process will be noted in the next section.
The Politics of Reform ;
Legislative Success~
If not apparent in the early stages of reform, there
was no disguising the political nature of the Carter reforms
When they were placed on the Congressional agenda. Clothing
civil service reform in a management costume makes it no
less political. Carter had prepared for his legislative
initiative well. m mid-1977 a Federal Personnel Management
Project, composed of nine task forces and close to 150
people, was organized to begin the process of garnering the
support of the executive branch and Congress. ^ Key roles
were played by Alan I. Campbell and Jule M. Sugarman as
chairman and vice-chairman of the C.S.C. in developing the
support of career employees. Congress and interest groups.
^Sally Greenberg discusses differences between theCarter legislation and the Task Force proposals in "TheSenior Executive Service."
^See Felix A. Nigro, "The Politics of Civil Service
Reform," Southern Review of Public Administration 3, No. 2(September 1979 ): 196-239 , for a detailed description of the
creation of the Personnel Management Project and the
reform's legislative history.
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Heading the Project was D„i,ht Ink, a respectea federal
career executive, and the Task Porces were composed largely
of career executives. The t=ov f„Task Force on SES, for example
was composed of three career civil servants. Thus unlike'
the Hoover Co^nission Task Force approach, the Carter project
attempted to get initial support from the executives them-
selves
in addition, the Task Forces served as spring boards
to generate support among the attentive public. Hearings
were held in large cities throughout the country and conunents
were solicited from close to 1500 individuals and groups in
and out of government. To further generate executive
support a working group of Assistant Secretaries for Admin-
istration from each of the major departments and agencies
was established to review Administration proposals. Finally,
a legislative task, group was established to develop Congres-
sional contacts. Members of the relevant House and Senate
committees were briefed and committee staff were invited to
participate in the Task Force studies.
President Carter was himself heavily and directly
involved in the effort to generate support. Campbell notes
that Carter devoted "parts of several Cabinet meetings to the
issue and there was active Cabinet discussion."^ Cabinet
members were asked to contact congressional people with whom
^Interview by John Macy, "Campbell Reflects on Reform
Process," Public Administration Times 2, No. 2 (January 15,
1979):4. ^
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they dealt. Also Carter „et personally with congressional
co^ittee staff members, both Democratic and Republican
movers of the House Post Office and civil Service Co™„it-
tee, and leaders of the American Federation of Govermnent
Employees
.
Chairman Campbell was the key Administration spokesman
meeting with editorial boards of newspapers, public interest
groups, groups of career executives, union leaders, business
organizations, civic groups, civil rights organizations, and
professional associations. "l met," Campbell says, "with
editorial boards of literally dozens of major newspapers
across the country. out of that came overwhelming editorial
support from newspapers like Th^JTev^rk_T^ Chicago
Tribune, Chicago_Sun_Tim^ Washington Post, and Los Angeles
Times. More than 200 editorials were written in favor of
civil service reform. There's no question that helped us,
and it helped us because we had some difficulty arousing
substantial interest on the Hill in the legislation ." ^ His
work paid off as support for the reforms was received from a
wide variety of groups: Business Roundtable and Common
Cause, Ralph Nader and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the
National Civil Service Reform League and the American Feder-
ation of Government Employees (AFGE) . But although support
'See Harlan Lebo, "The Administration's All-Out Effort
on Civil Service Reform," National Journal 10, No. 21 (May
27, 1978) : 837-38 .
"Campbell Reflects on Reform Process," p. 3.
was broad, it was not intenc,^. ^-k^ ^t: nse, therefore, securing support
from the House Post Office and r^.rM ouj-ric Civil Service Committee was
crucial
.
AS in earlier periods of history, the issue of civil
service reform had little salience for Congress. Campbell
and the Personnel Project members had to generate interest.
On the one hand, civil service reform became for many
mergers of Congress a safe, good government issue. Further
more, the 95th Congress reflected to a great extent the
dissatisfaction with government that existed in the country
congressional support for public expenditures and for publi
employees and their unions was down. At the same time,
however, there were pockets of potential intense opposition
among Congressmen with large civil servant, veteran, and
union constituencies, particularly on the House Post Office
and Civil Service Committee.
Opposition to the reform legislation by veterans'
organizations was fierce. They saw the Administration's
attempts to remove veteran's preference in hiring, promotion,
and reductions-in-force as "a litmus test of whether they
could continue to enjoy strong congressional support."^ In
the end veteran's preference was largely untouched, except
significantly in the SES where veteran's preference was
eliminated. Equally opposed to the Carter legislation were
^
"Civil Service Reform Likely This Year," Congres-
sional Quarterly Weekly Report 36, No. 37 (September 16,
1978):2460.
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public employee labor unions n .. Only the AFGE leadershiosupported the bin ir. ^ ^^ n p
inclusion of a Title vttwhxch established public sector collective h
under law. Yet even aft
^-^a.ning rights
"»—
::.::::r::::; rr:::":
reforms. pv^^n tt-j-h, ^-l.
''^^ Administration co^pro.ise the
r the .ationaxo.
.._t
easur. K^p^o^ees
„.io„
^^^^^^^^
the bill, hoping to secure greater concessions for labor
However, support of refor. b. the
...h, the largest public
sector union, helped to diffuse union opposition.
^
The senior executives' skepticism toward the SES wasbased on the belif^-F -1-1^-,+- •lref that xt would open both the front and
back doors of the service. m the reassignment feature of
the .ES many executives saw the possibilities of department
heads replacing career officials "with political or other
^^^f^ll!!!^!!!!!:::^'^^ '° "'^"^ individual liking...3
on
•Reform.r^^^e^e'rarTi^erir^So^^r;.^^^ "'^^'^^
Joel Haveman, ^^wTIl-lhi^ve;: T' I 'August 21, 1978) :1;the Federal Personnel Game? " m f^^^ Carter's Rules for(October 29, llTl^^HlTnf ' n %£i2i}£i^Iournal 9, No. 44dent's Civil Service Rn 1m : °™°"d Ayres, Jr., "Presi-
2
Act of ^978?"";.^?34!' R^f"™
Changingthrciv?r?;r""^"c ^""^ President's Plan for
Revili 38 No r^TnW.^'"'
System," Public Administration
_S_51J_ew JO, O. 4 (July/August 1978) : 301 . '—
same time, too expont--; r,—"txves were doubtful that a ten percenUn..t on noncareer appointees wouia prevent a dete
Administration from politicising r
an, any system can be manipulated. Some ob
t
rmined
—
^ --"^serversSun..uist
.o. example,
.o..
.... t.e ten percent Ximit
on noncareer appointments is too hi,h and that a much
sharper distinction between career anrd^ noncareer must be
established to <-r-o=.-i ^c eate a competent managerial service.
^
In addition, care^e^r ^itt^in re civil servants were skeptical thatObjective performance evaluation was possible, believing
that personal favoritism and political bias can never be
entirely eliminated.
. particular concern of some was that
an unqualified political appointee would be making work
appraisals which had important career significance.
.'There
is no way," one senior official claimed, "for a political
appointee to distinguish between good performance and servile
performance of a subordinate^ " 2i>uDorainate. Many executives agreed with
one bureaucrat's view that the SES "is an obvious attempt to
politicize the civil service system. Nothing more and
nothing less. "3
^^^^^^^ ^.^^^^
^^^^^^
separation, reassignment, and reduction
pp. 3_if^''^^^^^t'
"J^'^y carter as Public Administrator,"
tives ^?n?M.^p^^''^^'''^
Richard E. Vaden, "Federal Execu-
Socie;v M ^f^'rti^ns to Change," Administration andb ty 12, No. 1 (May 1980) :106.
^Ibid., p. 105.
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pay, .any executives spoke of a ".eturn to the spoils
system...
.h. consequences of politicization, ™any critics
warnea, „oui.
.e a civil service in which technical Kno„le.,e
and expertise suffered and "yes ™en" were substituted for
"constructively critical and politically neutral profes-
sionals
.
The House and Senate debate reflected a variety of
political concerns. There were those like Senator Percy who
blamed the bureaucracy for the declining reputation of
congress, and others who used it as an all-purpose receptacle
for complaints. It is not credible, Percy pointed out, that
95% of the civil servants get satisfactory ratings and 98%
get periodic pay increases when bureaucracy is frequently
"unresponsive, insensitive, and lackadaisical." it is this
kind of bureaucracy that "creates the huge amount of mail,
the huge number of phone calls, and the great number of
visitors we have."^
Other members appeared to be concerned that the
reformed civil service would give the President too much
power. Republican Representative Ashbrook argued that
Carter and the Democrats were trying to manipulate the civil
service, citing what he believed were Carter abuses in
^Ibid.
2Rosen, "Merit and the President's Plan . . .", p. 302.
3U.S., Senate, 95th Congress, 2nd session, Congres-
sional Record 124, No. 135 (August 24, 1978) :S 14269.
Personnel^actions an. intense Administration Io..,in. for
the bill. Republican Benjamin Oilman reminded his House
colleagues that the Carter reforms were "remar.abl, similar
to the infamous
'MaleK Manual' and noted that Man May, its
author, had not only congratulated Carter on his reforms but
had received inquiries from members of the Carter Adminis-
tration regarding ideas in the manual. Like partisan
congressional debates in earlier reform periods, members
supported or resisted increased Presidential control of
administration depending on whose ox was being gored.
But others, both Democrats and Republicans alike,
argued in support of the bill that every President should
have the right to manage the federal government. m
replying to Ashbrook, Udall recited the problem of securing
a responsive bureaucracy. "when the Nixon people came in,
they wanted to make some changes and they found all these
Johnson-Kennedy people, who were held over, were holding the
reign of power, and they could not get rid of them. Eight
years later I am screaming and yelling that the Nixon hold-
overs are there when Jimmy Carter gets to town. 'President-
Philip Crane in January 1981 . . . will get from this bill
^U.S., House, 95th Congress, 2nd session, Congres-
sional Record 124, No. 126 (August 11, 1978) :H 8455:
2
^
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Post Office andCivil Service, Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Report on
H.R. 11280, 95th Congress, 2nd session, 1978, p. 421^ See
also Sheila A. Hershow, " 'Malek Manual' Author Hails Carter
Plan," Federal Times 14, No. 3 (March 20, 1978) :1, 6.
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u.e..c.e.
..a
..e
.o.e„.en.
.......
Kep.e3en...e
.e™..^..,
...
^^^^^^^
£>iil, agreed that Presidenfc^idents are prevented
"from effectively
managing the entities over which th.W ey presumably preside "
ae^ina^n, co.Xea.ues
..at
..e
..proposition n „entaXU.
-cxuaes frustration over t.e inaMlit. of the average
-trzen to get proper service fro™ Government,., oerwins.i
argued that this frustration is felt because the civil ser-
vice bureaucracy often does not respond to the public
interest or the directives of a Presiaent.
..what we are
trying to do in this bill,., he concludes,
..is to give the
President the legitimate authority a chief Executive should
have... in a Congress that was quite aware of the public
anger directed toward federal government and in a setting
where memories are thr.rt- ,s o , an argument calling for increased
Presidential control over bureaucracy was persuasive.
At the same time, there was concern in Congress for
the potential contained in the Carter bill, and particularly
in the SES provision, for politicizing the civil service.
Especially vocal on this issue were Senators and Representa-
tives from districts containing large numbers of federal
bureaucrats. Echoing the bureaucrats' fears Senator Mathias
Ibid., p. H 8456.
2
Rennr-H ^OA " J^"""^^^
Congress, 2nd session. Congressionalcord 124, No. 140 (September 11, 1978) :H 9362. ~
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from Maryland claimed that "it would be relativel
~. m..e than lo.
,,.3e CS.S.
.ositie. L3e..iee, particularly 30 because career e.ecuti.es
could be reassigned and demoted without cause "l ^of
+-K = 4. . N tingthat the Nixon Whitp ro„o«
attrition in career ranks toplace partisan appointments in the civi] •rn l service, Mathias
warned that the SES gives Pre^-iH.r,^- -.g es dential appointees power to
create attrition 2 ^"t.on. in the end, most Congressmen appeared tobe persuaded that there wer^^n re sufficient protections in theSES to prevent political abuse.
The final issue raised in Congress by the Carter
reforms also relates to the issue ofrn the political power of
congress vis-a-vis the President. Congressional actions
w.th regard to supergrade manpower needs have historically
been based on the desire to maintain the influence of
congressional co^ittees over the executive agency. ^
,
result, authorizations for supergrade positions have been
ad hoc and chronicaUy slow, a situation that C.S.C. profes-
sionals hoped to remedy with the reform legislation. In the
debate over the SES the struggle for influence was manifestedbi^^mpts of Congressmen to exempt "their agencies" from
also the remarks of Senator StIviL of aLs^! P s"i4273!
2 Ibid., p. 14294.
For a discussion along these lines, see Hugh Heclo
tsH^-Tf-mf— (Washington: Th^ BrooKin%'s"lns?i-
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SES requirements- The ci^^y^^i-^debate record shows a string of
amendments aimed at exemni-inr. -fempt ng favorite agencies, all of
which were defeated exceot for-'"""P^ amendments exempting the FBIthe CIA, the NSA, and the Defense Intell.'aelligence Agency (dia)
congressmen ha. support
.ro™ „.n. career executives in t.esl
attempts to exempt agencies fro™ SES provisions.
.i,e
congressional co^ittee ^em.ers ana sta„s, executives are
orientea pri^ariX, to specific programs ana organisations
rather than a govern.ent-„iae perspective. Though many
executives are expert managers,
"nearly all Care: confinea
to narrow specialisations in specific organisations "l
consequently, the SBS was seen as an attacK on their program
orientations and their professionalism.
For political reasons Congress was quite serious about
linking performance ana rank awards to performance, m order
to justify such "extravagance" to their constituency such a
linkage had to be maae. As future events wouia prove,
congress aid not proviae for the awara system without an
expectation of future legislative or aaministrative limita-
tions.^
Perhaps the most striking observation about the Con-
gressional debate was its brevity. There was comparatively
A^m-; /j^^^i^"^' "Professional Public Executives and PublicAdministration Agendas," p. 12. 'ruL>±x
R^.n-innft'^M''^''
^* Feinstein, speech before the Mid-Atlantic
Oc?obef 2l?\"^80:'p.'4?''''""''
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little discussion about the qpq . ^ ^SES and few questions were ask.Hregarding the likely effects of the SES .a .
svst.rr,. appraisal
ana
.ses were
.e,.e3.ea or prepare,
.e.
..e
..^p...^implicit in the qpQ
'"^'^ performance appraisal systemsIndeed, there was no effort t-o assess the real level of
.overn.e„t pro.ucUv.., or .o ae.e.op a..er„aUve approachesfor re„ar.in, ana motivating p..xic employees, nebate was
Short because Congress is onl, rarely capable o. a sustained
interest in an issue ana civil service refor™ is never high
on the congressional agenda for very long. Members attempted
to derive as much political mileage as possible from the
refer™ debate and then moved on to the next crisis. The
carter Administration was thankful for this rapid movement
for all along it had feared that delay would be the tactic
used to defeat its legislation. To move the legislation
through the House committee and floor debate Carter astutely
called on Morris Udall, vice-chairman of the civil Service
committee. All observers agree^ that Udall's legislative
skill and respected reputation were crucial for passage of
the bill.
That the Carter Administration in 1978 successfully
established a corps of senior government executives where
other Administrations had failed is due to a variety of
Coalit^nr; f^^'^^^u^'P^^' ^^^^^ Sawyer, "Udall 's DelicateS S^Pte^r^r?^^^
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factors. « ,,.3t ,Xance tHe reason Carter succeeaea
le.isxauve.,
,3 ,u.te 3i„p,e: w.3 t.e «rst U.e t.at
such a proposal had been ma^= kde by a Democratic President to aDemocratic Conarf^^a d, 4.c gress. But gxven the failure of most other
carter legislative initiatives, it is clear that other
factors contributed to success. Prom the early planning
stages to final passage, reform was supported by intense and
sustained presidential interest. Carter needed a victory
and had staked much political capital on his ability to
reform and manage the bureaucracy. Carter was able to begin
hxs tenure by appointing three new co™,issioners to the c S C
"with no need to defend the past. In Campbell and
Sugarman, Carter found energetic and effective spokesmen who
were quick to learn the ways of Congress. Campbell success-
fully captured broad, if not deep, public support, concomi-
tantly, the SES provisions were almost totally the product
of C.S.C. planners, and it was widely agreed among line
managers and top career officials throughout the civil ser-
vice that changes were needed.
Fortuitously, the political climate for reform was
ideal. Public pressure to "make government work" was
irresistible. Carter and his legislative managers effec-
tively used the Proposition 13 mentality to justify the
creation of the SES. When the legislation was presented to
„^ „
-"-Jule Sugarman, "What the Administration Wanted,"The Bureaucrat 7, No. 2 (Summer 1978) :8.
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congress,
.He
.a„.„.3t.a..o.
.o..,.3. ana Co.,.e33.o..
supporters kept the pressure on for a aul v
-t, not allowing extraneo
'"^^'^ °' '''^
effort B
'^'"^^ '°
-cause the legislation was consi.erea in the 2nasession, when Concireqc; ^g ss was pressed for time, debate andpolarization was forestall *=r=ied. Moreover, with the vote onreform taken shortly befor^^ -hh^ my ore t e November elections, a safegood government position to present to . •" constituents wasgiven to Congressmen. 1 At the c,.r.o ^•same time. Congressional
attituaes haa become iess sympathetic to the alarms raiseaby public employees ana more in tune to the notion of
squeezing more out of le<!=!r ss. As Sugarman points out, civil
service reform in 1978 was "a coming together of a great
-ny forces which haa previously operatea in ignorance of
one another. Suadenly a moment seems to arise when all thes
forces are unitea and the momentum exists for real change "2
Whether or not the legislative success of the Carter Aamin-
istration was responsible for real r^o^^tUr^i i, positive change remains
to be assessed.
^^^j2g-£2ij^y:Os__o^jmplementation;
Reaction and Chano^
In the American governmental system, often there is a
wide disparity between promising certain public policies and
^-^-^^-^^ There is even a wider gap
Reform'Acttf'L78""'p?'l3^'"^' "^^^ ^-^^ Service
2Sugarman, "What the Administration Wanted," p. 8.
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conse-
between the promise and the ar^h.'.a achievement of intended
quences. That this feature char.r^^ •i^ur racterizes the American
PoUe.
^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^ ^Jpolitical force«5 in +-v,,^ces the implementation of policv
. ,
t^o-Licy. Attemptsto implement the Senior Execiif-n ..o cl ecutive Service in the federalCivil service iil.3trate
..e polities poii.,
txon and su,,est the tenuous relationship between promise
and actual performance.^
When the SES became effective on July 13, 1979, 98 5»Of the approximately 7,000 eligible people
"voluntarily.
entered the new service. Many, perhaps n,ost, did so
believing that the SES was the only alternative for career
advancement. Less than a year after the adoption of the SES
Lynn and Vaden concluded from their study of senior execu-
tives' attitudes that "there does not appear to be a great
mandate of support for the Carter proposals. clearly, for
nar^^top^bur^^ the SES was "the only ballgame in town."
of impl'em^ntaUon ^""see^^of^ °'
^i*^"*"" °" the problems
^^^iSis "Ber^eLlf'^^L^^rSro-r
1^ (c:mbrIdg:r'„L'L^iAu e"?ts! 1^1'^?.'.^^^^^^^^
TnllilTtL m^^^'^.i^^ (Washington,'"?!; Thfikar*'^
ESRA Thf'oi? ^' Stephen K. Bailey and Edith K. Mosher
ii^oll^i|if~^^^5^i2^^ (Syracuse,New Yorx. Syracuse University Press, 1968) .
ResponsftoVf;n^S" Richard E. Vaden, "Bureaucratic
Review ?q Krr^\?^r/''^ Reform," Public Administration39, No. 4 (July/August 1979)T34T7~
Morale o. senio. executives in t.e su™.er
alreaay at a Xo„ level
.ue to Carter's
...ash the hudfan n bureaucrat-"
ca^pa.^n in sup^rt o. the re.o™ legislation.
„i,,
.^Ple^entation o. the S.s, a hi,h ae^ree o. nneertaint.
„asadded to the livf^Q r^-F 4-uU es of the bureaucrats by a new performance
appraisal syste. and the approaching 1,80 Presidential
election. indeed, Oeneral
.ccountin, office,^
Protection Board, 3
,,,,,,,
^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^
Association^ surveys of senior executives' attitudes toward
the SES reveal a serious discontent, if not hostility, in
the top ranks. The PEI;« survey of April isgl, ,or example
found that 24. of its respondents felt that the SBS should
be discontinued!
The surveys indicate particular sensitive areas.
Eighty percent of the MSPB respondents felt that the SES
Offered insufficient incentives to retain competent
can rAl'lTlTToTs^:- Pubfif Executive Service: How We
NO. 3 (May/June 1981^31?^^^^-^^^=^^^^^^^
Director ^6fficr^fp'''"'°""\"^ ^eport to theF^^°fi5'M~~S~^^^^^ called
1981, ^T^nd ^" EHblij^fldministration Times . April 15,
Office ^nd'rtvfi i '- ^^''''''^ Committee on Post
Before thf c K
Service, Senior Executive Service
. HearingsSggg^hgSubcomgi|^ee on-^.vxl Service . 9/th ron^^.o. .1
?v»^,?"' 1?"'.PP- 27-32, hereafter cited as SeniorExecutive Service, Hearings, 1981.
1981, pp°^67-72^^^''^'^ ^"
Senior Executive Service, Hearings,
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e^Plo^ees, e.ea.X, a
.espon.e
.o Congress.onaU.
.„,„3e.
tx.e,
.any respondents appeared to feel insulted
,hebonus system. Twentv-fr,,,,-enty four percent in the Feiaa survey
wanted to discontinue the k„
^""^ altogether, while in
not
.^prove performance, 30. indicated that it was unXi.ely
that the opportunity for salarv ir.^v-y y increases will increase
motivation, and 44. said that the ^ssiMlity of a salary
decrease was unli.ely to motivate. Such figures seem to
confirm the observation i-hat-r t t a unique characteristic of
-ny in government is that financial reward is not their
Chief inducement to good performance.
. major proportion of
government executives has chosen public service for the
personal reward found in serving the national purpose,
such individuals will not be inspired to better performance
by the remote promise of an annual financial award or
bonus. "1 At the same time, it is clear that deep dissatis-
faction with regard to compensation exists among SES members.
Performance appraisal is also the source of intense
concern among top career officials. Among GAO respondents
41% indicated that performance appraisals were having a
negative effect on SES morale and 37% agreed that appraisals
would not improve performance. Although it appears that
Make , ntf^" "Executive Accountability: Will SESa Difference?," The Bureaucrat 9, No. 3 (Fall 1980) :6.
most executives suDDort t-h^pp the concept of performance evalu-
ation, specific criticisms are apparent.
.n the c.o surve.
S
*
Of the bureaucrats heiievea havin, a personal reiation-
S..P With an influential person „oul. influence ratings.- 3,,beUeved agreeing with the philosophical beliefs of the
current Administration would bias performance ratings, and
69% agreed that one'c; ^s abxlity to negotiate with supervisors
would influence ratings. A thn'rH r,f *.uigs i d of the executives in the
M.S.P.B. study believed bonuses did not go to the best
performers but to management favorites and 50% felt that
bonuses go disproportionately to executives at the top of
the agency.
1 m general, then, senior executives do not
see a linkage between performance evaluations and pay,
awards, or other personnel actions. Taking the SES as a
Whole, federal executives saw little evidence that the
promised management efficiency and effectiveness was to be a
consequence of its implementation. Thirty-six percent of
the FEIAA respondents, for example, believed that the SES
had had no effect and 52% believed that it had hindered
hr,r,„= f^'^t Statistics Confirm this tendency to skew
in ^qfio
those executives in the higher ranks of the sTs.I 1980 out of the 1,614 individuals receiving performance
^Lfr^ r o"""" awards, more than 1, 400 were in the topthree grades. See Philip Shandler, "The Federal Column,oap on Pay Skews Bonuses, GAO Reports," The WashingtonStar
, August 3, 1981, p. 4. ——
management efficiency.^ With c=v»r,^ •skepticism and discontent sowidespread among executives reoor^=, p ts announcing the earlydeath Of the SES would not be surprising.
2
A crucial test for the future of the SES is the
transition from the Carter to the Keagan Administration
The law does not allow performance appraisals or involuntary
reassignments within 120 days after the beginning of a new
Administration or appointment of a new agency head. Many
Observers were anxious to learn whether or not the Reagan
Administration would encourage
"voluntary" „oves of career
executives within t-ho i on ^hin^e 120 day period or engage in wholesale
of SEs'me^be^'^towardnhf'refo'""'''" --essing attitudes
include: D. Anthon^ Buttlrf!e?d
-pi^^r''"'-DOL SES; Performance Appraisa? qi^/ ^ Evaluation ofpaper delivered at th= ? ? System: Promise Pending,"
Department," and Char^e^A
P^^l^^^^nary Assessment From One
Of nSJ Yo^k If^ u ^ ' sponsored by the State University
1981 mov7r M ^"^^''^^ Binghampton, NY, October 28-29/
Tow^;^ pi°? • "Attitudes of Federal Employees
r?R? Tn, ? "T^"^^ Appraisal and Merit Pay: Implications forCS A implementation," Public_Admi^^
letT7~lTllT"^^ }^^^Tl|4^W-pFt?I^I^-V^^ '
The Cas; nf^l'
Political Reform and Government Management:e o the Senior Executive Service," paper prepared
MeLhis'^T^^ southern Political Science Association,mphi , Tennessee, November 5-7, 1981; and Peter Colby andPatricia Ingraham, "Civil Service Reform: The Views of the
fstratiorr^r" ""^riSf : " ^^view of Public Personnel Admin-i tration 1 (Summer 1981 ) : 75-89 . "
f^^!^^^"^.'^- Lanouette in "SES—From Civil Service Show-piece To Incipient Failure in Two Years," National Journal 13(July 18, 1981):1296-99, already has sugge sted its death.
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Service in April iqRi v
°^ the Merit SystemProtection Board claimed that there was "no specific
thai- cri;.c ^ eviden<at SES ^e^bers have been pressured to vacate their
positions through resignation, retirement, or reassignment"
aur.n, the i20 da. period nor „as there evidence that the
-ratoriu. on performance appraisal was being violated ^
O.P.M. director non Oevine testified that between Znau.ura-
career SBS
.embers had been reassigned and that he had no
information that these moves were involuntary. 2 on the
other hand. Congressional Democrats have claimed that some
abuses have occurred, citing an inordinate amount of move-
ment^at the Departments of Energy and Agriculture and the
0PM.
3
i„ defense of these personnel changes, some partici-
pants insist that they are the result of minor reorganiza-
tions and the necessary replacing of retirees, m general,
and surprisingly to many observers, it does appear that the
Reagan Administration has not abused the intent of the 120
day waiting period. One suspects that there are two likely
explanations. First in moc^ ci?cr±LST:, m st SES positions expertise is the
^Senior Executive Service, Hearings, 1981, pp. 30-31.
3Noted by several interviewees.
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-cona, i3 Xi.e., that the new
.^ministration Jmost qpQ rr, u ^ciuio has founduiubr bES members winSr,rT 4- ^ ,lling to follow the political l
.
whf^n
-L-LTiicai leadershipW e It IS provided. ^
The reactions of senior- ^- • -.r ior civil servants have been
- congress to t.e
...t ro.n.
agencies to give bonuses—NASA qRA
.
SB , and MSPB-awarded them
- the ma..™™
^^^^
^^^^^^^^ ^
congress reacted angrii, and swifti,. zn
..ne 1980, the
^
proportion o. SES positions eii.i.ie
.or performance awards^
was reduced
.rom S0» to 2S.
. .o indicate good faith and
protect the bonus system from complete destruction, OPM
director Campbell instructed agencies to limit bonus awards
to 20% of those eliaible m- *-u______^^^^^ig bl
.
At the same time. Congress, whose
SS^i^ilcutf;; slr^Ice P^rCl'"" £i£l^Jt22k^
E^S^Htiv^Service Per^irman;: £4^:^ti^22L^t_Senior
utive Servic4 Performl^I ^ 5^ii:2tJ,2£*_At_Senior Exec-3^_^^^___ice^ forj«^
sional'sL%^e"r'[n'i:^en?i:o to\' ' -"-P^--<3 Congres-bonuses exclaimed ^» ^ ?S ? reporter regarding the
made more ?han he and ^"^f '^^"'"^'^ " ^ bureaucrat
system. Perhaps the sto?v ?='o^ *° '^^"^"e the bonus
true that Cong?lss was udLJ n°?^ nonetheless
.^IpB-d?a ? ---- - so^e—se?^
sible lor Pva^nJ^-'^''
"''""'"^^ S°^'^<3= (those respon-
w:shrng?o'n:i!^!f\"„\^^ri"^?!^' ^'^^-^^^^^^ •
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pay is linked to executive salar.-.ries, continued to impose ^cap on pay. -impo a
With the n^r, A ^ 1
.
' congressmen and Execu-tives increased only 53.^^uj. 355% between Mamh i 0-7-7^ ^^^^ and May 1981
while the coc:+- r^*: . .ost Of l.v.ng increased by over 47%.l P^^her
a half ao.en levels of responsiMXit.-so.e of „.o. other-
wise would be paid as much as $61 finn rn ? , 600— [were: getting the
same $50.]19 T^ j0,112. undoubtedly, many executives entered theSES believing that the bonus awards would alleviate this
situation and some few Congressmen supported the award
system as a way around the pay cap. When Congress reduced
the amount of bonuses available the resnH^Dx n action was predictable
Morale, which was already low, dipped even lower
Officials were bitter, believing that they had been lured
-to the SES on false promises and then betrayed, that
congress had reneged on a promise. Almost immediately a
senior Executive Association (SEA, was formed to represent
the interests of SES members. its first act was to file suit
in October 1980 in U.S. District Court to overturn Congres-
sional action with regard to the bonuses, an action still
pending. The SEA has grown to 800 members, a small percent-
age, but even its existence is significant.
May l,^l|81?'' '^''''''"tives Association, "Pay Fact Sheet,"
^Shandler, "The Federal Column."
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That morale iq cin^rpIS suffering is also indicat^H k
eJcodus of senior ^
^ a ed by thei^enio executivPQ ^v-^r es from government.
"Th<. r-ment rate for Federal p retire-^ Executives Cgs-15 to SF^ r .
15.5. in March l„s,. 28 9. i„ „
" "
P^, cap „as
1980 ana
.4 in ;
'
"
° " ^^'^
• 6. in March
^^'/o August 1980 ao ^ •As of mid-1981
ment rate for ^Fq m u retire-
•Lur bi^s members of ^.i t ^
38,. 2such a loss o. expertise an. experience win certainl Han adverse effect nn
'Certainly have
°" governmental performance, perhaps
making the establishment of the SES a .cn strange irony
The reduction in performance awards „iu li,,,,
It much more difficult i-r.
the SES .
'"^'"'^^ i"to
^
-S. m a system which emphasizes pay as a motivatorWhy Should a CS-ls accept more responsibility in the SESWhen the Chances Of a bonus are almost nil. m fact, the
employees say they are li.ely to ,oin the SES if a 30b ^hey
wouxa li.e were offered to them.-
executives already skeptical of the fairness of the bonus
^;;^^^^^^_-^-tion^in the number available has created
May l,\'98l?' S^r^llr-ThrPed""?"' """^ ^^^^ ^heet,"June 1, 1981, p? 41 Federal Brain Drain," Newsweek .
Senate,'^Coli?te"onVof"""'^ statement before the U.S.
-SI. ^„is sL\\-ent f=^t:^^tlt^^J^^-
^Senior Executive Service, Hearings, 1981, p. 29.
greater doubt i-h;=i-f- k^>.t at bonuses can be awarded fairly to thelarge number of deserving executives.^ Pi^^Uy,
,He
reduction of bonuses confirmed to so^e executives that
congress had a totally distorted view of SES productivity
congress, action on that part of the S.s which is conside;ed
the most innovative and its cor» i =a I e, leads many to believe thatthe SES is destined to be merely a "paper project. "2
For congress, the issue of bonuses and pay was seen inl.ght of two political realities: the widespread mood of
budget cutting and the widespread perception that government
productivity is low and bureaucrats are unaccountable. In
order to justify to constituents spending millions of
dollars for bonuses to well-paid bureaucrats. Congress had
to link bonuses clearly to improved performance. When the
bonus awards turned out to be greater than expected or, more
precisely, when through press reports the public perceived
that bureaucrats were exploiting them again, and when
congress became concerned that bonuses were not linked to
performance, 3 the bonus system was put in jeopardy.
DifferencS?'' p^^|^""^^ Accountability: Will SES Make a
1981.
"ith participant, Washington, D.C., August
3
sentafiv» Li''"^''
to Representative Jamie Whitten, Repre-
on «vn%! " Schroeder, Chairwoman of the SubcommitteeCivil Service notes that "the press has reported that
ret'i'rTL^''^ T"-""^ friends of agency management, toemployees as going away gifts, and to exceptionallylarge numbers of top agency management." Senior ExecutiveService, Hearings, 1981, p. 161.
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Constituency pressure =i„
.
.
P^^essu also made raising the pay cappolitically difficult „
f y. However, by the end of 1981 thecrisis of low morale and earlv
"tirements in the SES hadcreated such pressure for lif.i.,
^^^^
ac,.iesced. Xn mid-Oecember 1981 Congress raised the cap
-o.,SO,ll..SOto,ss,SOO.^
congress, however, did notbreaK the traditional lin. between executive and congres-
sional pay. Andrew Feinstein <;^ = <=ftem, staff Director of the House
Subcommittee on Civi: c;er-,„-„„c l Service, argues that "this linkage
exists for two reasons. First, pressure to increase execu-
tive pay creates pressure to increase congressional pay
second, most members of Congress do not think a career civil
servant
.
. .
should make more money than elected represen-
tatives." 2 If the performance awards are used to get around
the pay cap the pressure for pay increases is reduced. "it
is not in the interest of Congress to reduce this pressure
to raise the cap, and therefore, it is not in their interestt^^w a great number of bonuses to be awarded. ^he
istratiorTrilfi^; iTTsV- t"' ^Hbli^^-Pay iHHTiiSi-i^'a cale study 'bv it;elf r."""^ ^^^^"^that support from th^ cf^^ ,j s . It appears, however,
0PM, anfinLLe preLure^?rom tiSeie'"''°;;' P""-!--!^tion and Washinaton n r , Senior Executive Associa-
forces for change ?he'fact tL^rr'"°" ^""^ ^^^^^^^
voted r . ^ ^^^ Congress recently had
sof^en^d'resi^ta'^cl!""' deduction, undoubtedly,
^Andrew A. Feinstein, Speech before the Mid-Atlantio
O~:^5'r?llorp.'4?'^""'^^' "^^^^"^^ Beach,^^i^g\^n^L'rctober 21, 1980, p. 4.
3 Ibid., p. 5.
ae
congressional response to the SPq ho system and paylinkage suggests that any effori- ^r.t ort to create and motivate
professional corps o. executives
.asea on pay, „UX .
extre.ex,
.i„,c.Xt. w.en promises o. increasea
.oneta.,
rewa.as are ™aae, „Hen a s.ste™ is preaicatea on economic
-centives, it is not unrealistic to expect executives to
want these rewards. It is a ga^e in „Mch, under current
political conditions, the cards are stac.ea against execu-
tives
.
What effect raising the pay cap will have on executive
attrtudes and performance remains to be seen. Given the
already tenuous position of the bonus system, the pay raise
may place the bonus systen. in deeper political trouble.
Strong support from the Reagan Administration may keep the
system at its present level but to expect an increase in the
available awards is fantasy. Breaking the linkage between
congressional and executive pay is almost certainly out of
the question, although House Speaker Tip O'Neill has
indicated he is in favor of delinkage.^
another area where change is possible is the 120-aay
moratorium on performance appraisal ana involuntary within-
agency reassignments. Although denying that the 120-day
period was overly burdensome, 0PM Director Divine in testi-
mony to a House Committee raised the question whether the
^SEA Newsletter. Vol. 1, No. 4, July 1981, p. 5.
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- - p---
....
an Administration's tenure q„oh
. .
• ^"'^'^ ^ restriction late in an
-ministration create a Hei,.tenea frustration over t.e
^naMiit. to c.an,e top bureaucrats.
..e Oemocratic House
on the other hand, "feels strongly about the 120 days
'
Any attempt to change the 120-day protection for civil
-rvants would, under the current conditions of a Republican
President and Democratic House, precipitate . h-' i"^s<^iPitat a ighly partisan
debate.
Reflectiri2_on Doctrine,
Mgig!Etions7~and~v£TTj?^
m selling the SES to Congress, senior executives, and
the public, the carter Administration stressed the need for
better ••management." p^om the Administration's perspective,
efficient and effective management had two faces. it would
give political managers the tools to secure and reward
greater responsiveness and productivity, defined in terms of
Administration goals, while, at the same time, giving the
individual bureaucrat a greater incentive to strive for
professional competence. Better management, to the Carter
senior Executive Service, Hearings, 1981, p. 3.
hoaringsfIbid!,''p':'™?''^''" *° ''^^'"'^ '^"'^'^"^ ^^'^
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Administration, wa- t-h^. he answer for the problem of continui^and chanqe Jt ^ tyI xs true that the SES does recognize to agreater extent th^r. ^ ^ ^
z
an previous reform attempts the specialist
::
- e_i.:. ::r
Z
""""
" --'^^ ' =°rP3.
.ut tries
encourage professional competence
„hiie gi.in, p.,,,,.,,
;t
"^"^"^^ ~ —ore.SES aces provide career civil servants a number of
protections against politically motivated action
And ,et, taKen as a whole, the emphasis of the SBS hasbeen on «a.ing the
.ureaucrac. responsive to political lead-
ership rather than on developing a valuable resource to
achxeve broad public ends Th» crc ^a . e SES does nothing to reduce
the numbers or layers of political appointees at the top of
the bureaucracy.
1 Consequently, the most responsible
positions remain closed to career officials. It removes
from career executives the right to appeal decisions that
reassign them to less responsible work, reduce their pay,
and separate them from the SES. It institutes a bonus system
whrch may foster sycophancy rather than independent judgment
and disciplined skepticism. It does little to prevent those
executives who have served one Administration at senior
levels from being shoved aside by the next, further discour-
aging initiative and attenuating institutional memory. At
ment,"'pp! 562-63!''' ''""^ °* Confidence in Govern-
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~tte.
.0 ..e .roaa p..,,. ,„,,,,3,
^^^^^
Political acceptance of such n^.-
•
r a notion remains a major
obstacle.
-art Of the Carter Administration promise was made towomen and minority qrounc, •
.
^ P^^^^^-g to increase their propor-tions m the higher levels of the civilrn service. Veteran
preference was identified as the
.a,or obstacle to achieving
greater representativeness, and proposals were made to change
xn Significant ways. Veterans'
.roups and their congres-
sional supporters won a major victory when veteran preference
was eliminated only in the SES
. .t the feeder levels, os-13
to 15, there was no change in preference rules. And yet
even without Congressional timidity on this issue, the Carter
Administration appears not to have taken its own promises
seriously, by rejecting key affirmative action recoMnenda-
tions of the Personnel Management Project. ^ Undoubtedly,
the Administration decided that affirmative action was too
controversial an issue and opposition to changes in veteran
preference too intense to risk defeat of their bill
. Thus
representative administration in terms of women and minority
group members was not a concern, making administration more
representative of a managerial outlook was.
Minor,- Jv^LJ;^''"''?
"°"ard, "Civil Service Reform: A
Rev?ew M
Woman's Perspective," Public Administrationi 38, No. 4 (July/August 1978) :305-309.
in the carter Administration the emphasis on
..„ana
»ent.. transited into an emphasis on.oiitioaioontri: oT
^--ation.
.h..
„.,h Heco.s cogent re.ar.in,
.heN^xon
.a.rnrstration.s concentration on management stii:
-..s tr.e,-
..however apoiiticai the management concept mi.htseem rn theor,, operating in the government context o.
Washington it could be nothing hut poUtical.-l
approach to securing responsible administration win
problems of continuity and change.
If carter's emphasis on management was not new, his
application of particular motivation theories to public
administration was. Both Carter's 1978 State of the Union
address and his message to Congress transmitting the Civil
service Reform bill made the assertion that senior managers
.n government "lack the incentives for first-rate performance
that managers in private industry have. "2 m seeking a
remedy for the senior civil servants' "inadequate motiva-
tion," Carter/campbell assumed that higher pay is the primary
incentive for executives. For the f^r<=^rui n rirst time, a ma]or civil
•""Heclo, A Government of Stranaers r> 7=; »i
S^orrxV- ^^^t^^^^'^^'^^^^^ 'Refolds'
^
August IsrsuTs-TlL 5Hblic_MEin^^ ^sTAy/
transm.^ti:^^.^^''^'''
"Message on Civil Service Reform."smi ted to Congress on March 2, 1978, in U.S., CoAqressHouse, Conmiittee on Post Office and Civil Servic^ rivi^Pf^Ji^^-^5^t_of_l^^ ' J-J^Congress, 2nd session, 1 9 7 87~^7Too:
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through t.e pereo^ance appraisal. Pa.X
.o.entzen, P.esi-
o.
..e
..e ori,i„.
app.oac.
.ea.The bonus system was based on Taylorism th.^d i , e economic man,
rational man, going back to the 1900 's .n^ •<-iie , a d private '
e^e...! one ,la.in, irony is t.at the SKS isbase, on the
.yth rather than the reality of private enter-
prise. Another is that individuals who should have Known
better failed to comprehend the unique problems and chal-
lenges Of motivating senior public executives.
What are the implications of making the dollar the
primary motivator of senior civil servants? Pirst, many
executives deeply resent the approach because it conveys a
message that the executives are not working hard enough.
Many executives feel they are working to their capacity
already. 2 a GS-18 expressed his feeling this way, "The
reforms are based on crass materialism and fail to recognize
the performing professional in nonmaterial ways. I work as
a professional supergrade civil servant. I do not work for
bonuses. I do my work in a professional top quality fashion
-Senior Executive Service, Hearings, 1981, p. 59.
^Noted by interviewee in 0PM, Washington, D.C., August1981.
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txve Sloths were true.
second, e^pHasis on „oneta., awards i„px,.3 t.at
competitive behavior is bett^-rte than cooperative. Because
awards are iar.e and li.i.ed, competitive rather than
cooperative behavior is encouraged,
.orent.en observed that
special monetary recognition
"tends tn mo place an additional
Prciu. on seX.-a,,randi.in„
.„e first- behavior which isdestructive o. cooperative tea. wor.... 2 Kven though
.an.,
perhaps most, executives are not primarily motivated by
promises of bonuses, when they see that many competent
rndividuals receive no rewards, or perceive that awards are
not fair, then morale suffers and ill-win is created
competitive behavior may lead to a variety of "bureaupathic-.
3
responses that are dysfunctional in terms of the goals of
the SES. In particular, exaggerated competition may under-
mine professional objectivity; hinder the objective reporting
°^J^^ts^^specially when they are negative; encourage the
Initia;°^:::?iL"s^""cha"^gI?^%": llf.'^''
'
^Senior Executive Service, Hearings, 1981, p. 44.
Alfred r\nonf°''lt^ir''"'r°''' Modern_Organ^^ (New York:
"rUr^i Q 1961). See ali^^ederick c"rThFyer's
Disaster ""publfo'r" Performance Appraisal: A^Policy
t^Tl- ^^^ii:?-^^£sonnelJ^l^^ 10, no. 1 (1981) -20-
Lok LesL'nTflFf^^^ and th;
^
8? NO 3 ?Fa?i 19?Qrfr??'^f '^"^^^^ Sectors," The Bureaucrat
nP^fo;^,:
79):16-25 for provocative critiques of~^performance appraisals and their consequences.
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hiding of mistakes; qive ric^ ^g se to a variety of perverse
performance measures- anr^ h.-^.^^ , d hinder communication
The.e is in the SES
.efor„ ana in the
^u^ti.ications
usea to achieve it the aou.ie-ea.ea presumption that higher
civil servants are best he.i^ =ia accountable by external checks
ana b. appeals to their possessive e,ois„. it is one o. the
v.via lessons of post-Worla War IX ^erica ana particularly
post-Watergate that though external r~h^yn checks may be necessary
they are neither always desirable nor sufficient for
insuring responsible aaministration. External technical
Checks carried to the extreme, like exaggerated competition
-y create dysfunctions. More importantly, they may hinaer'
the aevelopment of a personal sense of responsibility in the
public servant. Legal ana technical checks can be subvertea;
one's conscience may be the harder taskmaster.
In his provocative piece on "Official Liberality,"
Richard A. Chapman argues that "conscience is something that
grows and depends upon socialization. If we tamper with the
official's socialization process either before or after entry
into the public service
. . . then we shall be affecting the
development of the official conscience . "^ Clearly, the
emphasis placed by the SES upon pay incentives ana measurable
performance standaras will affect the aevelopment of official
conscience. Will SES affect it in ways that are desirable?
.
.Richard A. Chapman, "Official Liberality," PublicAdministration 48 (Summer 1970) :135. —'^^^
Will the emphasis upon ext^r-r^^i .ternal accountability dull the
conscience to val.es of p..Uc
.o.alit. ana the spi.it toqualities Of imagination ana courage, will motivational
techniques that stress inaiviaual monetae,
.ewaras aiscoura^e
xn the Official conscience a con^itment of service to a
broaa puMic interest ana pn.lic values,
.he Carter/Camphell
response would undoubtedly be no hnt--Ly D , but how can one be sure
without asking the questions. Certainl, the problem of the
pay cap on federal executives should be remeaiea. certainly
executives shouia receive compensation approaching compara-
bxlxty to their counterparts in the private sector. Equity
and the public interest demana such a response. Yet the
approach to developing an official conscience compatible
with responsible administration will emphasize the personal
satisfaction of contributing one's professional skills to
achieving public purposes ana the aignity of public service.
Finally, the central features of SES suggest that its
creators assumea the road to responsible public administra-
tion to be technical and instrumental rather than political
and purposeful. Wallace Sayre's criticism of administrative
reform in the late 1940s remains relevant today: "At a time
when the urgency, difficulty, and complexity of governmental
performance are daily increasing ... the public service
becomes steadily more dependent upon a cold, impersonal,
rigid quantification of human ability and worth in public
Pre.en..
..e
^^^^
se.ve.. p.,po3es tie. to poXic, ,oals.2 carte.-s
emphasis on pay and bonuses for outsf.n^^ta ding performance andtnreats of removal from the qpq f„
P""-^ performance suggeststhat his Administration did not understand
"that truly
."ective public administration
.s. above all, dependent
upon effective political action at the policy level "3
Neither did the Carter Administration understand that
effective public administration also requires political
leadership which inspires and communicates a sense of dignity
AS several interviewees commented, the start to restoring
confidence in government and morale to public employees is
for political Officials to take the lead in recognizing the
contribution of senior executives and educating the public
to that effect. Responsible public administration is devel-
oped from the "stuff" of r^nlirir^^i i ^r pol t cal leaders, not managers.
Taken together these implications suggest that the
Purpose''"^Pnh?.-n\H^^''^'."^^^ ''^^^"^P^ Technique Over^
'
PHMj^_AdjIlinistration Review R (Spring 1948) : 137
.
nri (J^^Z^'^f Seidman, Politics^osition, and Power 3rded. (New York: Oxford uHT^^i?^Ttrp-ri¥¥7^9WTT^
Servicef^'p! 294!^"
History of the United StatP. r.-..n
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P-.ar.
.auure of the Carte, refo^ers was the ^ispU
.opportunity to reco,„..e senior civii servants
national resource and to • • " '
'^'"^"^
'°
-strtutionalize important publicvalues at the crucial nexus between politics and adtion ^ IT u
-Li-nic ministra-. Hugh Heclo correct! v •ly claims that "the civil ser-vanfs value lies in his or her capacity to respond
-.ectivel. to a succession o. different political leaders
n. to Offer a service that is .ore positive and independentthan mere passive obedience "2x . to some extent the SES
recognizes this resource by creating a corps of senior
executives with demonstrated managerial and professional
competence. On the other hand, the Carter Administration.
s
en-phasis on political-managerial control and the prominence
Of competitive performance evaluation in the SES do not bode
well for the provision of objective, independent judgment.
Furthermore, although the SES structure may increase the
possibilities Of senior executives serving politicians of
all partisan colors, the necessary ingredient for this to
occur fully-a political consensus that top bureaucrats are
valuable resources— is not yet present. 3
^Hugh Heclo, Government of Strangers , p. 246.
Government?" P.' f^^f^^"-*'
"^he Crisis of Confidence in
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It is possible that within thP ^x n e SES framework profes-
s.onaxs
. p.,,,, ^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^
create a govern.entwi.e-corps co^itted to public service
values, as Chester
.ewian. cXai^s.^ However, the concentra-
tion Of tKe SHS on ™ana,eriai concerns, economic incentives
an. measurable performance misses the chance to he.in now tl
systematically socialise career officials into a service
Characterised by a public service philosophy^ rather than
market motives. Perhaps, ironically, economic pressures
wrll force future changes in that direction. Then the
consequences of reform may more closely match its promise.
DO the British have anything to teach in this regard^
IS reform of the British civil service on the path to
creating a more responsible public administration? It is to
these questions that we shall turn next.
^Chester A. Newland, "Professional Public Executivesand Public Administration Agendas," p. 24.
e
r.f T, uf?^*"
Marshall E. Dimock, "The Criteria and Objectivesof Public Administration," in The Frontiers of PublicAdministration, eds. John M. Gaus, Leonard D. White, andMarshall E. Dimock (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,1936), pp. 132-33; Marshall E. Dimock, A Philosophy ofAdministration (New York: Harper and Row, 1958); andRosamund M. Thomas, The British Philosophy of Administration
Dohl'fc"L^:?,?H2"'\'?f°"P Limited, ly/S), for a discussion of-aputiii service philosophy.
CHAPTER IV
s
THE FULTON COMMITTEE: MINISTERTar
RESPONSIBILITY UNDER AwIcK
As was discovered in examining United states civil
service reform, it is difficult to attribute reform effort
to any single cause or group of causal factors, but it is
possible to extricate, from a complex assortment of
political, social, and economic forces, the predominant
trends which both give rise to reform and define a respon-
sible public administration and which, consequently, shape
the reform's recommendations and actual administrative
Changes. Before examining the Fulton Co^nittee recommenda-
tions, then, it is crucial to discuss, in some detail, the
political environment or context in which the Fulton Commit-
tee Report was conceived and the major criticisms of the
pre-Fulton civil service, chapter V will then describe the
report's proposals and discuss the responses to them.
The Pre-Fulton Civil Service
To understand the reformers' criticisms and to provide
a basis for comparison to the post-Pulton service, it is
important to describe briefly the structure of the pre-Fulton
non-industrial. Home Civil Service. After the Northcote-
Trevelyan Report established the civil service on the prin-
ciples of open competition, division of labor between
"intellectual" and "mechanical" tasks, and a unified civil
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these s.exetax p.,neip,es. B. ™ost accounts, the B.Uish
—
e
-a reacea t.e cu.^.nat.on o. st.uct^aXdevelopment
„,th t.e endorsement o. tHe
.ort.cote-..eveX,an
principles by the Tomlin Royal Co^nission of lS2s-,,n
-„e p.e-Pulton, moae.n civil service was cHaracteri.eaby a .i,ia structure aiviaea into departmental ana treasury
or general classes,
.he departmental classes were composed
Of lobs restricted to one department, which controlled the
conditions of entrance and service in those ,obs. m 19SS,
the 1400 departmental classes ranged in size from 20,000 or
-re in the Tax Inspector and Tax officer classes in Inland
Revenue to just a handful in the highly specialized
inspector classes.
The general classes, on the other hana, were those
classes common to all departments, whose conditions of
entrance and employment were determined by the Treasury.
Those classes responsible for the management of the service
were the Administrative, Executive, and Clerical classes.
The scientific classes were divided into the Scien-
tific Officer Class, the Experimental Officer Class, and the
scientific Assistant Class. There was also the Works Group
of Professional Classes for technical officers, engineers,
architects and draughtsmen, as well as Legal, Medical,
Accountant and Economist Classes and other technical and
183
ng
sub-
e
ss
specialist cxasses „Mc. co^p.isea
.V ,..erai classes inin IQfip T ^ ^-Labs m all
-
H^ve ana Speciaiis. ciasses,
_ separa. an. 3ordinate to the Administrative Class a: th ., l ough the higherExecutive qrade=! of(-=„often performed tasks indistinguishable
from those in the lower Administrative grades and the
specialists often had educational and experience backgroundOf comparable quality.
Bach class had its own grading structure and pay seal
and each civil servant was recruited into a particular cladepending on his educational background. Por example, the
Administrative Class was graded into Permanent Secretary
Deputy secretary. Under Secretary, Assistant Secretary,
'
Principal, and Assistant Principal while the Executive Class
was divided into Higher Executive Officer, Senior Executive
Officer, Chief Executive Officer, and Principal Executive
Officer grades. Direct entrants into the Administrative
Class were normally university graduates of 22 or 23 years
of age, while recruits to the Executive Class and Clerical
Class were 18 year old school-leavers with "A-levels" and
16 year old school-leavers with Q-levels" respectively. 1
Recruitment to the Administrative class in the pre-
Fulton service was primarily through promotion from other
cation^ 'rrcprn^^- """^"^^ *° ^^'^ General Certificate of Edu-
age ?6 Recru^ti"to^.-^^''?^
examinations, usually taken at
lelst two rrp =^ Executive class must have passed at
age 18
Advanced level examinations, usually Lken at
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classes and direct- <=>t^+->^„
,
'
examination of university graduates(about a 40-60 t-^+--;^ • «Lfc;b
"
• direct entrants
.ost pro.otees fro™ other classes, entrance to the
Assistant Pn'rif^^nai .-ii-rincip l grade was by one of ^^,rstJi! r two examination
methods. Method I consistPrt r.fisted of a written qualifying exam-ination in general subiects fr.ii„ a ^j , followed by, for those success-
ful, an interview and a written examination in academic
subjects Of the candidate. s choice covering the main honors
courses at the universities. Method XI, which was reserved
for candidates with a first or second class honors degree
consisted of a qualifying examination similar to that in
Method X. But instead of further academic examinations, the
Method II candidates were tested by a team of assessors in a
-ries Of intelligence and psychological tests and interviews
designed to discover the c-anfli/i = ^^in d date's reasoning power,
maturity, composure, and other "soff criteria. Neither
examination method was designed to secure a candidate with
any specific body of knowledge. Both were intended to
identify the intellectually superior candidate in any
academic field.
Of those entering the civil service directly from the
universities in the years 1948-1956, 78 percent came from
Oxford and Cambridge. The percentage from Oxbridge increased
to 85 in 1957-1963. The proportion of successful candidates
from fee-paying independent or boarding schools went up from
31 percent to 37 percent, while those from government
185
supported schools w(=.n+-
^--"t to 30 percent.At the same timo proportion of those successful candidates "who took degrees in m •m classics went up from 21 r.^
to 94 P^J^cent24 percent, while social o •xx sciences fell from 9/i
1 T
^ 24 percent to
-
percent
™a..e™a....„., 3.en.3. an.
....^.^..^
re^a^ne. a.^ost „e,.,,,.,.,
^ ^^^^^^^ ^
the PuX.on Co^,,,ee appeals to ,ave witnessed an upsurge
-
social an. aca.e^io excXusiveness of t.e
.a^.nistra-
tive Class.
once a member of a civil service class, the civil
servant's pay, responsibilities, and promotion patterns were
^^^^^^^^P--i^by the Class. Por example, policy-maKin,
~tiS:%\L\"n'?;6f^Tl?5^^
ment to the Civil Service," ^pvj^vtf.' ""^^^^it-
civil ser^ic^lntr^ncfeL'"""^"'" " ^^''"'^^e successes onletter to the iTthor ntXrTl"°cV''^ ^" ^
relevant factors might include " " ^"99^=ts that
II tJpe^exa'L'^ ^
^^^^^
-PeciallTofMethod
Ca^ridqe°tenr?^^'^','""?^ """^^ students from Oxford and
fr^ elsewl^erf tSS ^ ^^"^^^^^^ admission than
studenL^^L'%^^nsiSe"'^^hTc^^lfle^eic%"^L"\^'c^?etr^'^^L
aboit'th; r^"''^" "''^"''^'^ t-"^ bl morfrnformeS
e^ aL r =^^<^"1 heads of Oxbridge colleges are
tend^n^H ''"''^ ^^^^^ officials, and Oxbridge collegls
coneae ..It "^H^ ^'^"'^^^ Officers for each
elsewhere! """^ ^'^^ ^"^"^ university as
n^v'^f*'"''''"^^."''"
^""^ constantly told they are superiormay be more at ease in the civil service interview andconsequently able to give of their best
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and administrative duties we^r^ -hv.r re the prerogatives of the
.a..„,3t„...e ana K.ecu..ve cXasses. Spee.aX.s.
„Ho
.ou,..
.roaaer administrative responsibilities Had to transfer to
one Of these classes. However,
.ove.ent fro» Specialist
Classes to Administrative or Kxecutive Classes was rare due
to restrictive procedurf:^^;P.ocedures. Promotion within class followed
the established grades. For the Administrative Class
training of the new entrant followed the generalist concept,
that it consisted chiefly of short tours of duty in a
variety of different jobs during a two year probationary
period. Prom 1963, short training courses were conducted at
the centre for Administrative Studies. Even after the pro-
bation period, relatively rapid movement from post to post
was common for members of the Administrative Class. Employ-
ment in the service constituted a career, although often the
official thought in terms of career in class rather than
career in the service.
^ Thus, civil service employment
afforded the higher civil servant, for example, great
security not only from arbitrary dismissal but also from
competition from members of other classes.
In the pre-Fulton civil service, the Treasury's role
in the management of the service was of central importance.
At the ministerial level this was suggested by the fact that
-'Great Britain, Committee on the Civil Service, TheCivilService, Cmnd
.
3638 (June 1968), Vol. 1, "Report"^the Committee 1966-1968," p. 65. Hereafter referred to asF.C. Report.
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2!T """" °^ ----Cnancellor of^-Lio £ the Exchequer was the senior t..
T Treasury Minister
-
-a..o.,
..e Pe^anen. Sec.e.r.
...
........
p.esM.e tnan Pe.„anent Secretaries ot.er depart-
ments. More ^-r»
^'^'^ y -s responsible forthe si.e, pa„ recruitment poiic., ana structure of t.e eivii
service. Xn addition, it had control of the budget ana
expenditures of the departments and overall economic coordi-
nation and Planning. Given its financial and personnel
responsibilities it is not surprising that the treasury „as
at the center of most political controversies . ^
.nd in the
postwar years it has been the target of much criticism
(which will be discussed later)
.
T£^^iona]_Responsib^^
RumblTngs^^oF^Change "
Also important to understanding the dynamics of reform
is an appreciation of the pressures being placed on the
traditional notion of ministerial responsibility in the pre-
Fulton service. The doctrine, in its idealized form,
claims that the minister is completely and fully answerable
to Parliament for the actions of his department and the
actions taken by his civil servants whether or not he has
^See Hugh Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky, The Private
^P^^^^^^'^^i^^ (Berkeley: UnI;eFiTtF-5T^lifor-
and p^eer'of'the Se^^ury!^^"^"'
discussion of the role
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authorized them t^^ 4-i_
h
satisfaction o. Parliament
.eIS obliged to rec^irrr.
servant'
"^^^""^
^"""-^^ ^ -vii
in return for this protection from political prethe civil <^(^rw^r.4- ^ °»uxe,
less Of tJ """^"^ """"" ^--^—
-
he m.nrster.s views or party affiliation, oncepolicy has
.een aeter^ine.
.y the minister it is the respon-
sr.rlity of the civil servant to carry it out whether hel^^es it or not. While policy is .ein, formulatea it is the
auty Of the civil servant to provide to the minister all the
.nfonuation available regarding the issues, even if it
conflicts With the minister's Known view. Anonymity or
confidentiality allows civil servant, "i-r. •s to give their full and
frank opinion to the minister- "It*ter. Information does not only
include "technical" advice but nom-^„ , ^ •cu o p litical advice as well; it
is the Official's duty to protect the minister from his
"enemies"^ or from potential adverse political repercussions.
The inevitable growth of administrative discretion may
produce tensions in the relationship between the minister
and his civil servants. But the tensions may be eased some-
what as the official comes to know the minister's position
r»,-,^„= Aft''"
Chapman, British Government Observed (London-George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1963), p. 38;
.
this war?n''^^^-°5 ^^'^ "^"^^ servant was characterized in
had soent ™n=t
^"terview with a retired civil servant whop mos of her career as a higher civil servant.
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on the issues and his approach to problems.
The higher rank of
ftJ^ ^-q^ainted with thrmin"^!"* the more closelyeels himself at Hber(-„ ^r®"^ ^ ™in<3, the more hetion of the policy bu? '"°'^'f^ '^'^^ detailed appUca-rank would ?hin/it comp^M^jrii?--"^' "^atevffii^^any step inconsistent with it tI i. '^''^^ ^o takestep to be imperatively reoii;»H „ thought such adifficulties and ask ior i^struc^ions"?"^"^ represent his
-us, in the traditional view, the civil servant has no realpower. eritchley, as a higher civil servant himself,
argued that the civil servant s
..uthority is delegated tohxm and may, at the co™.and of Parliament, be instantly with-drawn." Echoing oale, Critchley claims that the civil
servant "speaks, not with his own, but with his master's
voice. He is literally a nonentity. Pew persons outside
government circles know the name of even one permanent head
of a Department. Constitutional theory demands that he shall
be voiceless. "2
Behind this traditional view of the duties and respon-
sibilities assumed by the civil servant is a prescription
for the character and abilities co,™ensurate with those
duties. Sir Edward Bridges (later Lord), former Permanent
Secretary to the Treasury and Head of the Civil Service,
believes that the qualities of the best administrator
include the power of rapid analysis, the capacity to
^H. E
(Great :i "^^'^^r civil Service of Great Britainlo Britain: Oxford University Press, 1941), pp. 38-39;
Victor rAit"
'^'^^t^^ey' The Civil service Today (London:'Gollancz, Ltd., 1951), p. 86^
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recognize the essential points in . • . •
.
^ situation, a sense of
^^^^^^^
.-UPS, t.e capacity to tMn. aheaa, tHe capacity to oia
'
even balance between orin.- ,
"
p ciple and expediency, and thepersonal qualitif^c, Arr,-ties Of imagination and perseverance andleadership. Thp m'.r-Jicivil servant is to bring to his job not
only a sense of ver^nr^^l a^^-p sona integrity and honesty but also a
sense of fairness and justice to guide him in his dealings
w.th individuals and groups, further, a breadth of judgment
w-ll help him to see problems from a larger perspective, to
arrive at a balanced judgment in the society's interest
Balance and detachment are also achieved in the traditional
View by the application of consistent principles and rules
by the moderation of radical ideas, by a liberal education
and frequent job rotation. Infusing this traditional view
is the civil servant's ethic of public service,
"selfless
service in the national interest, accepting constant abuse
from the very public they serve, as a function of their
profession. "
^
It follows that in this view of responsibility the
administrator can be characterized as a non-specialist, a
generalist, although by all means a professional, a
How r^J'^^l
Edward Bridges, "Administration: What Is It' And
ed A D,''"'' ''?m''""'"
The Making of an Administrator?
ttse^:
P^^sire^^Manchesterr- Manchester Unive-rsity Press,
tor " fn'^^hf^rr^''"; Responsibility of the Administra-, m Th^Makmg of an Administrator , ed. A. Dunsire, p.83.
;—
-
aoes not
.se the tools ac.ui.e.
professional training o. a law.e. engineer, or scientist
example,
..t abstract
.no„Xe.,e acquired t.rou,H the
'
experience o. aoin, ana o.se.vin, t.ose ai.eaa, s.iiiea in
administration, acMevea throu.K frequent ,o. rotation
Bertrana Russell nicely captures this point of view:
u.e!/r,^oTi::^°L:?:jrs:^,:L\p-^i-
becomes more organized a m! ^ "^"""^^power in a grea? orqanizationV"-''^^ ^ Position ofOf Ability /namelyr^hat^Mch ifcallea "'""'"^ ^^^^administrative: it makes very Ut??e afff^'^"'''''^the matter is th^+- • -^^^^-'-e di ference what
Skill required at the top'^?^^^'°" ^he k^nd of
man who can organize suocessfillv^Het''^ '^'^ f^"^"Lancashire cotton trade u ^ ^^i'* ^he
tackles the air defencL nf t ^ ''^ S"<=<=essful if he
Central Asia or th^ r London, the exploration of
Columbia to EngLnd Por'^^" °' """'^^ ^"ti^'h
"ill require no kno^leage of cotto^'°"' ""'^"takings heaeria] wRrf^^^ ^ ^wx u r n, no knowledge of
nlJigatlon His ^^iT "^^^^^^^ance with forestry or
in thfsev^rafLses'^'re^u^rr^r^'""'" positions will,
skill, but his ski?l n-T^ ^^^^^ several kinds of
not depend upo^n^specia^^l.e^S kn::?:.^ge^^%\^^^th;s\^'as organizations increase in size th^t IL happens,
h^nds'o^ °' ^r^^ -re'and'mor: to^r^rthe''
The abstract skill of the generalist administrator partially
lies in weighing and synthesizing the advice of the special-
ists, balancing the interests involved, and judging the
impact on the public interest.
rinnHor. n^f
Russell, Education_ai^^ the Social Order
M^k?t L^'''^."^'''-"' P- 240; quoted in TheMiki:iig_of_^7i_Adr^^ ed. A. Dunsire, pp. xiii^iv.
In practical termc; i-u^
,
^"^^ t'^^diUonalists saw thepotentially best administrators a,s those who receive firstc ass honors decrees at the first olass universities inClassical subjects,
.s the ISS. Hacaula. Heport
.a.es clear
th^;^,L\"?^^r,^eXf-i-^le the Civil servant of
'
while still young; bSt i t is af.o • °" "^""esshould have recei;ed the best tL '^^'f^?^^ *hat henost finished education tha^ A; liberal, theWe think it desirable ?hat^ "^"""^ country affords,
civil servants of the considerable number of the
taken the first degrle ^r^rL'^rn^^^We believe that men who have Lgaged ,^^ ^ Cambridge,and twenty, in studies which h^,,!' '-"^ ^? twowith the business of any profet! "° ^™«=<3iate connexioneffort is merely to open ?o ?f ^"'^ °^ ""ich thethe mind, will gener^^ly'be found^°in '° ""^^^^every profession, suDerfor%^ ' i business of
19, devoted themselves to 18 or
calling. 1
raselv the special studies of their
It Should be noted that the Northcote-Trevelyan Report took
some exception to this view by opening the possibility of
competitive exams based on more specialised studies in the
social sciences. The Report again proved to be ahead of its
time, as critics of the civil service in the post-World
War II period questioned the lack of specialist training for
Civil service administrators. Postwar criticisms, of course,
did not stop with training but attacked the whole traditional
notion of ministerial and civil service responsibility.
That the notion of ministerial responsibility was in
for a bumpy ride during the 1960s and into the 1970s and
1980s can be seen in a number of case studies of
Ip.C. Report, Vol. 1, Appendix B, pp. 119-21.
administrative decic?inn t«=v 1
.
— Perhaps the crichel oown
" .-es the Clearest iXZ.stration o. the ,ro„in,
Press^res
.e.n, p.acea on the traa.t.ona.
..e„ o.
ana „h.ch haa
.een co„p.,sorU. ac^uirea
.n h. the Mr
Passea into the hanas o. the Ministry of
..ricuXt.re.
.,terthe war a numh(=>T- r^^^ -p-,of farmers were promisea by the Ministry aChance to bia for the land, but the promise was never
honorea. ^t the sa^e ti^e the Ministry of Agriculture
refused to resell!
-i +- 4-^se l it to a Lxeutenant-Commander Marten, heir
of the original owner. InstpsH 1-1,= m- • .i ead, the Ministry decided to rent
the land as a model far™ to a "tenant from some aistance
away whom they had chosen in a rather arbitrary fashion.-^
Marten, after attempting unsuccessfully to secure
redress for his grievances through Parliamentary channels,
organized local political pressure upon the Minister of
Agriculture, Sir Thomas Dugdale, who agreed to ask for a
Genera^AlfSr-lomf|;fW^"'' '^'^^P"^"' "^^^ Vehicle and
in Britain " Public Administration
BriarSedg;mo?ir«|^^ = "3-90;
Stoughton Limited IMHuf L^^ i '?" (London: Hodder and
Of power struggM; ^^r^S^^J^-^J-^-^^^
p.
144^^^''''^' Representative and Responsible Government
,
194
.ouna no
..ace
....er. o. co^.pUon,
...
was highly critical of some nf ^h= ^ • •o the decisions that had beentaken, the methods used ar>^ j-v, u ^, nd the behavior of five of the
cxvil servants involved
,„ho were named,
. xt noted that
-ny of the decisions had been made with inaccurate informa-
tion and Chastised the civil servants for deliberately
attempting to "mislead applicants fn^ •PPi or tenancies into thinking
that their applications had received due consideration
When, in fact, they had not, and for having a hostile
attitude toward Marten, "this attitude being engendered
solely by a feeling of irritation that any member of the
public should have the t-omf^r--n-w 4-^rn e e ity to oppose or even to ques-
tion the acts or decisions of officials of ^v-^j-i- j.ciai t a government or
state department!""'"
When the report was published Dugdale played down the
affair and accepted full responsibility for the actions of
his officials. The political heat continued to such an
extent that five days later Dugdale resigned and a committee
was set up to recommend discipline for. the civil servants.
Marten was reimbursed costs and given the opportunity to
purchase Crichel Down.
The implications of Crichel Down for ministerial
responsibility are clear. In the first place, the affair
the question of administrative power, as a few career
""Ibid., pp. 144-45.
raises
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vid-
officials acted arbitrariixr = ^x rar ly and unjustly against an indi
ual to further departmental policy in the na.e of the
Ministry and with the full
1
" °^ Cabinet and House ofCo.r„ons.
.o Xon.er can a Minister
.e intimately, nor
perhaps even vaguely f^Tniiiov •^^^^ r i am ar with i-ho lav-^^xizn the large quantities of
work, much of it tpnhr.i^..i • , .I echn cal, m his department. First,
Ministers average only two vearc, -; n 4-ky r y ars m the same job. Second,
not only must a Minister, as Head of a Department of state
attend to the demands of administration but he or she
remains a member of Parliament. Thus the Minister must
attend to his constituency and party responsibilities
Third, the Minister, as a member of the Cabinet, is increas-
mgly involved in inter-departmental discussions. Hence,
even when a Minister has the inclination and energy, they
are spread too thinly to have sufficient time to be involved
in every decision.^ it is not realistic to believe that
Ministers can be aware of each decision taken in their name.
Given the size, complexity, and positive nature of
contemporary government, it is clear that Ministers must
rely on civil service officials for advice. Advice from
senior civil servants most often takes the form of a
^Chester, "The Crichel Down Case," p. 388.
Money '^''130^''^^^^'^^^^^' T^^e_Private_Gov^ of Public
f^ir^.Jid r^- ^f%^l^°' Tesse Blackstone, "MlHI^t^?^:
Memorfa^
^nd Civil Servants ,
" delivered at the Gaitskeil
bi!rd^n!
Lecture, London, no date, for a discussion of the
cone w^h °" Ministers and the resources available top ith their jobs.
"-iste..3
.r.e.in,.
...
..^^^.^^
^^^^^^^^
xs strictl, for internal consumption, because it reveals as
explicitly as possible t.e basis o. „.at t.e aepart.ent
„antsana (o.ten, its strate., ,or ,ettin, it.^ But even „itH t.ebest of intentions ana the best analytic capabilities, thebrief is an editing 30b. By the time the Minister is
briefed most optionQ h^tro k^^Pr s ave been circumscribed and most
decisions settled by the civil servants,
.hus, Crichel Oo„n
showea that Placing responsibility solely in the Minister is
neither fair to the Minister nor adequate protection to the
citizen against arbitrary government.
in the second place, the Crichel Down investigation
was an attack on the principle of anonymity. Officials'
actions were examined in detail, names were named, and their
actions were criticized in an official report and on the
floor of commons. Anonymity had perhaps allowed frank
aiscussion, but at the expense of individual justice. The
affair teaches that anonymity is likely to allow civil ser-
vants to abuse their power and then prevent disclosure of
that abuse.
In the third place, the affair illustrates the power
of the civil service to pursue its own policies. It appears
that the civil servants closest to the Minister continued
the policy of their predecessors despite the fact that a new
^Ibid., p. 138.
rrma-
Government had come into power ^ rr . m order to pursue thei
policy it appe..3 that the eivU servants withHeX. in.o...
tion fro. the public an. their Minister. Thus the Crichel
Down episode suggests that civil servants had the power atleast for a while, to frustrate the will of the Oovern.ent
xn power (a theme to be taken up .ore forcefully by the
Labour Government of the 1960s)
. if administrators were
not, then, the willing servants of Ministers, regardless of
their party, nor politically neutral sources of information
and advice, how re^l f:^\r^n+- 4--u
,
n e eva t is the concept of ministerial
responsibility?
Since the Crichel Down affair it has been generally
agreed that a Minister will not be held responsible for the
actions of his civil servants (in the sense of being
expected to resign) where he had no prior knowledge of them
or where the actions were contrary to his known policy.
2
At the same time, though civil servants have more and more
been allowed or even encouraged to take a public role,
anonymity of civil servants remains the normal practice and
prescription. Where, then, does responsibility lie? The
affair is a pointed reminder that the theory and practice of
ministerial responsibility is on a precarious pedestal and
has led many critics to intensify their questioning of
-^Ibid., pp. 393-94 .
in Wh
79.
2Lewis A. Gunn, "Ministers and Civil Servants: Changes
itehall," Public Administration (Sydney) 26 (March 196 7)
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Whether ministerial responsiMXit. is an a.e.uate aevice to
secure responsive administration in contemporary aemocrac,.
in addition to the changing nature of administration
illustrated by Crichpl nr^wr, 4-uy e Down, there were other changes taking
Place in postwar Britain. Economically, Britain was going
through a period of decline. its share of world trade had
declined from 33% in 1900 to 22% in 1937 then to 15% in 1962
From 1950 to 1954, British exports had increased by 6%,
While those Of the European Common Market countries increased
by 76%; from 1955 to 1960 British exports increased by 13%,
common Market exports by 63%, and from 1960 to 1962
Britain's exports increased 18% while Common Market exports
grew by 50%.
^
m 1964 Britain's rate of economic growth was
less than 4% per year, a rate below any major European
country; the postwar policies of the Treasury and the Bank
of England were widely questioned. Not surprisingly, this
poor economic performance stirred widespread self-castigation
and institutional criticism and invited comparisons not only
with Europe but also with the United States.
Changes were also taking place in education which were
to have an impact on society and the civil service. Postwar
changes in education beginning with the Education Act of
^Arthur Koestler, ed
. ,
Su icide of a Na tion (London:
Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., 1963), p. 10^;
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1944 that introduced free public
,
^""^^"^ education and continuing
through the 19^;^ d^uu •1963 Robb.ns co^ittee on Higher Education thatP.o.ptea the creation o. new diversities ana technical
schools lea to an increase in the nu^ers of students
entering and graduating
.ro„ universities and polytechnic
colleges. The consequence for the civil service was
increased pressure to fina places in the Aa^inistrative
Class for well-,ualified university graduates who were notfro™ Oxbridge and to re-evaluate the practices making it
difficult for specialists to enter the Executive and
.a.in-
istrative Classes.
socially, the country was experiencing a perioa of
pessimism and self-criticism. The reasons for this malaise
are, undoubtedly, many and complex. it was partially due to
the relative decline in economic fortunes and, perhaps,
partially related to a sense of declining empire, as the war
and postwar period saw the loss of overseas territories in
the Middle-East, Africa, and Asia, "the consequent loss of
prestige and an open relegation to second class power
status. "1 There was also a changing value system which
affectea all sectors of society-political parties, church,
iness, and education. Anthony Sampson captures well this
f the early 1960s as it relates to the civil service.
busi
ethos o
1.
Background Analysis
,
" AdministrationTr (SuJt^neri 9 70^1 81-82
.
^X:^^;;'?ff'"^"'-^!?'_ "^^^.^^Iton Report: A Sociological
aristocracy, pubUc school P^^^il^g^d values of
-dominate /o^.lZlnl today ha^ffa-^.^r ""^^^^stimulus, the Purposive poJfcies anf ^"^^"^^ ^hefuture which Britain i i^i^? ^ "^^en eye on the?ld ethos was
-ulded by Se's^Slcce"; ""^^ '''^^ ^IJIimperial machine. its stvle ? , ^" invinciblesmall, exciting things borlL to make big things seemin the unconfident context o?'t^r ^'^t'^'^^ fa-iUar: butation-and the assumefsuperforfty^hat' "^"^<3eP«ci-merely succeeds in dispell?;^ li^K ^ '"^^ "i^h it-
curiosity and dulling Spe^?Lnf ??ir""' """"ngthe pragmatic outlook are a 1 r?^; 9roove-outlook,
with an age which suffers, i^iiL t^J '^""P^"^an oppressive lack of innnv^ft^^ ^ Victorians, fromfabric of the British ""°^^^i°n and zeal. The old
social and'^i?ticifh^?r'^has^fanef't"'''^ "^^^^-^ ^^s
analyse the vast forces of
failed to accommodate or
change which (wheSer ?hey lik^Jt'or no?f'°" -.socialthe face of the country.! "°t) are changing
If the Sampson analysis is correct-that a malaise, brought
on by the incongruency between two competing values, infused
all institutions and leaders-then, certainly, the civil
service and particularly the higher civil service could not
escape unnoticed.
Similarly, Subramanian argues that the basic elements
of the British administrative system-the Administrative
Class, the dominance of the all-rounder or amateur over the
specialist, anonymity of the civil servant and the power of
the Treasury-were consequences of the social and political
dominance of the landed aristocracy and gentry in the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries. Although these elements
"continued undisturbed throughout a period of expanding
franchise and mass democracy" in the late eighteenth and
^Anthony Sampson, Ana tomy of Britain (London: Hodder
and Stoughton Limited, 1962), pp. 637-38T~
nis-
1
r
se
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early nineteenth centuries, t.e late 1950s ana earl,
19S0S,
..tKe discrepancy between t.e elements o. t.e a.^i.,.^
tratrve syste. a„a of ™ass society
.aa beco.e too ,larin, a
Thus, it was wiaely perceived that bureaucracy was no lon,e
representative of predominant postwar attitudes or of tho
groups which had emerged aft^ra t e the war as the dominant
political force.
.3 Kingsley „aKes clear, if pu.Uc aa™i„-
.stratxon is to remain aemocratic, administrative arrange-
ments ™ust reflect the character of the social structure of
the nation.2 «any critics believed that the time for reform
was overdue.
Perhaps in response to this national psychology of
pessimism and self-criticism, perhaps in the more positive
sense of searching for solutions, many people in the nation
turned their attention to science and technology with the
hope that they would provide an escape from Britain's
malaise. Harold Wilson's often repeated campaign theme of
1964 was that the "white heat of the scientific revolution-
would be harnessed by Labour to serve Britain. Scientific
and business management techniques applied to public admin-
istration were seen by many as a cure for bureaucratic slug-
gishness and inefficiency. Many people were adopting the
view of the Confederation of British Industries (CBI) that
^Subramanian, "The Fulton Report," pp. 179, 183-85
2J. Donald Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy,
. 215. "
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many
••nu,neracy. is as important as Xiteracy.-l
.
true believers was McHa^ara's Planning, Programing,
Budgeting Syste™ (p.p.b.s.) i„ the United- States Defense
Department. The Pulton Cor^ittee reported in 1968 at the
height Of this faith in science and scientific management, a
faith Shared by some key committee members who questioned
the efficacy of a notion of responsibility that valued
judgment over scientific
"objectivity."
gxternal Pressure; Critics
and Criticisms
These postwar social, economic, and educational
Changes and the resulting pressures on ministerial responsi-
bility and the civil service, although growing intense,
remained rather vague Afi-^y -: 4- ^dy . tter all, it must be remembered,
Britain's civil service remained basically competent,
accountable, and honest (even Crichel Down suggested no
criminal wrongdoing) and the object of admiration from
reformers in other countries, for example the United States.
It was left up to journalists, politicians, and especially,
academics to give focus and specificity to the amorphous
suspicions and to lead the assault on the higher civil
service, a quite visible, but by no means helpless "scape-
goat." During the early 1960s, a string of books was
published expressing dissatisfaction with Britain's perfor-
mance and position in the world and laying the blame solidly
^F.C. Report, Vol. 5 (2), p. 509.
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was a
on the civil service mandarins. Examples include The
edited hy „u,h Thomas and especiaU.
.ho.as
Balch.s article,
"The
.potheosis of the Dilettante" in thatbooK ,1,59); Th^_,^^,^
^
_
^^^^^
Srmsh^overn^en^^
,1963,; suicide of a
Nation edited hy Arthur Koestler (1963,; Micha;7^;;:;;;;;r'
The Stagnant Society (1964, Ppi-o^ ou„ ,ixao ), eter Shore's, gntitled to Know
(1966); and The^^stem by Max Nicholson (1967).! Each
biting. Often bitter attack on the civil service.
Brian Chapman held the view "that British government
is unnecessarily handicapped in dealing with the problems of
the modern state by our failure to revise archaic procedures
and reform the policy-making institutions; and that, further,
our tendency to disguise reality by the use of myths [minis-
terial responsibility] has made even the ordinary management
of affairs more laborious than it need be, despite the
strength and quality of the Executive class. "^ Balogh was
more direct,
Jvni!^''''rK^^?i^''^ °^ British power cannot entirely beexplained by the venality of the voters, the folly ofpoliticians and the harshness of world events. The fact
uir^r.^ tI^;^^^ ?'n?nf^' "
^he Establishment (London: AnthonyBlond Ltd., 1959), republished in 1968 as Crisis in theCivil Service; E. Strauss, The Ruling Serv^ts (London:George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961); Brian Chapman, BritishGovernment Observed (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 196371
Peter Shore, Entitled to Know (London: Macgibbon and Kee
Ltd., 1966); Max Nicholson, The System (London: Hodder andStoughton, 1967); and Michael Shanks, The Stagnant Society(Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 196A)~. "
2
B. Chapman, British Government Observed
, p. 44.
^^^^r^^' - ^^^^^^^
Max Hicolson was even ™ore pointed in characterization
Of the higher civil service as a
..band of ill-infonned,
untrained, miscast full-i-imo = . .r n t e amateurs, doing a little of
everything without any coherent pattern. "2
The academic and popular literature focuses on five
main cri ticisms-the skills (or lack thereof) of administra-
tors, their character, the class structure of the civil
service, the lack of political responsiveness on the part of
the civil service, and the power of the Treasury. Perhaps
the most persistent criticism made of the higher civil
service was that recruitment and selection procedures for
the Administrative Class were based on the assumption that
those with a public school and Oxbridge education and certain
personal qualities could best govern modern Britain. While
administrators may have been educated men they were still
amateurs, dilettantes, or, less pejoratively, generalists.
According to the critics there were two consequences
of this recruitment bias. First, administrators lacking
experience in business and social service fields and
training in management techniques, statistics, or economics,
failed to be effective managers of resources and manpower
^Thomas Balogh, "Government by the Dilettante," TheNew Statesman and Nation 52, July 28, 1956, p. 93.
2
^Nicholson, The System
, p. 436.
The
LC
a n3,,„„,,
^ ^^^^^^
^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^^
that a.„ini3t.ators ai. not have the technical o. scientific
expertise to advise Ministers effective!,, xhe result
BaXch bluntly asserts, is that "when^ve^an^^j^o^^
^^i^^i^^^^^Jl^^-tSL^a^ecruiteij^^
solutions to this lack of managerial and scientifi<
expertise lay in, first, appointing more members of the
Professional and Scientific Classes to the top positions,
second, allowing Ministers to bring in their own expert
staff, and, third, more training in management and economics
for administrators.
Many pre-Pulton critics have noted the dearth of
training subsequent to entry into the Administrative Class.
^
The belief that administrators could best learn by practice
was prevalent; consequently, the service had little or no
systematic training in management or the social sciences.
A second popular criticism made of the higher civil
service in the 1960s was that it was inhabited by men who
lacked vitality, drive, and initiative. A temporary civil
servant during the war wrote that "they are not men of
imagination or action. They are slow, cautious, and
^Balogh, "The Apothesis of the Dilettante," inH. Thomas, The Establishment
, pp. 119-20, (his emphasis).
2See, for example, William A. Robson, "The Reform of
ig^-llT""^'"
Political Quarterly 35 (April-June, 1964):
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obstructive Thoxr z^>-^ » ,ey are 'shrewd- but not wise, dependable but
not creative. They are, too often cynical rather than
realistic. They are small men."l This cautiousiiij-b , conserva-
tive quality was attacker! for- •rtacked r being inconsistent with the
needs of postwar Britain.
Many critics pointed to what they saw as the inhumane
nature of the Administrative Class. Administrators were out
of touch with the problems of the larger society; they
lacked human sympathy and sensitivity for working class
problems, possessing "a sense of superiority to humanity at
large. "2 certainly, the Crichel Down investigation provided
evidence that some administrators possessed an "excessive
sense of self-importance" resulting in broken promises and
the ignoring of "the fef^linnc <-m- 4-i^ -ceei gs or the convenience of
individual citizens."^
Similarly, the focus of the service was on London, and
most administrators lacked experience in other regions.
Thus the civil service was viewed as closed and parochial (a
view compounded by the secrecy which surrounded governmental
decision-making), lacking in interchange with business and
universities, and especially as unrepresentative in character.
Temporary Civil Servant, "Post-War Machinery ofGovernment, III—Government Administration and Efficiency "The Political Quarterly 15 (1944):94.
^Bosworth Monck, How the Civil Service Works (London-Phoenix House Ltd., 1952)
, p. 23 .
"
o
"Notes and Comments, The Civil Service and Its
Critics," The Political Quarterly 25 (October 1954) :305.
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It has already been shown that in the pre-FUlton civil
service a selection bias existed for graduates fro. Oxford
and Cambridge, for former students of independent, fee-
paying schools, and for arts rather than social science,
natural science graduates. One cause for this selection
bias, the critics claimed, was the increasing reliance on
the oral interview in Method II, where social class biases
can creep in, as opposed to the anonymity of written exams.
^
Another cause was the lack of a regular practice of transfer
from Professional, Scientific or Technical Classes to the
Administrative Class. During the 1950s only six percent of
the new recruits to the lowest ranks of the Administrative
Class were specialist transfers. 2 Although World War II had
the effect of lowering some of the interclass barriers for
promotion, the critics argued that informal, if not formal,
barriers to transfer remained in the pre-Fulton civil
service. The result, critics argued, was a higher civil
service which represented only a narrow social class.
A fourth discernible criticism of the Administrative
Class, exemplified by the Crichel Down affair, was that it
was not responsive to public sentiment or to changes in
political leadership. The charge was most often made by
•-Balogh, "Government by the Dilettante," p. 94. Also
R. K. Kelsall, Higher Civil Servants in Britain, From 18 70
to the Present Day (London: Routledgp and Kegan p^mI Trifit-^-i.
1955)
, pp. 65-84
2Kelsall, Higher Civil Servants in Britain
, p. 116.
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academics with «?n(-i n-socxalxst leanxngs, but not infrequently by
conservative Party supporters, that the civil service
thwartea the implementation of party manifestos. Blame was
sometimes placf^r? r.r, +-k i-P aced on the bureaucratic structure and red tapebut Often critics felt that Administrators made conscious
'
political choices to sabotage manifestos when they conflicted
with departmental policy,
.he solutions most often suggested
were to politicise the higher civil service in some way, by
exther allowing politicians to bring in political advisors
or making advice given by top officials public.
Although much of the orin c ticism was directed at the
higher civil service in nt^r^^^^^i ^ .x m general, some of it was focused
squarely on the Treasury, a few critics faulted the
Establishments Divisions-the Divisions concerned with
staffing-with inefficiency due to a failure to use scien-
tific management techniques. others faulted specific policy
decisions championed by the Treasury/ such as on balance of
payments. But in one way or another, the criticisms often
boiled down to distrust of the Treasury's power. Balogh
argues that the power of the Treasury was consolidated in
1919 when the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury was recog-
nized as Head of the Civil Service. This was followed by
making the consent of the Prime Minister necessary for any
vital appointments in all departments. Since the Prime
Minister could not have first-hand knowledge of personnel
matters, the power of appointment was given essentially to
209
the „eaa of the civU Service.^ effect was to reduce
the departmental minister's power in relation to his top
cxvil servants and the Treasury, since career advancement
now rested within the civil service structure.
Through the Second World War and postwar period the
concentration of power in the Treasury's hands continued
until the early 1960s when, as will be noted, the attacks on
the Treasury's power resulted in reorganisation, still, to
many critics in the years just prior to Fulton, the Treasury
possessed a monopoly of policy-making power that should be
trimmed by separating its financial and personnel functions.
Internal Pressures: Civil
Servants and Unions
Certainly a great deal of noise and heat was generated
by the academic critics of the British civil service in the
late 1950s and early 1960s, but perhaps the rather more
quiet pressure applied within the bureaucracy had a greater
impact on the actual changes, Richard Chapman and J. R.
Greenaway, in tracing changes in the pattern of recruitment
and classification and training in the British civil service,
observe that "the original impetus for reform [of the civil
service] came primarily from high-ranking civil servants
"'"Balogh, "The Apotheosis of the Dilettante," pp. 86-
87. See also, William Hampton, Parliamentary Affairs 17(Autumn 1964) :431. ~ ~
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m1themselves T?/-^v- ^. For example,
'.the proposal for 'one class-
was first considerea within the service C in 19433, long
before it was publicl, aiscussed . " ^ Many top civil servants
-
the early 1960s were taking the unusual step of publicly
Chastising the civil service ana calling for change. Por
example, an Assistant Secretary at the Ministry of Defence
was warning in 1964 that management shouia be taken more
seriously in the civil service.3 others, like K. a. s. Brown,
a Principal in the Administrative Class of the civil service,
called upon his peers to develop a better problem-solving
attitude by recruiting more specialists, training adminis-
trators in the use of management techniques and in their
substantive areas, and breaking down the barriers in communi-
cation between aaministrators and experts.^
But perhaps more important than individuals for
creating internal pressure for change have been the positions
taken by civil service staff associations, particularly those
^
representing Professional, Technical, Executive and Clerical
Classes. The early postwar years witnessed a number of
departmental committees and informal inquiries into the
of T.^J^^'^i^^t^- Chapman and J. R. Greenaway, The DynamicsAdministrative Reform (London: Croom Helm Lta., 1980)
.
—
p . 159
.
^Ibid., p. 161.
3
^* N^i^"^' "Management and the Administrative
Class, Public Administration 42 (Summer 1964 ): 11 3-1 22
.
^R. G. S. Brown, "Organization Theory and Civil Service
Reform," Public Administration 43 (Autumn 1965): 327.
211
possiMlities Of ch.n,e, all of „.ieh ".enectea the
aissatisfaction enpressea ana tensions felt a.on, the
various professional groups in the civil service..•! Hach
association callea for changes in civil service recruitment,
selection ana promotion practices, class structure, pa„ ana
conditions that „ouia benefit their members. Thus, the
institution Of Professional civil Servants, representing -
professional, sci p^n^i -f-; ^ *. •-L, ent fic, technical, and most of the
specialist graaes, in its testimony to the Pulton Committee
complainea that "management ana aa^inistration at the higher
levels are still almost exclusively the monopoly of the
Administrative Class," despite the fact that "over the last
century the Government has become involvea in the complex
economic, technological and social problems of moaern
society. "2 To remeay this monopoly by the Administrative
Class, the I.P.c.S. callea for the abolition of class
divisions in the higher civil service, which would allow top
aaministrators to be recruitea from executive, scientific,
and professional as well as administrative grades, and an
increased flexibility of transfer between classes. In
similar ways, other staff associations were urging adminis-
trative changes upon the Treasury.
By the early 1960s criticism from within ana outside
B^f^v-
'^''^P"^" and Greenaway, The Dynamics of AdministrativeKetorm
, p. 162, —-
—
2f.C. Report, Vol. 5 (1), p. 286.
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the Treasury had reached such a pea. that the Treasury was
reorganl.od so that a aoint Permanent Secretary was ^de
responsible for finances and economic planning and another
aomt Permanent Secretary for pay and management of the
civil service through the Establishments Divisions of the
Departments. it was reorganised again in 1964 so that it
lost its planning functions to a new Department of Economic
Affairs. In early 1968 a new Management Services Division
was created in the Treasury to perform operations research.
^
Nor was the training of administrators overlooked. m
1963 a centre for Administrative Studies was established
Which, among other activities, started a short course on
economics for Assistant Principals. After the 1964 election
which brought Labour into power, there was a great influx of
economists into the Treasury, although most of these were on
a temporary basis. In addition, efforts were made in some
technical departments to move specialists to top posts,
although again, the success of these efforts may be
questioned. But again the point is that changes were taking
place—some to address administrative needs, others in
response to political pressure; whether these changes were
merely cosmetic or were of substance is a matter for debate.
For a more detailed account of these administrative
reforms, see Roger Williams, "Administrative Modernization
in British Government," International Social Science
Journal 21, No. 1 (1969)
": 100-115
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The^CataT^it ~
into the cauxaron of refo™ already bubbling with
acaae„ic ana popular dissatisfaction, pressures fro™ staff
associations, and discontent fro™ within higher civil
service itself, was dropped the party politics of 1964
Although Change was occurring, largely out of sight, the
political personalities and issues in the mid-1960s pro-
vided a catalyst that for a moment brought the myriad
pressures and actors together for a burst of reforming
activity. Whether or not the activity produced a radically
new ingredient (as many of the reformers had hoped) or
merely a puff of smoke will be investigated in Chapter VI.
If leftist academics were critical of the civil service
for its lack Of political responsiveness, it is not surpris-
ing that Labour politicians were also suspicious of a civil
service they thought was powerful enough to misdirect and
stifle the Party's manifesto. This suspicion was given vent
by The Fabian Society pamphlet issued in 1964, The Adminis-
trators.l Written by Robert Nield, later to become a member
of the Fulton Committee, Shirley Williams, Labour MP
appointed to the Fulton Committee only to withdraw when she
was appointed Minister in the Government, and Thomas Balogh,
an academic economist closely identified with Wilson, The
Administrators clearly had an influence on the thinking of
Ia Fabian Group, The Administrators (London- TheFabian Society, June 1964)
.
214
the
.a.our Government ana Xater the Pulton Co™,ittee
-aee. it Has
.een o.ser.ea t.at
..t.e
.uXton Co^ittle.s -
report looks remarkahlvb y like an expanded version of The
MiEiilMtrators .
^
The pamphlet, an upaate of a Pa.ian Heport iss.ea in
1947 that was itself a precursor of much of the later
criticisms, char.ea that reform of the higher civil service
was a prerequisite for the Labour Government or any ,overn-
n-ent to carry through policy changes. The civil service is
an anachronism, the report went on, ana fails in three basic
respects: its amateurism, its negative approach to problem-
solving, ana its closea and secretive formulation of policy
TO make the civil service more professional, more adaptable,
and more creative the Fabians proposed widening the net of
recruitment, allowing freer movement in and out of the ser-
vice, creating an expanded and more scholarly training school,
abolishing class aistinctions between specialists ana admin-
istrators in the higher civil service, increasing the number
of specialists and political appointments and, finally,
separating personnel management from the Treasury. As will
be seen, their findings and recommendations were in many
ways an exact image of the Fulton Committee proposals.
Administration '"^S^ 5"": •"''?^°™ ^""^ ^''^"^e in British Centralo , Political Studies 19 {June 1971) : 220.
t^^'r"-"^
Committee for the Fabian Society, The Reform
'^"^^ "^""'^on: Fabian Publi cations
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Haroia wnson ,.ve expression to
.abo^.-s suspicion o.the evil service by co^piainin, that "whoever is in of.icethe „hi,s are in power.-l
„ore recently, Labour „p ,cny
Benn captured the continued frustration with the civil
service by ar^uin, that a civil service policy
.as developed
over a long period of ti.e which "draws so.e of its force
from a deep commitment to the benefits of continuity and a
fear that adversary politics may lead to sharp reversals by
incoming governments of policies devised by their predeces-
sors, which the civil service played a great part in
developing. "2 civil servants prefer a consensus politics
Which minimizes public controversy and change and thus "it
is not a coincidence that governments of both parties appear
to end up with policies very similar to each other. "3
In its evidence to the Fulton Committee the National
Executive Co„™ittee of the Labour Party showed how adminis-
trators might secure ministerial compliance with the
administrator's policy.
T""^ °^ 5°^= °" a department whichthe Minister knows nothing of-some of it research work
to'?t''M°''"'=r
i'"P°'^tant results which are never shownthe Minister; some of it planning work which may bedeliberately concealed from him, either because it might
••Balogh, "The Apothesis of the Dilettante," pp. 111-12.
y ggjjj^^ „^j^^ ^^^^ ^ Constitutional civil
service. Lecture given to Royal Institute of Public Admin-istration, January 28, 1980 (Nottingham: Institute forWorkers' Control, 1980), p. 5.
^ibid., p. 7.
216
Civil service secrecy, its control of information, and its
ability to set the framework in which policy is ™ade are
only a few ways top civil servants
.ay exert influence over
policy. in the view of Labour these characteristics
justified their reform efforts.
A key figure in the civil service reforms of the 1960s
was, of course, Harold Wilson. Wilson brought to the social
and political environment of the middle 196 0s a background
Which gave him sympathy with the attacks on the Administra-
tive Class. Wilson, a chemist's (pharmacist's) son from
Yorkshire, was described by one member of the Pulton Co™„it-
tee as a man of "humble background"2 „ho had an aversion to
aristocrats. He went to Oxford with the aid of an academic
scholarship and eventually taught economics there. Yet it
is likely that as a statistician in the civil service during
World War II he continued to feel the strong class bias of
British society as it was manifested in the Administrative
Class to specialist relationships. Emerging from what
Wilson considered ill treatment by the Administrative Class
during these war years was his critical opinion of it.^ At
Ip.C. Report, vol. 5 (2), p. 655.
2Characterization given in interview with member ofFulton Committee.
Noted m interview with Lord Armstrong. London, April
30f 1980.
the same time his technir-ai k ,hnic l background gave him a belief in
science, technoloqy and sr-,- „„4- cgy scientific management that was the
underpinning for much of Wilson's reformist
.eal
.
Thus Wilson brought to the 1964 elections not only adeep rooted suspicion of the British upper-class but a
professional expertise in economics. Robert Presthusl has
Characterized the elen-ionn ct as a confrontation between the
Establishment and Meritocracy. The Conservative, Sir Alec
Douglas-Home, a product of Eton and Cambridge, a believer in
the wisdom of the amateur, and a member of a Scottish family
Whose title dated back fourteen generations, representing
the traditional qualities of birth and character was being
Challenged by Wilson and Labour who represented progress
through science and management. Accepting much of the
academic and Fabian criticisms of British society and the
civil service, Wilson described the conservative period in
power since 1951 as thirteen wasted years. 2 one observer
has noted that "Harold Macmillan, as Conservative Premier
from 1957 to 1963, seemed to be largely unconvinced of the
need for reform. By contrast, Wilson wanted to be
remembered as an activist, a reformer.
T. ui •
"^^2^^^^ Presthus, "Decline of the Generalist Myth,"Publ ic Administration Review 24 (December 1964 ): 211-16
.
2John P. Mackintosh, The Government and Politics ofBritain (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1970), p. 150.
Frank Stacey, British Government 1966-1975, Years ofReform (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 2.
—
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Dur.n, the campaign, wiXson e^phasi.ea that he intendea
to restructure the government machinery. xn a revealin,
raaio interview by Or. Norman Hunt^ (later to be named to
the Pulton co^nittee,
, Wilson indicated that as Prime
Minister he would increase the number of temporary appoint-
nients of outsi df^^r-cers to increase the number of scientists and
economists in the civil service, increase the number of
political appointees in the Prime Minister's office, give
responsibility for economic planning to a new ministry
separate from the Treasury, and introduce more scientific
management techniques into the civil service.
True to his promise, one of the first acts of the new
Labour Government in 1964 was to appoint a number of politi-
cal advisors and create some new posts for economists and
scientists. For example, economist Thomas Balogh was
appointed Economic Advisor in the Cabinet Office, Robert
Nield became Economic Advisor to the Treasury, the post of
Scientific Advisor was added in the Cabinet, and, as already
noted, the Department of Economic Affairs was created to
make it easier to bring in outside expertise. The spirit of
reform quickly engulfed the Wilson Administration. In quick
succession between 1965 and 1969 were reports from the
Mallaby Committee on staffing local government, the. Maud
Committee on management of local government, the Seebohm
^Interview with Harold Wilson by Norman Hunt, "White-hall and Beyond," The Listener 71, March 5, 1964, pp. 379-381.
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Co..ittee on local authority personal social services, the
Redcliffe-Mau. Royal Co..ission on local
.overn.ent structure
England, and the Select Co..ittee on Nationalised industry
Which recommended that the Post office should become a public
corporation. The Cabinet itself was a target for reform as
Wilson in 1968 implemented a reorganization scheme. ^ one
point is clear, in the mid-1960s the appropriate nature of a
responsible public administration was being questioned and
the mechanisms to secure responsibility were being sought.
Fulton was part of this flood of dissatisfaction and reform.
Wilson was not alone in the drive for reform. During
this period Parliament was also trying to reform itself. m
1967 the House of Commons set up three new select commit-
tees, in addition to the three already existing Public
Accounts, Estimates, and Nationalized Industries Committees,
to improve the Parliament's oversight of administration.
Also in 1967 was the establishment of a Parliamentary Commis-
sioner for Administration, or Ombudsman, to investigate
administrative actions on behalf of the Crown. It was in
this climate that the House of Commons Estimates Committee
investigated the problems of recruitment to the civil
service in 1964-65. ^ As Brian Smith observes, "although
Isee Richard A. Chapman, "Administrative Reform in
Britain," Administration 18 (Winter 1970) : 326-41, and B. C.Smith and J. Stanyer, "Administrative Developments in 1967:
A Survey," Public Administration 46 (Autumn 1968) : 329-79, as
well as F. Stacey and R. Williams for accounts of the reform
context of which Fulton was a part.
^Great Britain, Sixth Report from the Estimates Commit-
tee, Session 1964-1965 . ~
ng
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primarily concGrned with ^^^7i^ •Civ l Service Commission recruitment
methods, the Committee, und^r •r e the influence of the pervadi..
reformist atmosphere dr^^w 4. •Pn , e attention to the policies under-
lying recruitment, such as the structure of the Service, the
task of Government and the need for expertise and special-
ised Skills...! The committee criticized the Treasury for
its lack Of Change to meet new demands upon government and
were specifically critio^i +-uJ-y cal of the isolation of civil servants
from the rest of society, the lack of mobility between
government and business and universities, and the lack of
specialists. These areas should be investigated, the Commit-
tee recommended, and called for
.'a committee of officials,
aided by members from outside the civil service, ... to be
appointed to initiate research upon, to examine, and to
report upon the structure, recruitment and management of the
civil service...2 it should be noted that Conservative Sir.
Edward Boyle was one member of the Estimates Committee quite
pointed in his questioning of the then Joint Permanent
Secretary of the Civil Service, William Armstrong, regarding
the need to open up the service and for more interchange
with the outside. Sir Edward was shortly to become a member
of the committee which he recommended.
^Smith, ..Reform and Change in British Central Adminis-tration, .' p. 220.
2 .Great Britain, Sixth Report from the Estimates Commit-
tee, Session 1964-1965, p. xxxv. ~ '
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The
_Creation
Because a head of government
.ay fina it difficult to
xnxtiate investigations of those agencies and individuals
xmplen,enting his policies, the reco^endation of the Esti
mates Coro^ittee provided Wilson the justification he
apparently had long wanted. On February 8, 1966, Wilson
announced in the House of colons the aovern^enfs acceptance
Of the recon^endation
"that a co™„ittee should be appointed
to examine the structure, recruitment and management,
including training, of the Home civil Service. Wilson
anticipated that these "very broad terms of reference will
require a fundamental and wide-ranging inquiry. "2
concept of responsible administration about to change in
some radical way? Did Wilson intend to turn the traditional
notion upon its head? Wilson went on to say that "the
Government's willingness to consider changes in the Civil
Service does not imply any intention on their part to alter
the basic relationship between Ministers and civil servants.
Civil servants, however eminent, remain the confidential
advisers of Ministers, who alone are answerable to Parliament
for policy; and we do not envisage any change in this funda-
mental feature of our parliamentary system of democracy.
J-Great Britain, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates(Commons)
,
5th series. Vol. 724 (1966): 210.
^Ibid.
Thus, the tension inherent in attempts to refo™
„.re
reveaxea-tensions
.etween the need to change and the need
for continuity. The boundaries for the Committee on the
Civil Service were established and a premonition of the
nature of its recommendations was given.
The committee was composed of twelve meters appointed
by Wilson plus a small staff of civil servants. On first
glance the Committee appeared to be a well-balanced group
representing a cross-section of society with three academics
(political scientists), two MPs, two Permanent Secretaries,
two industrialists, one trade unionist, one scientist, and'
one economist. On closer examination it is clear that
the composition of the co™,ittee was designed to give Wilson
the recommendations that he wanted. Lord (John) Fulton,
vice-chancellor at the University of Sussex until 1967,
was appointed as Chairman. His active teaching life had
been in philosophy and politics at Balliol College, Oxford
(providing a threat to Jowett, the Balliol tutor who had
influenced Northcote and Trevelyan)
. More importantly,
Fulton had served as temporary civil servant during the war
years 1942-1944 as Principal Assistant Secretary at the
Ministry of Fuel and Power. He was at the Ministry when
Harold Wilson became Director of Economics and Statistics in
1943. It was here, while pulling their night-time "fire
watching" duties,
^ that the two .en had occasion to tal.
about the complaints that each had against the
.andarins-
Wilson for their mistreatment of specialists liKe himself
and Fulton for their lacK of initiative and inventiveness 2
For Fulton's service to the country, indicated to some
extent by his service on numerous boards and commissions, he
was made a life peer in 1966 by Wilson's Government. Perhaps
because of his wide involvement in other areas or perhaps
because by 1966 he had no real interest, Fulton was chairman
in name only. 3 his war-time link to Wilson, his sympathy
with Wilson's perspective, his public prominence was
apparently enough for Wilson.
The second academic on the Committee, Professor Simey,
Professor of Social Science at the University of Liverpool,
had also recently been made life peer by the Wilson Govern-
ment. Simey was the only academic member of the Committee
who had a special interest in public administration,
although this does not appear to have been the primary
reason for his selection. The most likely reason was that
Simey was a member of Wilson's Lancashire constituency and a
.
''"During the war, civil servants took turns watchingtheir office buildings at night to put out fires that might
result from German bombing.
2 .First noted in interview with Lord Armstrong. Alsodiscussed in Peter Kellner and Lord Crowther-Hunt , The CivilServants (London: Macdonald General Books, 1980), p. 29
.
^Several interviewees noted that Lord Fulton was
rather ill-informed and provided no real guidance for the
committee
.
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Labour sympathizer. He had most recently gained notoriety
When his Wife refused to ta.e the title of .ady. The third
academic. Dr. Norman Hunt (later Lord Crowther-Hunt)
, Pellow
and Lecturer in politics at Exeter College, Oxford, was a
close friend to Wilson and shared his thinking.
The two Members of Parliament were Robert Sheldon,
Labour, and Sir Edward Boyle, Conservative. Boyle had
'
already publicly expressed his criticisms of the civil
service as member of the Estimates Committee. Sheldon, a
product of technical college with engineering training,
shared the thinking of those who believed that civil servants
should be individually responsible for their actions.
1
Similarly, Robert Nield, Economic Adviser to the
Treasury from 1964 and Chairman of the Fabian Group respon-
^^^^^ Thej^dmi^^ was very close to Labour
Ministers and highly critical of the "amateurism" of the
Administrative Class.
The other members of the Committee included Sir James
Dunnett, Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Labour; Sir
Philip Allen, Second Permanent Secretary in the Pay and
Management side of the Treasury; Walter Anderson, General
Secretary of the National and Local Government Officer's
^In Parliamentary debate, November 1968, Sheldon
argued that the ability is needed within the Civil Service
"to lay blame or give praise upon individuals so that they
can be rewarded when they have been successful or be
reproved when they have been unsuccessful." Great Britain,
Mgj^sard's Parliamentary Debates (Commons) , 5th series.
Vol. 773 (1968):1611.
225
ng as
a
Association; Sir Wi T i ; ^ ,xliam cook, Deputy chief Scientific
Adviser, Ministrv <~,-f t^^-pxy of Defence, with longtime experience in
the civil servicf^- q-Jv xtice, Sir Norman Kipping, retired Director
General of the Pe.eration of British Xnaustries; Sir aohn
wall, business executive, with many years experience in the
-vil service, who shortly after his committee appointment
was made vice-chairman of the Post Office Board. Servl
secretary to the Committee was R. „. l. Wilding, then
Principal in the Treasury but to become an Assistant Secre-
tary in the new civil Service Department.
The committee was large by postwar standards, ^ but its
Chief Characteristics appear to be the strong representation
Of known civil service critiVc. ux ti s and the heavy representation
of current and past civil servants. AH the members were
undoubtedly influenced by the mood of the country, the
thinking of the new Labour Government, and the recent wave
of critical literature. Even the civil servants were pulled
along by this wave-afraid to resist its pull for fear of
reflecting on the conservatism of the Service.^
The committee appointments and structure gave rise to
skepticism among many observers regarding the ability of the
^Timothy J. Cartwright, "The Fulton Committee on theCivil Service m Britain," Canadian Public Administration 12(Spring 1969) :92, notes that the Fulton Committee had twelve
members while the average is eight.
2As one interviewee, a civil servant on the FultonCommittee, noted, he supported the controversial first chap-ter and many recommendations, lest the skeptics and criticspoint to the civil service as being against change.
con^ittee to produce an effective refo™ document, so^e
critics saw the heavy representation of civil servants as an
attempt to sabotage real reform, though others saw it as a
tactic to insure that recommendations were implemented
Others noted that the Pulton Committee was a Departmental
committee of Inquiry, not a Royal Commission. Some observers
saw this as a downgrading of the investigation into the '
civil service, since Royal Commissions have more prestige
and more authority to call people and papers. ^ At the same
time, the departmental committee may have more flexibility
and be less threatening to witnesses since oral testimony is
not published. Nonetheless, the committee assembled and
began its work as a body of prestigious, well-educated,
public spirited men and, ironically, largely amateurs with
regard to the task at hand.
The Fulton Debate and Emerging
Themes of Reform
If it is correct that "administrative responsibility"
is a concept that captures the competing values inherent in
political debates over civil service reform, then it should
be possible to organize the criticisms and actions aimed at
the British civil service in the 1950s and 1960s under this
rubric. Yet the dynamics of the reform process do not
necessarily make this an easy task. It is clear that much
of the academic and popular literature in calling for, among
^Kellner and Crowther-Hunt, The Civil Servants, p. 26.
other thina-^ "< o-^n ngo,
.e.s secrecy in decision-making, more
P^^liarnentarv ovp>T-ci rrv,*-y ers ght, more specialists, technicians, and
soc.al scientists, better management, and abolition of the
Class structure,
„as stressing the themes of openness or
comprehensibilitv oniT+-i^ = iy, polit cal responsiveness, professional-
technical comnetenno ^r^A ^P ce, and representativeness. But these new
standards perhaps left those who were charged with imple-
menting the Changes bewildered. Por as William Armstrong,
Permanent Secretary and Head of the Home Civil Service,
complained.
The demand that administrative processes <,hnni^ k
effiS^ncv'"' '^°r f ^^'"^^^ ^^^--^^ - inrr ciency
. . .
deplore the meticulous scrutinv ofParliamentary Committees and the Ombudsman
"These conflicting ideas and demands," Armstrong went on to
say, "are not simply represented by different groups in the
population: they can frequently be found together in the
same speech or report."-^
Nor were the signals coming from politicians less
confusing. While members of Parliament were, on the one
hand, attacking civil servants for their lack of initiative
and drive, they were, on the other hand, criticizing them
for their lack of responsiveness and were establishing more
^ _
^Sir William Armstrong, "The Role and Character of theCivil Service," The Proceedings of the British Academy 56(1970), p. 213. ~ — — -
le
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detailed accountability through Parliamentary con^ittees.
At the same time, civil service staff .... •associations wanted to
make it easier for their members to move into administrative
Dobs or to increase their members' status relative to the
Administrative Class while simultaneously protecting their
own members from competition from either outside or insid
the civil service. Thus the themes and prescriptions
Offered by the various critics, though clear when standi
on their own, were often conflicting and confusing to admin-
istrators when examined in the aggregate.
Out of this maelstrom of the reform process it can
also be observed that the higher civil servants themselves
had a role in initiating reforms. By the time the Pulton
Committee was appointed, several changes had been made in
administrative organization and procedures in the direction
the critics were urging. At the same time, however, it is
notable that the values pursued by the civil servants were
often different than those pursued by the external critics.
Those running the machine were often concerned with internal
efficiency and keeping the machine well-oiled while protec-
ting the status and character of the Administrative Class
and the basic principles of ministerial responsibility.
Many external critics, however, were out to provide
.
Ministers
with alternative sources of advice and make the Administra-
tive Class more egalitarian.
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Thus, the implications for ministerial responsibility
Of the political debate were confused, certainly, its ma.or
components were under attaC, hut at the same time, Wilson.
s
charge to the Pulton CoMnittee, undoubtedly reflecting
-aority Parliamentary and higher civil service opinion, „as
to preserve the basic relationship between minister and
Civil servant found in the traditional notion. There was no
agreement in society. Government, or civil service about the
character of a responsible civil service.
The reform dynamics that culminated in the creation of
the Fulton CoMnittee were, thus, a whirlpool of professional,
political, and personal motives and values that resulted in
conflicting themes of reform. How did the Fulton Committee
attempt to reconcile these conflicts? Can they be
reconciled? To these questions we shall now turn.
CHAPTER V
THE FULTON COMMITTEE: OPERATION
REFORM, AND REACTION
'
The Fulton Cownittee was created in response to a
complex set of political events.
.Ms chapter „iu continue
to trace the process of reform, focusing on the i™,ediate
influences on the Pulton Co^ittee and its findings and
reco^nendations. That reform is a continuous or cyclical,
rather than discrete, process can be seen by examining thl
reactions to the Pulton Cor^ittee Report, its implementation,
or lack thereof, and the new wave of criticism that followed
Fulton.
The Conunittee at Work
It is clear that the establishment of the Committee
was the result of almost inexorable political pressures that
coincided quite nicely with the political aims of Harold
Wilson. Certainly Wilson wanted the Committee to complete
its work as quickly as possible so that he could publicly
report that his Government had reformed the civil service.
Thus, the Committee was working under political and time
constraints. Did the Committee keep the question of the
proper nature of a responsible civil service open while
examining evidence and exploring options? Was the Committee
essentially a political gimmick, a facade, or was it a
230
thoughtful attempt to secure responsive administration.
During the two and a half years the Co^ittee took to
report, there were indications that research and empirical
evidence r„ight provide guidance for Committee deliberations
There is almost unanimous agreement that Dr. Norman Hunt
(now Lord Crowther-Hunt) made a vital contribution to pro-
viding the committee with research assistance and overall
momentum and direction. In an unusual step, the Committee
commissioned a Management Consultancy Group to examine the
work of the civil service. Serving on the Group were a
civil servant who had climbed the clerical and executive
ladders to work in the Organization and Methods Division of
the Treasury, a management consultant in industry, an execu-
tive from British Petroleum Company Ltd., and Crowther-Hunt,
who was given leave from Exeter College for over a year.
Between October 1966 and April 1967 the Management Group
evaluated the jobs of some six hundred civil servants,
covering twenty-three blocks of work and twelve departments,
and investigated the relationship of administrators to
specialists. Serving as liaison between the Committee and
the Management Group, Hunt kept the Committee informed of
the Group's findings and progress and the Group in touch with
the Committee's reactions. ^ According to Crowther-Hunt his
tenure with the Management Group served to mold his ideas on
a number of issues, particularly the need to abolish the
•^Interview with Lord Crowther-Hunt, London, July 1,1980.
class structure and nr-^^^r. • . ,c eate unifxed grades. it is signifi-
cant that Crowther-Hunt cites pvt.It E. K. Ferguson, the British
Petroleu. executive, as being especially influential on his
thinking. The British Petroleum company personnel were
organized into a unified grading system and employed job
evaluation and management by objective techniques.
The Management Group found^ that officials in the
Administrative Class were characterized by lacK of continu-
ity in the job, relative isolation, lack of management skills
and experience (particularly in accountancy and costing,
statistics, economics, operational research and computer
systems work)
,
and largely irrelevant educational back-
grounds
.
It is not surprising that these inadequacies are
incorporated into the Fulton Report since Crowther-Hunt
wrote the first draft of the Report. By his own account, 2
the Report would likely have been much different if the
Secretariat of the Committee, R. w. L. Wilding, a career
Treasury official, had written the first draft rather than
himself. That his draft was allowed to act as the working-
draft is itself a case-study of Committee behavior. But the
crucial point is that the entire Committee was influenced by
Crowther-Hunt, who had a key position, a keen interest, and
'"Great Britain, Committee on the Civil Service, TheCivil Service Cmnd. 3638 (June 1968), Vol. 2, "Report ^aManagement Consultancy Group." Hereafter cited as
F.C. Report.
Interview with Lord Crowther-Hunt, London, July 1,
1980 . J- /
perhaps n,ost importantly, the tirne to devote to the Co^U-
tee-s work, unlike any other member. Crowther-Hunt himself
and his draft were strongly influenced by the structure and
management style of ^ r^r-iw^+-^ . .j'-Lt: r a private corporation.
There were also other research efforts commissioned by
the committee: a large social survey of the civil service,
a survey and interview with selected Administrative Class
officials, a follow-up survey of administrative officials to
compare progress and to check validity of the selection
procedures, and a historical study of reports on the civil
service since the Northcote-Trevelyan Report.^ m addition,
volume 4 provided a mass of factual and statistical material
from the Treasury and Civil Service Commission. But it is
unlikely that any of those had a great impact on the Commit-
tee. The "Social Survey of the Civil Service" was published
a year after the main Report; other researchers were not
even called in by the Committee for further discussion.
Thus "there is reason to wonder how useful for their delib-
erations the Committee members considered the sponsored
research, and how closely the Committee members read the
research documents prepared for them."^
If academic research had little or no influence on the
Committee, perhaps direct observation and comparison did.
"'F.C. Report, Vol. 3, "Surveys and Investigations."
Richard Chapman, "The Fulton Committee on the Civil
Service," in The Role of Commissions in Policy-Making
, ed.
Richard Chapman (London: Allen and Unwin, 1973), p. 20.
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s were
Between September 1966 and Februarv lQfi7r D y 196 7 groups of the
Corrunittee visi f(=»rl v-^-^^^ted France, Sweden, and the United States fo
four to five days each.^ Certainly, Cor^ittee member
impressed by the youth of civil servants in top policy-
making posts, the extent to which Ministers chose their own
staff, and the
"professionalism" of higher civil servants
that they found in each country, and hoped to incorporate
these "strengths" into the British Civil Service. Yet one
may wonder, along with Richard Chapman, "how firm a grasp
the committee actually had of the experience of foreign
countries"
2 or whether the Committee had thought much about
the desirability or the difficulties of transferring these
characteristics to the British system.
Finally, it is possible that the evidence presented to
the Committee was influential in shaping their thinking
about the changes needed in the civil service. The evidence
was certainly massive-152 written and 250 oral submissions
of evidence—and marked by "a remarkable consensus of
opinion. "3 Although some testified to the strong qualities
of the civil service, "there is a large measure of agreement
on the major problems that now need to be solved and on some
_.
"'F.C. Report, Vol. 1, Appendix C, "Impressions of theCivil Services in France, Sweden, and the United States."
2Chapman, "The Fulton Committee on the Civil Service."
p. 21.
This quote and the following quote from F.C. Report,
Vol. 1, Appendix K, "Main Evidence on Important Topics,"
p. 181. ^
Of the reforms that should be introduced for this purpose."
Yet it is also Clear that much of the evidence came from
staff associations naturally seeking to protect their
members
' intere^i-c: r'^v ^ •t: rests. For example, the First Division Associ-
ation, Which represents members of the Administrative Class,
opposed integrating the top structure with specialist classl
Professional interest groups furthering their special
interests, for example, the Royal Institute of British
Architects, argued for the need to give specialists more
experience in administrative work. Business firms or asso-
ciations calling for more efficient, economical government,
for example the British Institute of Management, emphasized
the use of new management techniques such as management by
objectives and the need for internal efficiency audits.
There was a great deal of evidence from individuals and
groups (e.g., the Fabian Society, the Labour Party)
interested in reform for a variety of political, philosoph-
ical reasons. And, indeed, there was evidence from thought-
ful academics and civil servants or ex-civil servants. Yet,
Chapman's assessment that "the main characteristic of all
this evidence was that it did not analyze in depth but
merely identified the problems from various viewpoints and
suggested possible solutions is correct. There appears to
be no attempt to analyze alternative solutions in light of
-"Chapman, "The Fulton Committee on the Civil Service,"
p. 23.
the given problems or, indeed i-r., to evaluate the various
perspectives of the DroKi^rr. ^p oblem, to assess the impact of solu-
tions upon one another ot- 4-^, r to recognise contradictions in
the various proposals.
certainly, it is difficult to .now what the i™„ediate
influences were upon the Co^nittee's decision-.aKing. it
appears, however, that neither research, observation, nor
evidence played a crucial part in shaping the Co™ittee-s
recommendations, with one exception, the Crowther-Hunt
Management Consultancy Group. Criticisms and solutions were
well-publicized before the Committee was even created (for
example, Th^ Administrators) and these pre-Co™,ittee argu-
ments, along with the political needs of Wilson, were the
primary influences on the Committee's thinking. Also, given
that the Con^ittee membership was, to a great extent, polit-
ically allied to or sympathetic with Wilson, it is not
unreasonable to suggest that the Committee's effort was a
political expedient to help Wilson create a reforming image.
Findings and Recommendations
Although the Fulton Committee brought little new
evidence or analysis to its Report, perhaps the Report did
attempt to integrate the solutions into a clear, radical
vision of responsible government. Certainly, the Committee
perceived its recommendations to be innovative: "The Home
Civil Service today is still fundamentally the product of
the nineteenth-century philosophy of the Northcote-Trevelyan
Report. The tasks it facp<: ^^,I r es are those of the second half of
the twentieth centurv Thi=, ;„ , ^inu y. is IS what we have found; it is
what we seek to remedy..! examination of the Report's
findings and recommendations win suggest the nature of the
Report and its view of a responsible civil service.
The Pulton Co^nittee's starting point is the finding
that "the basic principles and philosophy of the C nineteenth
century Northcote-Trevelyan ] Report have prevailed: the
essential features of their structure have remained," in
particular, the tradition of the •all-rounder" or "amateur. " =
In the meantime, the role of government has changed-it is
more positive, more technical, more complex, and more inter-
national. Yet, "the structure and practices of the Services
have not kept up with the changing tasks. ... The service
is in need of fundamental change. "^ The Committee found six
main inadequacies:
1. The service is based on the philosophy of the
amateur, where the ideal administrator is the gifted layman
who, moving frequently within the service, applies his
practical knowledge and experience of the government machine
to any problem. The cult of the generalist "cannot make for
the efficient dispatch of public business" and, thus, "is
-•-F.C. Report, Vol. 1, p. 9.
2Ibid., pp. 9, 10.
^Ibid., p. 11.
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Obsolete at all levels ana in all parts of the Service. "1
2. The system of classes impedes the work of the
Civil service by hampering its adaptability to new tasks
preventing the best use of individual talent, contributing
to inequality of promotion prospects, causing frustration
and resentment, and impeding entry into management for
qualified specialists and technicians.
3. Scientists, engineers, and other specialists do
not get the responsibilities or authority they ought to have.
4. TOO few civil servants are skilled managers; they
neither see themselves as managers nor have the training in
management
.
5. There is not enough contact between the service
and the community. The civil service is not aware of new
developments in business or in the universities, nor has
recruitment produced a service with a wide social and educa-
tional base.
6. There are serious problems of personnel management.
There is little career planning, too frequent movement to
unrelated jobs, and little reward for individual initiative
and objectively measured performance.
The key principle adopted by the Committee to guide
development of the civil service was, "look at the job
2first." By this the Committee meant that managers in the
^Ibid.
^ibid., p. 13.
service must review t-h,^ +-=ov .l e tasks xt xs called upon to perforn,
and the alternative wav^ of r.^ ^ys performing them, then find out
what skills are needed -,and, finally, find, train, and place
people in the jobs. That job evaluation was the "one hasic
guiding principle" to govern the development of the service
suggests the strong influence of the Management Consultancy
Group and, more important! v k •"portantly, the basic value guiding the
Fulton Committee document.
TO address the problems the Committee made 158 distinct
recommendations-some quite specific, others ra.her vague.
Only the primary recommendations need be noted here, since
the cult of the generalist was the primary evil rooted in
the civil service, the recommendation to weed it out was to
staff the civil service with "men and women who are truly
professional."! Professionalism, to the Committee, was
"being skilled in one's job-skill which comes from training
and sustained experience" and "having the fundamental
knowledge of and deep familiarity with a subject that
enable a man to move with ease among its concepts." The
service should develop greater professionalism among the
specialists by training them in management and providing more
opportunities to move into administrative positions. For
administrators, more professionalism meant greater special-
ization during their early years in particular areas of
^This and the following two quotes from F.C. Report,
Vol. 1, p. 16. ^
.ems
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administration, either areas concernea with social probl,
or those concerned with economic and financial problems.
Changes in recruitment policies were also reco^ended
to destroy the philosophy of the amateur. . majority, with
four dissenters, believed i-h^^ = »
,
ut^xiev a that a "preference for C the]
relevance" of the recruit's academic work to his future job
Should be Shown by a heavier weighting of relevant subjects
(politics, economics, science) and experience in the
entrance examinations. stress was placed on recruits having
a greater understanding of numerical techniques and quanti-
tative methods as solutions to problems.
A Civil Service College whose purpose would be to
contribute to increasing the professional nature of the
Service was proposed. The College, in the Committee's
opinion, would provide training courses in management and
administration and conduct research into the problems of
administration and policy.
To end the monopoly of the Administrative Class gen-
eralists over the provision of advice to Ministers, the
Committee advised the creation of Planning Units headed by a
Senior Policy Advisor who would assist the Minister in
planning future policy and evaluating current policies. The
Committee stopped short, however, of recommending that the
Senior Policy Advisor would share responsibility for the
affairs of the department with the Permanent Secretary; the
Permanent Secretary was to remain responsible for overall
departmental activities.
in addition the Co^ittee proposed that late entry
.nto the service should he expanded. Their view was thatlate entrants fro. industry, the professions, and univer-
sities would hrin, in new ideas and reduce the isolation ofthe service. Por the sa.e reason, they thought it desirahle
that there be .ore
.ove.ent in and out of the service by
specialists, economists, and professionals, similarly, to
strengthen the control of the Minister over his department
and to provide alternative sources of advice the Co^ittee
supported the increased use of personal political appoint-
ments by Ministers.
A key proposal to end the dominance of the Administra-
tive Class generalist was to abolish all classes and to
replace the system with a single, unified grading structure
covering all civil servants. The proposal would remove
horizontal barriers to movement into the Administrative
Class by merging the Administrative, Executive, and Clerical
Classes into an Administrative Group and vertical barriers
by allowing free movement from one occupation (scientist) to
another (administrator)
.
The uniformly graded structure,
similar to the U.S. civil Service and British Petroleum, was
to enable more specialists to move into policy-making and
management positions and to promote better management of
personnel and more efficiency.
In the Committee's view the creation of a grading
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structure would allow the application of t-h. • •i-FXicar he principles of
accountable management.
"Accouni-^Ki «untable management means
holding individuals ptnri „r.-;^-a d units responsible for perfonnance
-asurea as objectively as possible.^
. ,ra.in, structure,
-
the opinion of the Co™„ittee, wouia facilitate individualjob analysis, management by obiectivpc, .J uDj ives, and departmental
efficiency audits so that performance could be measured
against cost or other objective criteria and individuals
could be held personally responsible for their performance.
Lrke the Carter reform of 1978, an important component of
"accountable management" was the linkage of annual pay
increments to performance evaluation. Through reform of the
grading structure and use of modern personnel management
techniques the Co^nittee believed that more flexible, econ-
omical, and efficient use could be made of staff and promotion
could be based on merit- r-^t-Viov • •.uierir a her than seniority and class
membership.
TO implement these proposals the Committee recommended
the establishment of a new Civil Service Department which
would absorb the functions of the Civil Service Commission
and manage the civil service. A new department was needed
because many civil servants lacked confidence in the Treasury
and many believed too much power was concentrated
. in a
Treasury that exercised both financial and personnel
functions. Consequently, the new department was not to be
^Ibid., p. 51.
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predominantly staff k,, 4=^- .Y ed by officials who had spent most oftheir careers in the Treasury.
Finally, the Co^ittee noted that the professionalised
cxv.l service ™ust "guard against the danger of isolation"
and that "it should remain the servant of ^uis democracy and be
responsive to the control of Ministers. "^ Thus, a greater
amount of openness and wider consultation with societal
interests was recommended. This would require eliminating
unnecessary secrecy and a modification of the traditional
anonymity of civil servants by allowing civil servants to
explain publicly what their departments are doing, closer
links with the community were to be achieved with the new
recruitment procedures-more in and outers, wider basis of
recruitment, expanded late entry, m particular, more pref-
erence for relevance would, the Report assumed, ensure that
recruits "become more representative, geographically,
educationally and socially of the nation at large. "2 Greater
departmental responsiveness to Ministers was to be achieved
by the Minister making more personal and political appoint-
ments and also by giving the Minister greater freedom to
change the Permanent Secretary, Senior Policy Adviser, and
Private Secretary when he came into office.
A number of observations should be made about the
Fulton Committee's findings and recommendations. First, as
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already su..estea, its findings we.e largely not
.uch
.ore
than a co.pUation o. t.e current
.asMona.Ie criticises ana
were little affected its own research and evidence. zts
crxt.cisms of amateurism, ignorance of managerial skills
Class barriers to promotions, and so forth "follow slavishly
the political view which had developed and on which the
Government was determined to act."l clearly, the Report was
a product of and tactic in the larger political debate.
Second, many of the Committee's recommendations
"merely confirmed developments which were going ahead in the
Civil service quite independently of [the Pulton] enquiry. "2
Since the war. Prime Ministers had brought in their own
political advisors and certainly since the 1964 election
departmental Ministers had felt free to make political
appointments. In effect, the Committee was just recognizing
and blessing an initiative that had already taken place.
^
Likewise, the service had already made improvements in the
use of specialist staff, training programs, and recruitment
procedures. Thus in under-rating the changes that had
already occurred, the recommendations of the Committee, as
.
/Brian C. Smith, "Reform and Change in British CentralAdministration," Political Studies 19 (June 1971): 222.
2
"Editorial: Reforming the Bureaucracy," Public
Administration 46 (Winter 1968) :368.
3peta Sheriff, "Factors Affecting the Impact of the
Fulton Report," International Review of Administrative
Sciences 36 (1970) : 220.
~
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one ^e^ber reflected later, were
...roa.Xy conservative "l
in aadition, ™any of the recommendations were consistent
wxth suggestions of the staff associations and even the
Treasury, xhe concern to secure acceptance of the Co^it-
tee-s proposals by the civil service and Government precluded
radrcal change. Furtherraore
, the limited terms of reference
given to the Committee hindered it fro™ examining the civil
service-s relationship with Parliament or the civil servant's
relationship with his Minister. The Committee was con-
Strained from an exDlinit- ^t-i-o^u •plicit attack on ministerial responsi-
bility.
The fundamental reforms that the Fulton Committee
hoped to secure were also precluded by the ambiguity of
their recommendations. The 158 proposals contained some-
thing for everyone, with the result that they were often
vague or conflicting. Creating a more professional civil
service would increase its power vis-a-vis the politicians
and conflict with efforts to achieve more political control.
Greater use of management techniques and managerial control
tends to conflict with a bureaucracy open to public partici-
pation. While the Committee expected the higher civil
service to remain a career service, it also called for
increased late entry, more temporary appointments, more
interchange of staff, and more movement in and out of the
•'Sir James Dunnett, "The Civil Service: Seven Years
After Fulton," Public Administration 54 (Winter 1976): 372.
246
service, other examples could be cited b.t tv,^ t-itea, u these conflict-
ing proposals are sufficient- fo 1
1
J^ricient t illustrate the failure of
the com^nittee to consider its ,oals tKou.htf.u, and system-
atically ana to pursue them consistently. On the other hand,
the pluralistic nature ^r of the Report's recommendations
perhaps made for a hm^r^if^^y ^broader base of acceptance than would
have been likely otherwise.
Despite the ambiguous nature of the Fulton Report, it
has, at the same time, a clear emphasis on managerial-
technical approaches to achieving a more efficient, profes-
sionally-competent administration. The Committee found a
civil service which was, in their estimation, amateurish,
incompetent, and unprofessional. Attempting to apply new
standards of performance to the civil service, the Committee
adopted the techniques and language of business. A competent
civil servant was one proficient in using the techniques of
quantitative management and expert in a substantive area of
policy. Clearly influenced by the intellectual environment
of the mid-1960s and the Management Consultancy Group, the
Committee sought to replace informed judgment with positivist
techniques and a liberally educated generalist with a
technically trained "professional." So although from one
perspective the Committee's proposals were rather lackluster,
their implications were indeed radical in the context of
traditional British democratic politics. Attempting to
redefine the prevailing notion of responsible administration,
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to establish new crii-or--;=> • n .„ teria for judging the civil service, the
Fulton Co™.ittee Report challenged the notion of ministerial
responsibility and the nature of the political system.
Prevented from e^vni i o-; ^-^ j-xpl citly discussing and examining minister-
ial responsibility by its termc! v=<=y ICS ms of reference, the Committee's
recommendations to establish
"accountable units" of work,
reduce anonymity of administrators, and recruit more
technically trained civil servants nonetheless struck at the
center of the traditional notion. To implement these pro-
posals fully would possibly require a modification of the
political system itself; to a great extent the conduct of
public affairs would pass to professional and managerial
experts
.
The failure of the Committee was not necessarily in
undermining the notion of ministerial responsibility, but in
not discussing nor apparently understanding the implications
of their managerial approach for responsible administration.
As Parris suggests, if the "Fulton-type technocrats" were
adopted, it is possible that the British system would break
down because administrators and politicians would not be able
to understand each other. ^ For while top administrators
^See "Editorial: Reforming the Bureaucracy,", p. 374,
and Lord Plowden and Sir Robert Hall, "The Supremacy of
Politics," The Political Quarterly 39 (October/December
1968): 368, for discussion of this view.
2Henry Parris, Constitutional Bureaucracy (London:
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1969), p. 315.
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wouia spea. t.e Xan,.a,e of expertise ana presu.a.l, co^e
fro. ^iaaxe ana „o..in, clas.
.ac.^.o.nas, poUUcians wouia
co.e preaorainantly fro™ upper-.iaaie class Oxbriage back-
grounds. Essential ingreaients of
.utual trust ana unaer-
standing would possibly disappear eroding the policy-^aKin,
process. The Pulton Co™,ittee thus ignores the implication
of changing the fragile but crucial relationship between
administrators and politicians.
A further question not considerea by the CoiMnittee is
the impact upon the attitudes and ethical standards and
behavior of the civil servants of giving preference to those
trained in relevant specialties. Fulton left no doubt that
pre- and post-entry training for the civil service was weak
in a number of respects. Yet, as Chapman suggests in his
provocative article "Official Liberality," perhaps the
socialization provided by a classical education and tradi-
tional on-the-job training "instills acceptable codes which
may temper the possible excesses of bureaucratic power."!
It is possible that traditional forms of training in the
civil service impart a concept of morality or conscience
which would be sorely lacking in a public administration
dominated by technicians. Is having more statisticians and
economists an important concern compared to having civil
servants with a high sense of public service and ethical
^Richard Chapman, "Official Liberality," Public
Administration 48 (Summer 1970) :132.
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appreciations Are the two incompatible? Perhap. not. But
Fulton fails in not concerning itself with the moral i.pii-
cations of a more managerial, technical training program,
just as the Carter reformprc? f^ii^^r rmers failed to discuss the implica-
tions of performance appraisal and bonuses on officials'
attitudes.
Finally, like their American counterparts, the Commit-
tee was remiss in not understanding that public administra-
tion is not just technique, that administration and manage-
ment are not synonymous. Where the term "management-
suggests the application to the problems of government
techniques that assume commensurable values and measurable
social goals, the term "administration" suggests "a process
of balancing and optimizing, in which, by definition, goals
can never be exactly fixed, tasks cannot be exhaustively
specified and the methods chosen must themselves take
account of value judgments on the part of the administrator
and in the society at large which affect both priorities and
modes of procedure. "^ Where the goal of management is to
control and manipulate, administration seeks to "adjust
relations in a manner which satisfied a plurality of purposes
2and values." While no individual member of the Committee
would deny their commitment to democratic administration, as
a whole the Committee failed to pursue that commitment in a
'-"Editorial: Reforming the Bureaucracy," p. 372 .
^Ibid.
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consistent and thoughtful fashion.
g£^AM£gl_Rgactj^n-^^ j^^^^^^^
If the Fulton Committee was a politically inspired
enterprise which produced a political document, it is not
surprising that the reaction to the Report was also politi-
cized. The immediate reaction was mixed, ranging from
enthusiastic support to enthusiastic denigration. Roger
Opie, an economist who had served as a temporary advisor
under Labour, argued that the power of the civil service
should be curbed by implementing the Fulton proposals at
once.^ On the other hand. Lord Simey, a member of the Com-
mittee, issued a reservation to Chapter 1 that pronounced it
unfair to the civil service by not recognizing the great
contribution the service had made to Britain. The proposals,
he argued, were not radical changes but evolutionary in the
direction the Service was already moving. Undoubtedly
speaking for the Treasury and many higher civil servants,
Simey posited that while modern quantitative techniques are
needed, they do not "supercede the importance of the funda-
mental qualities of judgment" and "decisiveness, and the
ability to understand how the reshaping of values may be
embodied in and implemented by public policy."^ Likewise,
Lord Helsby, former Head of the Home Civil Service, denounced
•'-Roger Opie, "Implement at Once," New Statesman 75,
June 28, 1968, pp. 859-60.
^F.C. Report, Vol. 1, p. 102.
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the Report and asserted that it had a "rather imperfect
understanding" of what a professional is in the British
government.^ F. a. Bishop, a retired Permanent Secretary,
noted that Fulton had put "the cart before the horse" by
focusing on the lack of professionalism and specialists
rather than studying the machinery of government-its size,
the proliferation of departments, overlapping functions.^ In
The_Listener, Eric Hobsbawm accused the Committee of "cloudy
thinking" because the quality of its analytic work was
particularly bad.-^
Editorial comment in Public Administration
, journal of
the Royal Institute for Public Administration, was highly
critical of the Fulton Report, arguing that it was a techni-
cal, management, efficiency approach to reform which over-
looked political constraints and the purposes of public
administration.^ Similarly, The Times ' conclusion was that
the Report "is heavy in technical appraisal of immediate
practical problems, and light in political reflection."^
The Economist was also critical of the Report, specific
'Lord Helsby, "The Fulton Report," The Listener 80,
July 18, 1968, pp. 859-60.
2F, A. Bishop, "Fulton: The Cart Before the Horse,"
Spectator
, June 28, 1968, pp. 883-84.
3 •Eric Hobsbawm, "The Fulton Report: A Further View,"
The Listener 80, July 18, 1968, pp. 67-68.
^See "Editorial: Reforming the Bureaucracy."
^The Time s, June 27, 1968, p. 11.
proposals as well as its generally "rude" treatment of the
civil service. "The report is wide open to criticisms as an
assault on the whole-time gifted amateurs of Whitehall by a
part-time group of gifted amateurs, gathered in that most
nineteenth-century of British constitutional mechanisms, an
ad_hoc investigation by a number of uncommitted gentlemen,
meeting about once a week for three years, on a royal commis-
sion or committee
.
The response of the staff associations representing
the professional and clerical and executive classes was
muted in tone, pledging to study the Report's proposals but
disappointed that the Committee found it necessary to
caricature the civil service. The First Division Associa-
tion responded that "the service cannot command respect or
have reasonable morale unless everyone recognizes that tech-
nical expertise and efficient procedures are not enough."^
Among the civil service unions there was general support for
the creation of a new Civil Service Department, the Civil
Service College, and the proposals for better promotion
opportunities. Yet there was also deep skepticism about the
proposed abolition of classes among Treasury and First
^"The Good and Faithful Service," The Economist 227,
June 29, 1968, p. 15.
2 . . . . . .First Division Association, A Report by a subcommit-
tee, "Professional Standards in the Public Service," Public
Administration 50 (Summer 1972): 181.
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Division civil servants, the Institution of Professional
Civil servants, and the Society of civil Servants. To
convert the top civil servants and unions Crowther-Hunt
relates how the Committee held discussions with "Sir William
Armstrong (later Lord) long before it was publicly announced
that he was to head the new Civil Service Department, " ^ with
other top civil servants in the Treasury, and with some of
the civil service unions. In retrospect, Crowther-Hunt
feels that such discussions were counter-productive, allowing
the officials to prepare their counter-attack.^
In order to overcome the expected civil service resis-
tance, the Committee also engaged in "high-level ministerial
lobbying before the Report was published."^ Yet, in the
Cabinet, support for the Fulton recommendations was
unenthusiastic. The opposition of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer was assured; the creation of a new Civil Service
Department would remove significant power from his control.
Other Ministers were cautious. Wilson had at first received
the backing of only Tony Benn and Peter Shore. As events
would have it, Wilson began a June 25th Cabinet meeting by
exploding about a weekend leak on a sensitive political
issue by some Ministers. To assuage the Prime Minister's
'Peter Kellner and Lord Crowther-Hunt, The Civil
Servants (London: Macdonald General Books, 1980) , pp. 57-58
2lbid.
Ibid., p. 56.
ire, the Cabinet gave him an easy time on the Fulton Report.
^
The next day, June 26, 1968, the Prime Minister
announced to the House of Commons the Government's acceptance
of three key recommendations: the creation of a new Civil
Service Department, the establishment of a Civil Service
College, and the abolition of classes within the civil ser-
vice. Of the latter, Wilson went on to say that the Govern-
ment "will enter immediately into consultations with the
Staff Associations with a view to carrying out the thorough-
going study proposed by the Committee, so that a practicable
^Y^^^T^ can be prepared for the implementation of the unified
grading structure in accordance with the timetable proposed
by the Committee."^
The first full Parliamentary debate on the Fulton rec-
ommendations took place in the House of Lords in July; the
dominant issues were the Report's characterization of the
civil service as amateurish and the abolition of classes.
Lord Snow (C. P. Snow) took the position that "the contem-
porary stereotype is the very unhappy one that the Civil
Service is composed of amateurs,"^ while Lord Robbins argued
that the characterization was "intellectually muddled,
morally unfair and extremely damaging to the interests of
llbid.
2Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons) , 5th
series. Vol. 767 (1968) :456, (my emphasis).
^Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Lords) , 5th
series. Vol. 295 (1968):1104.
ee
the State. "1 Regarding the abolition of classes, Lord
Trevelyan, nephew of sir Charles Trevelyan, warned that th
Report had a tendency to level down too much and praised th
French Civil Service for the creation of an administrative
elite. AS a reflection of upper social class opinion, it is
not surprising that Lord Fulton appeared to be in a minority
as he emphasized that "we were right to recommend the
abolition of all artificial divisions. "2
Debate in the House of Commons was quiet by contrast.
In debate in November of 1968, Wilson rejected the Commit-
tee's proposal that selection of administrators should favor
those who had studied relevant subjects at university on the
grounds "that to accept the recommendation would close to
the Civil Service a very wide field of possible candidates
who have started or who may in future start on their chosen
university courses long before they had decided that they
wanted to become civil servants."^ MP Winstanley vocalized
an interesting and perhaps persuasive argument, at least for
Conservatives, in noting that "people who study subjects of
that kind [social sciences] do tend, I think, to lean
towards the Left in politics.""^ Yet for the most part the
-'Ibid., column 1129.
"^Ibid., column 1169.
•^Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons)
, 5th
series. Vol. 773 (1968):1553.
^Ibid., column 1622.
re
was
commons acquiesced in the Pulton proposals. Indeed, Edward
Heath, loader of the opposition, was in agreement with the
main recommendations."^
Thus it appears that Wilson's political objective had
been achieved. A report appeared with considerable fanfa
and momentarily received considerable attention. Wilson
able to accept the Report's major recommendations immediately
and begin implementation of those recommendations that the
primary participants found acceptable. On November 1, 196 8,
the new Civil Service Department was officially established
and in June 1970 the Civil Service College was formally
opened. The proposal for the abolition of classes, the most
controversial of them all, was ceremoniously accepted and
conveniently delegated to the civil service officials and
unions to be implemented privately. The politicians' concern
to appear to respond to popular demands for reform had been
accomplished. As the pressures of more immediate constituent
and policy concerns took over, the detailed implementation
of the reforms was left to the civil servants.
It is now in vogue, as part of the post-Fulton
critique, to argue that the civil service sabotaged the
Fulton reforms, that the unions and Treasury officials
worked to prevent the change Fulton prescribed. In a 1980
version of this critique. Lord Crowther-Hunt and Peter
Ibid., columns 1572-80.
Kellner claim that Administrative Class civil servants not
only had the power to block the key Fulton proposals but, at
the same time, had the audacity to assert they actually
carried them out. a new Civil Service Department was created
by Harold Wilson, but, these authors argue, it was staffed
by the same Treasury amateurs who always had been responsi-
ble for the civil service. Likewise, the abolition of
classes was accepted in principle, but the civil service
mandarins cleverly maintained a de facto class structure that
preserved their power. Increased selection of late-entrants,
in-and-outers, and specialists at higher levels was merely
proclaimed a fact by the mandarins without any substantive
change. Thus it was, in the story told by Kellner and
Crowther-Hunt, that the old Administrative Class, largely in
the figure of Sir William Armstrong, then Head of the Civil
Service Department, simply carried out those proposals that
it wanted and ignored the others. The triumph of the
amateurs in the battle over Fulton epitomizes for Kellner
and Crowther-Hunt the unchecked power of the civil service
vis-a-vis Parliament and Ministers.
Another version of the bureaucracy's role in reform is
perhaps possible. To discuss, develop, and implement the
details of the Fulton Report a Joint Committee of the
National Whitley Council was established immediately after
the Prime Minister accepted the Report. The Joint Committee
•'Kellner and Crowther-Hunt, The Civil Servants.
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was composed of higher civil servants (Official Side) and
union Officials (Staff Side), including Sir Willia. Armstror^,
Who, as Joint Permanent Secretary responsible for management
prior to and during the Fulton deliberations, and Permanent
Secretary of the new Civil Service Department and Head of
the Home Civil Service after Fulton, was involved in each
stage of the reform debate. He had presented evidence on
behalf of the Treasury to Fulton, had been privy to discus-
sions with Committee members during work on the Report, had
cautioned Wilson about too hasty a decision on the abolition
of classes and counseled that further study was necessary.
Post-Fulton, Armstrong served as chairman of the National
Whitley Council Joint Committee. Armstrong was supportive
of the Civil Service College and new Civil Service Depart-
ment but he had reservations about the Fulton proposal for a
unified grading structure, believing that such a structure
would create staffing problems. At the same time Armstrong
believed that change in the civil service was desirable
—
more flexible career management, less anonymity, better
pension arrangements.
Reporting the progress of its discussions and decisions
2m a series of four pamphlets, the Joint Committee took the
"'Interview with Lord Armstrong, London, April 30, 1980
2Joint Committee of the National Whitley Council:
Developments on Fulton (February 1969) ; Fulton: A Framework
for the Future (March 1970) ; Fulton--The Reshaping of the
Civil Service: Developments During 1970 (March 1971) ; and
The Shape of the Post-Fulton Civil Service (March 1972)
.
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view that "an institutions benefit f.o. ti.e to ti.e fro. a
radical review: and the Fulton Cor^ittee have provided a
major opportunity for this in the Civil Service. These
opportunities do not arise often. The Official and Staff
Sides of the National Whitley Council are in agreement on the
high importance of making the fullest possible use of it."^
Thus both sides of the civil service appeared ready to use
the Fulton Report as an opportunity to make administrative
changes. And further, "both sides agree that it is wrong to
limit our examination of possible changes to those which the
Fulton committee specifically proposed, "2 thereby extricating
themselves from being bound by the exact Fulton proposals.
According to the Joint Committee, "clearly, this is going to
be a long job.""^
The main problem for the Joint Committee was to devise
a practicable means for abolishing the civil service classes
and implementing a unified grading structure. For Wilson
this reform meant "that for everyone in the civil service,
whether from a college of technology, or from a university,
whether he or she comes in from industry or from a profes-
sion—all in future, the school-leaver, the graduate, the
accountant, the engineer, the scientist, the lawyer—for all
of them there will be an open road to the top which, up to
•^Developments on Fulton
, p. 1.
^Ibid.
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now, has been, in the main, through the Administrative
'
".ng
Class. Although enthusiastic about the goal of abolishii
.ess
classes, Wilson apparently did not have a clear picture of
how this would be done. The Joint Committee was itself 1
enthusiastic and asserted that "the introduction of a new
structure is far too great an undertaking to be completed in
a single heave. it will therefore be necessary to approach
the task in stages. "2 Thus on January 1, 1971, the Adminis-
trative, Executive, and Clerical Classes were merged into an
Administrative Group. This was followed in September 1971
by the merger of the Scientific Classes into a single Science
Category and in January 1972 by the merger of the Works
Group of Professional Classes and other professional and
technical classes into a Professional and Technology
Category. The changes went far to remove the horizontal
barriers to promotion within the service.
On January 1, 1972, a step was taken to remove the
vertical barriers to mobility as the Joint Committee intro-
duced a unified grading structure for the 600-700 positions
of Under-Secretary and above which allowed posts to be
filled by the most suitable person, whether specialist or
generalist. But the change fell short of the Fulton recom-
mendation for a unified system from top to bottom and.
-'-Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons) , 5th
series. Vol. 767 (1968) :456.
^National Whitley Council, Developments on Fulton ,
p. 24.
xnterestingly enough, was just what the Treasury had recom-
mended to the Pulton Co^^ittee. Whether this partial reform
represents a triumph of the bureaucracy's power to thwart
real reform or the best reform possible given the adminis-
trative and political constraints depends to some extent on
one's view of the nature of bureaucratic power and reform.
But it is clear that within the Joint Committee there was
very little support for a completely unified grading system.
The First Division Association and the Society of Civil
Servants opposed the move on grounds that it would disadvan-
tage their members, and the Official Side, led by Armstrong,
believed the unification of grades would be detrimental to
the efficient use of staff. The unification of grades at
the higher levels only was the result of negotiation among
civil servants who were responsible for running the machine
on a day-to-day basis. Incremental reform was predictable
given that the burden of actually making the administrative
changes was given to those very officials under attack and,
further, given that change was the result of bargaining
within the bureaucracy itself. That this particular reform,
and by implication many others, was only an approximation of
the recommended reform appears, then, to need explaining by
more than a "sabotage theory." In reality, the incremental
nature of reform was due to the complex intera-ction of union
and official self-interest, lack of clear principles and
goals to guide reform, competing perspectives, and lack of
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parliamentary-poXitical interest, m short, it may be
argued that the Pulton proposals were never implemented in
full because there never developed a clear political
consensus that these were the correct proposals for shaping
a responsible civil service.
Other reforms were implemented by the civil service in
the years immediately after Fulton. ^ Systems were introduced
for job appraisal reviews between the line manager and his
subordinates, thus developing accountable management as
recommended by Fulton. Arrangements were made for greater
staff movement within occupational groups and between the
civil service and industry. New recruitment techniques were
instituted and agreement was reached on new arrangements for
early retirement. The final Joint Committee report con-
cludes that "the impetus and stimulation derived from the
Fulton Report have permanently changed the nature of the
ti 2Service." Perhaps, more accurately, it should be said that
the momentum provided by external pressure and the Fulton
Report was used by those groups and individuals in the civil
service most affected by reform and desirous of change to
pursue those reforms that served their interests. The civil
service cannot be said to have played a role opposed to
change; but it appears that the service's role was to
-^See National Whitley Council, Shape of the Post -
Fulton Civil Service
, pp. 2-3.
^Ibid., p. 3.
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accommodate or even create change in order to conserve what
a consensus within the civil service believed to be the
strengths of British administration.^ To some extent, then,
the picture of responsible administration held by the civil
service was different from that picture held by the Fulton
reformers. But the picture that emerged was less a single
snapshot than a collage of interests and goals.
Latter-Day Prophets and Responsible
Administration
Because of the incremental nature of the implemented
reforms and the nature of the debate about responsible
administration, it is not surprising that a new wave of
criticism of the civil service soon began to swell. By 1972,
four years after Fulton reported, it was becoming clear to
many observers that the reform promised by Fulton had been
aborted. The tone and nature of the criticisms beginning in
1973 and continuing through the early 1980s fills one with a
sense of dgja vu. In late 1973, a new Fabian tract appeared
calling for the next step in administrative reform to
continue in the direction indicated by the Fulton Management
2Consultancy Group. Throughout the late 1970s and early
198 0s editorial comment and letters to the editors began to
'-Richard A. Chapman and J. R. Greenaway, The Dynamics
of Administrative Reform (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1980),
p. 188.
? ...John Garrett and Robert Sheldon, Administrative
Reform: The Next Step , Fabian Tract 4 28 (London: Fabian
Society, 1973)
.
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be concerned about burf^;?nr-T-^+--i ^ r. ^•Dureaucrat c spending, overstaf f ing,
inefficiency, and nnwc^r "rpu^^, iiu po er. The power system in Whitehall/'
wrote Michael Meacher, "is in no sense a democracy, but
rather a mandarin-dominated bureaucracy with only limited
ministerial control, ArtiVlc^Q o=,n-;r,^ -p^ ^r cies calling for reform appeared
in popular periodicals-New Society , ^ New Statesman , 3 The
Listener, 4 etc . —indicting the civil service for having too
much power or for resisting change. Robert Taylor, for
example, claimed that "Whitehall is in need of root and
branch reform, ten years after the Fulton report. ... The
generalist approach still rules supreme. "5 individual
members of Parliament returned to stressing themes of civil
service power or laying blame for policy failures on the
bureaucracy. Labour MP Tony Benn in a speech to the Royal
Institute for Public Administration posited the thesis "that
the power, role, influence and authority of the senior
levels of the civil service in Britain—especially now we
l"Men who block the corridors of power," The Guardian
,
June 14, 1979, p. 16.
^David Lipsey, "Who's in Charge in Whitehall?," New
Society 52, April 24, 1980, pp. 155-57.
^G. Cunningham, "Myths and Mandarins," New Statesman
94, September 23, 1977, pp. 387-88.
'^Lord Crowther-Hunt, "Whitehall— just passing through,"
The Listener 96, December 16, 1976, pp. 772-74; "Whitehall
—
the balance of power," The Listener 97, January 6, 1977,
pp. 10-11; "The case for civil service power," The Listener
97, January 13, 1977, pp. 43-45.
^Robert Taylor, "Generalist Cult," New Society 41,
September 22, 1977, p. 601.
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are members of the EEC-have grown to such an extent as to
create the embryo of a corporate state."! Former Labour
Brian Sedgemore continues the theme by asserting that "Two
things only can be said with certainty about Parliamentary
democracy in Britain today. First, effective power does not
reside in Parliament. Secondly, there is little that is
democratic about the exercise of that power. "^ por Sedgemore
the civil service mandarins are among the establishment
figures who govern by secrecy and illegitimate use of power.
By 1976 Parliament as a whole had again taken enough notice
of the criticisms of the civil service for the House of
Commons Expenditure Committee to conduct a review of matters
affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of the Civil
Service.
Latter-day prophets like Benn and Sedgemore are given
aid and comfort by the highly visible criticism provided by
Peter Kellner and Lord Crowther-Hunt , in a widely-reviewed
book. The Civil Servants
. "What is at issue," they argue,
"is the competence of senior civil servants—and also their
power: their power to influence governments and parliaments,
their power to select their own successors, and their power
^Tony Benn, "The Case for a Constitutional Civil
Service" (Nottingham: Institute for Workers' Control, 1980),
p . 1
.
2Brian Sedgemore, The Secret Constitution (London:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1980), p. 11.
"^Great Britain, Eleventh Report from the Expenditure
Committee, The Civil Service, Vols. 1-3, 1977.
to resist Change." m their estimation, the Pulton reforms
had been sabotaged by the higher civil servants and, in
particular, Armstrong, with the result that generalist
administrators have more power than ever to the detriment of
open and parliamentary controlled government.
While the external critics are building pressure for
new reform, internal critics, ingredients which have proved
necessary in the past, are contributing to the pressures for
change. The civil service unions and higher officials
continue to press for changes which will benefit their
members and facilitate administrative flexibility and
continuity. Thus the debate over the nature of a respon-
sible civil service and the ebb and flow of reform continues.
What of the future? Perhaps with the proper political push,
such as a return to Labour Government in the mid-1980s,
Britain will see the creation of a new committee charged
with restoring responsible government.
Kellner and Crowther-Hunt , The Civil Servants, p. 20.
CHAPTER VI
BRITAIN AND AMERICA-
THE SEARCH FOR RESPONSIBLE
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
I
Presumably both Jimmy Carter and Harold Wilson would
declare that the reforms they championed had gone far to
secure responsible public administration. For as President
Carter stated when he signed into law the Civil Service
Reform Act of 1978,
this legislation provides a fundamental and, I thinklong overdue reform of the Federal bureaucracy ' iputs incentive and reward back into the Federal system.It allows Federal employees to be encouraged, trans-ferred, or discharged for the right reasons if they can-
not or will not perform. This bill will make thebureaucracy more responsible. It will build inincentives
.
And Prime Minister Wilson echoed similar sentiments upon
accepting the recommendations of the Fulton Commission in
1968 when he said,
I am confident that the Report will stand comparison
with the historic Northcote-Trevelyan Report of more
than a century ago.
. . . The Fulton Report . . . finds
that insufficient attention has been paid to management
in the Service, and calls for a new system of training,
organization and career management.
. . . This Report is
an essential contribution to the modernization of the
basic institutions of the country.
2
Jimmy Carter, "Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,
Remarks at the Bill Signing Ceremony, " Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents 14, No. 41 (October 13, 1978):1761.
Great Britain, Parliament, Hansard's Parliamentary
Debates (Commons), 5th series, Vol. 767 ( 1968 ): 4 54-55
.
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The question to be asked is whether these reforms indeed
have been on the right track in the search for administra-
tive responsibility. if so, how? if not, why not?
The argument presented here is that responsible public
administration in contemporary democracy is characterized by
its responsiveness to changing political and social values
and forces, its broad representation of the groups it serves,
and its balanced commitment to professional competence and
ethical, moral ideals. m several important respects the
reforms of public administration have shown themselves to be
on the right track.
Social and Intellectual Influences
On Reform
Each of the reform efforts studied here has received
its impetus from mounting social and intellectual pressures.
Reform has not occurred in isolation from the social and
intellectual forces of the period. Changes in administra-
tive structure and processes have been made to make adminis-
tration compatible with newly predominant social values.
And although it is true that in the environment of politics,
ideas and systematic analysis are often subordinated to
bargained agreement among interest groups, "it would be rash
to conclude from this that those responsible for initiating
and implementing administrative reform in Britain C and the
United States] had been uninfluenced by ideas, or that the
intellectual climate has had no influence upon
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„1
was
administrators."! For indeed, Sir Charles Trevelyan
strongly influenced by the ideas of Benjamin Jowett regarding
competitive university examinations for awards. And 19th
century American reformers were in turn influenced by
British ideas. Both the Northcote-Trevelyan Report and the
Pendleton Act were products of 19th century liberal thought.
The attack by Northcote and Trevelyan on patronage was
rooted in the liberal concept of competition or meritocracy.
Similarly, American reformers of the same period based their
campaign against spoils politics on notions of political
liberty, open competition, and Puritan morality.
After World War II British society was heavily influ-
enced by egalitarian values and infused with intellectual
criticisms of the old standards of competence. Responsive to
this new climate, the Fulton Committee applied new standards
to the selection, training, and organization of senior civil
servants. It abolished the civil service class system,
eliminating the Administrative Class in favor of a more open
Administrative Group. A majority of the Fulton Committee
believed that in the selection and training of top adminis-
trators a heavier emphasis should be given to relevant sub-
jects such as economics and social sciences rather than the
classics studied at "Oxbridge." The Fulton Committee was
influenced also by the growing belief in science, technology.
'-Richard A. Chapman and J. R. Greenaway, The Dynamics
of Administrative Reform (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1980),
p. 195.
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and n,anagement science to solve the country's problems, it
emphasized the application of scientific and business
methods to the civil service. Recommendations to select
senior civil servants who possessed mathematical skills and
to hold these civil servants accountable through quantitative
performance assessment were quite compatible with emerging
social values.
new
In the 19th century in Britain the rise of a
middle class to positions of social and political predomi-
nance led to pressures for a more representative bureaucracy.
Similarly, the emergence of a strong labour movement and
Labour Party in the postwar years led to demands for a more
representative higher civil service. The effort to replace
generalists/amateurs with professionals, managers, and
specialists and Oxbridge educated elites with middle and
working class graduates of the London School of Economics
and red brick universities was evidence of widespread
perceptions of the higher civil service as unrepresentative
of the outlook of the working and middle classes and their
political leadership.
Likewise, in the United States civil service reform
has been in tune with the prevailing social-intellectual
climate. The postwar years, with the exception of the 1960s
to early 1970s, have been characterized by widespread
demands for reduced governmental spending and activity and
by a pervasive belief that business principles and management
techniques are key remedies for problems in government. The
ideologically conservative Second Hoover Commission responded
to these trends by proposing drastic overall reductions in
governmental functions and a corps of career senior civil
servants distinctly separated from the political executives.
The 1970s saw the re-emergence of deep distrust in govern-
ment and the growth of social attitudes that disparage
public service and worship the marketplace. Public choice
theories and quantitative productivity measurement techniques
gained a wide following. in this environment a Senior Exec-
utive Service was created to change administrative behavior
by stressing monetary incentives and security disincentives.
Reformers held up the civil service to a yardstick metered
by business performance standards and managerial techniques
and found it wanting.
A concern for the representative character of the
bureaucracy was linked closely to these changes in social-
political attitudes. The work of the Second Hoover Commis-
sion can be seen as less a concern for social class repre-
sentativeness than for the increased representation of
conservative business-market values in the higher civil
service. It is apparent that a goal of the 1978 Reform Act
was to make the senior civil service more representative of
the managerial outlook of the Carter/Campbell Administration.
It is also clear that concerns for increased representation
of women and minority group members was not a major concern.
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reflecting the political sensitivity of the issue. To a
large extent these public and intellectual attitudes
regarding bureaucracy have been rooted in events external to
the issue of civil service reform.
The Pressure of Externa l Events
Administrative reform does not take place in a vacuum.
Decisions about the ways administration should be changed
are often influenced by events external to the immediate
civil service reform context. In both America and Britain
reform has been a product of multiple external forces or
events. Four examples provide evidence for the way external
events have stimulated civil service reform: war, economic
pressures, scandal, and growth of government
.
Newspaper accounts informing the public of mismanage-
ment and confusion in the administration of the Crimean War
in 1853 provided a stimulus for the Northcote-Trevelyan
reforms. Public reaction to these accounts contributed to
the creation of a new Government under Palmerston who
quickly began implementation of the Northcote-Trevelyan
Report.
The Second World War was an event of considerable
significance for civil service reform in both the United
States and Britain. In both countries the war stretched the
-'This discussion draws from Chapman and Greenaway's
analysis of external events as they relate to British
reform, in Ibid., pp. 210-15.
isses
.
capacity of public administration, revealing its weakne=
Particularly in Britain, serious questions were raised about
the professional and managerial competence of senior
officials as large numbers of outsiders had to be called
into government service at top levels. Some of these tempo-
rary wartime civil servants also questioned the personal
qualities of Administrative Class officials, claiming they
lacked initiative and creativity. Both of these criticisms
were taken up by the Fulton reformers. In both the U.S. and
Britain the war stimulated experiments to improve efficiency
through better planning techniques, performance appraisal
systems, and training programs. Subsequent civil service
reforms were influenced by these wartime efforts.
World War II and the postwar years have been marked by
economic uncertainty and instability. In Britain, for
example, widespread academic and popular criticism of the
higher civil service was grounded in the inefficiency of the
economic departments of central government, particularly the
Treasury. And critics blamed the "amateur" character of the
Administrative Class for Britain's economic reverses.
Interestingly, economic pressures also were partially
responsible for the Northcote-Trevelyan Report. Parliamen-
tary dissatisfaction with rising costs of administration led
to a series of investigations by a Parliamentary committee
beginning in 1848. The Northcote-Trevelyan Report emerged
as one of these investigative reports noting that economic
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efficiencies could be gained by civil service reform.
Economic pressures have been important in influencing
united States civil service reform. The Second Hoover
commission was motivated by a desire to cut government spen-
ding and to reduce the impact of public administration on
the economy. The state of the economy was a stimulus to the
carter reforms in ways that are difficult to measure.
Clearly the widespread public agitation for reduced taxes
and government spending was an impetus for reform. In
addition, popular perceptions that government is wasteful
and inefficient had a direct impact on the tone and sub-
stance of the Carter reforms. Chapman and Greenaway's
observation regarding British reform appears relevant to
reform in America also: "the interesting lesson emerges
that efforts to cut down the cost or extent of government
activity have frequently stimulated proposals leading to
administrative reform."""" If this observation holds true, it
is likely that Britain and the U.S. soon will experience
another round of civil service reform as economic conditions
deteriorate and skepticism of government remains high.^
^Ibid., p. 212.
2For example, a measure recently has been sponsored by
Republican Senator William Roth and Democratic Representa-
tive Richard Boiling to create an eighteen-member Citizens
Commission on More Effective Government. Modeled on the two
Hoover Commissions, this time former President Ford has been
suggested as possible chairman.
An examination of the reforms studied here suggests
that the exposure of political scandal also has incited the
movement toward reform. Publication of the details of the
frauds and extortions perpetrated in the Grant Administra-
tion created public outrage that was tapped by reformers.
And clearly, the assassination of President Garfield had a
direct impact on the passage of the Pendleton bill. in
Britain, criminal abuse had been checked early on, but indig
nation over periodic cases of maladministration gave the
Northcote-Trevelyan reforms some push. Although no particu-
lar political or administrative scandal directly influenced
the Fulton reform effort, occasional exposure of official
abuse, such as the Crichel Down affair, indirectly contrib-
uted to the reform climate. In the postwar U.S., well
publicized accounts of scandals involving career and non-
career officials at all levels of government reinforced
attitudes already negative toward government.
A final example of an external event that has influ-
enced civil service reform is the growth of government. In
each of the postwar reforms studied, the growth of positive
government has stimulated reform in two ways. Pressure has
been placed on administrators to find more effective
approaches to meeting increased public demands. For example
many of the Fulton Committee proposals were already in the
process of being implemented in 1968 and the SES had been
incubating in the U.S. Civil Service Commission for many
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years just waiting for the appropriate political moment to
be hatched. At the same time, among large segments of the
population in Britain and the U.S., governmental growth has
led to perceptions of a bureaucracy growing increasingly
powerful. A concern for bureaucratic power has precipitated
political demands for increased administrative accountability
and responsiveness.
The Impact of Politics and
Political Values
In the postwar years, political leaders, particularly
chief executives, also have found bureaucratic power
troublesome. Both British and American reformers attacked a
bureaucracy which they believed had grown too resistant to
change, too closed, and too powerful. Hoover and Republican
Congressional leaders in the 1950s, the Labour Party in the
1960s, and the Carter Administration in the 1970s perceived
that a powerful civil service threatened achievement of
their political goals. Thus reform, in their eyes, was an
attempt not only to make the civil service more representa-
tive of their various political outlooks, but to change the
relationship between the bureaucracy and the political exec-
utives so that the politicians would exert more leadership.
To promote political responsiveness the Fulton Commit-
tee urged an increase in the number of political advisors, a
decrease in the traditional anonymity of career civil
servants, and a more exacting standard of accountability
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through management-by-objective techniques. For the same
reasons the Hoover Commission recommended enlarging the
number of political executives who were to be sharply
separated from a corps of career officials with rigidly
defined responsibilities. And the Senior Executive Servic
is an attempt to increase the bureaucracy's responsiveness
to the President by giving him flexibility to reassign
senior career officials, to place either career or political
appointees in general SES positions, and to reward senior
career executives for "good" performance. Civil service
reform in the postwar years, then, has emphasized the value
of political responsiveness to executive leadership.
And yet the nature of the reform process suggests that
reform has been the pursuit of many political interests and
values. The impetus for reform arises from pressure exerted
by many political actors, including the chief executive, as
well as by social and intellectual forces. The reformed
civil service is a result of political consensus, however
temporary, among reform participants. The present examina-
tion of reform in Britain and the United States points up
the central role of interest group, pluralist politics in
bringing about administrative change. Civil service reform
has emerged from the interaction of seven different polit-
ical sources: public opinion, individual reformers, senior
civil servants, interest groups, political parties.
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Congress/Parliament, and President/Prime Minister.
^
Although broad public dissatisfaction with government
and economics often is a stimulus for reform, it seldom is
so well focused as to affix itself specifically on civil
service reform. Except perhaps when associated with public
spending, problems of government organization and civil
service do not excite much public interest. They are not
"sexy" issues. However, public opinion often has been
"educated" by individual reformers and reform-minded groups
to perceive that reform of the civil service is the solution
for national ills. In 1855 in Britain the Administrative
Reform Association helped to focus public agitation with
government ineptness in handling the Crimean War on the more
specific criticisms raised by the Northcote-Trevelyan Report,
Likewise in the U.S., reform leaders such as Jenckes, Eaton,
Schurz, and organizations such as the National Civil Service
Reform League transformed public disgust with government
scandals and the assassination of President Garfield into a
more specific demand for civil service reform. In the
postwar period, widespread public unrest associated with
economic instability, loss of confidence in government, and
feelings of lost national prestige was appropriated by
reformers to fashion the Carter and Fulton reforms.
Reform leaders, therefore, have been crucial in every
'See Chapman and Greenaway, pp. 201-208 for a more
detailed discussion of the impact of political pressure on
British administrative reform.
reforming effort. just as the Pendleton Act would not have
been possible without the intense commitment of Eaton,
Schurz and others, neither would the Carter reform legisla-
tion have survived without the leadership of Carter,
Campbell, and Udall. The motivations of the individual
reform leaders have been as varied as the individuals.
Sometimes civil service reform is supported because it
yields short-term political advantages, as when President
Eisenhower supported the creation of the Second Hoover Com-
mission to placate Congressional Republicans. Reform is
advocated by other individuals because it coincides with
their broader political goals and view of the public
interest. Harold Wilson's support of the Fulton Committee
partially emerged from his belief that its recommendations
would support his conviction that more specialization in the
Administrative Class was in the public's interest. Likewise,
the enthusiasm of Jimmy Carter and Herbert Hoover for a
senior civil service corps was nurtured by their belief that
such a corps would make government more business-like and
management conscious. To their minds, the public good
demanded such standards. Individual leaders, even with their
varied motivations, have given reform efforts focus and
energy.
Senior civil servants also have been key participants
in civil service reform. They have applied pressure for
reform, developed the reform proposals and framework, and
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guided its implementation. Personnel administrators in the
U.S. Civil Service Commission throughout the late 1960s and
early 1970s not only worked to develop proposals for a
senior civil service, but also worked closely with Presiden-
tial appointees on political strategy and Congressional
members and staff on legislative details. It is clear that
the response of senior career executives to the new SES will
weigh heavily on its prospects for the future. In Britain,
civil service officials already had developed and, indeed,
had begun implementation of some of the Fulton proposals
when the Committee reported. Consolidation of classes and
an increased access to top posts for specialists are notable
examples. After Wilson accepted selected Fulton recommenda-
tions, the senior civil service was responsible for
implementing those recommendations. In implementing the
Fulton proposal to abolish civil service classes, the civil
service modified and moderated the impact of this proposal.
To many critics this simply illustrated the unrestrained
power of the civil service. For others, however, its
ability to guide the implementation of policy in this way
suggests the responsible use of power to adjust policy to
fit administrative and political realities.
Interest groups, too, have played an important role in
the reform process— in initiating the reform, shaping the
contents of the reform package, stimulating political
support or opposition, and implementing the reform. In the
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nineteenth century the Administrative Reform Association in
Britain and the National Civil Service Reform League in
America were critical to the creation of civil service
systems. Similarly, the Citizens Committee for the Hoover
Report was organized to generate support for both Hoover
Commissions
.
In the Fulton and Carter reform debates, interest
groups lined up on either side of the issues in typical
patterns. For example, civic, professional, managerial, and
business groups generally supported Fulton and Carter reform
proposals as contributions to more effective government. On
the other hand, veterans' organizations and public employee
unions offered intense opposition to those components of the
reform which conflicted with their members' interests, in
terms of job security, promotion opportunities, employee
rights, and so forth. This conflict between interests and
ideas was reflected in the political dynamics of the reform
process
.
On the whole, organized political parties have played
an ambiguous role in the efforts to reform civil services.
Reform planks in the Democratic and Republican platforms
prior to the passage of the Pendleton Act were concessions
to a few vocal activists rather than a result of party con-
sensus. After all, the attitude of most party members at
that time was expressed by Webster Flanagan at the 1880
Republican convention, "What are we here for except for the
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offices? "1 When party fortunes appeared to hinge on the
support of civil service reform, the parties were quick to
respond
.
In post-war American politics, political parties as
such have remained generally uninterested in civil service
reform. In 1978, legislative support for the Carter reform
package was bipartisan. Yet the creation of the Second
Hoover Commission was clearly a partisan effort and when the
Commission reported to a Democratic Congress in 1954, party
affiliation was highly significant in its failure. In
Britain, political parties have given scarcely more
attention to civil service reform. However, smaller groups
within the parties have sustained a longer term interest and
made important contributions. For example, the Labour
affiliated Fabian Society has remained interested in admin-
istrative reform since before World War II, writing tracts
on reform of the civil service in 1947, 1964, and again in
1973. Thus despite short periods of intense interest,
political parties rarely maintain an interest in civil
service reform.
It is equally difficult to sustain an interest in
civil service issues in Congress or Parliament as a body.
It is only when other reform actors, such as the chief
executive and interest groups, apply concentrated pressure
-'-Quoted in Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), p. 182.
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that Congress momentarily focuses on the reform problem.
The pressure eminating from Congress to establish a Second
Hoover Commission is an exception to the normal Congres-
sional apathy. However, it is true that some individual
lawmakers or committees do maintain a rather more consistent
interest in civil service issues. The Civil Service Sub-
committee of the United States House Post Office and Civil
Service Committee exemplifies such a committee and Represen-
tatives from districts with high federal employee
constituencies are examples of such individuals.
Because of the diffused nature of the demands on
Congress/Parliament and political parties, support and
leadership of the Prime Minister or President is vital in
the politics of civil service reform. Historically, chief
executives have steered away from involvement in reform
issues which demand much time and effort and yield little
political reward. Yet when the issue of civil service
reform can be used as a beneficial political tactic and/or
coincides with the chief executive's larger political strat-
egies or policy goals, he may devote limited attention. Both
Harold Wilson and Jimmy Carter are examples. Both men
wanted the image of reformer and Carter, in particular,
needed a legislative success. At the same time, reform was
the route for both men to achieve the more fundamental goals
of a politically responsive and managerially competent bu-
reaucracy. After Wilson and Carter claimed victory, their
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attention was given to more pressing problems. Neither
executive devoted time to the implementation of reforms.
Yet each has left his imprint on the civil service.
Thus, the politics of civil service reform in contem-
porary democracy results from the clash of ideas and
interests. Individuals and groups seeking to protect their
interests are often constrained by other individuals' and
groups' sense of the public good. Undoubtedly some self-
interested proposals are never offered because they appear
selfish, undemocratic, evil. While some public-spirited
reforms are fought because they so threaten another's
livelihood, self-respect, or status. Often disputes involve
some variation of the tension between the need for continuity
and the need for change. Conflicts usually occur because
notions of administrative responsibility are shared imper-
fectly. Where consensus fails, proposals for reform are
laid on the shelf. Where a favorable consensus is reached,
at least some of the reform proposals are accepted. Disput-
ants then return home, only to return another day.
Problems and Prospects
To the extent that civil service reforms in the two
democracies under discussion have been stimulated and influ-
enced by the prevailing social, economic, and political
forces, responsive to the values of the predominant political
leadership, and intent on securing representative bureauc-
racies, they have been on the right track to securing
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responsible administration. Yet both the Fulton and Carter
reforms take detours that may seriously impede the search
for responsible administration. One of the traditional
strengths of British politics has been the ability of the
political leadership to regard the civil servant as a
national resource. To a greater extent than the United
States, Britain has valued the civil servant "for his or her
capacity to respond effectively to a succession of different
political leaders and to offer a service that is more posi-
tive and independent than mere passive obedience.""*" There
is some question as to whether the Fulton proposals to
reduce the anonymity of civil servants and to increase the
number of political advisors do not indicate a reduced
appreciation of the civil service as a resource. On the
other hand, the creation of a SES in the United States marks
a potential contribution to realizing the senior civil ser-
vice as "a 'third force' that is different from the self-
interests of either political partisans or bureaucratic
organization men." However, SES provisions for reassign-
ment of career officials, interchange of career and political
appointees in career general positions, and limited right of
appeals indicate that a harmonious balance between political
responsiveness and neutral competence is quite delicate.
-"-Hugh Heclo, A Government of Strangers (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977), p. 246.
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A second and more important problem relates to the
balance between competence and ethics. Another of the
strengths of British civil service has been a particular
philosophy of administration which combines the pursuit of
efficiency and effectiveness with a commitment to ethical
ideals. Rosamund Thomas points up three ethical ideals
which form the basis of this commitment: 1) administration
is a means to attaining a higher form of society; 2) admin-
istration should render a service to the community by
supplying the public with quality goods and services at a
reasonable cost; 3) administration should provide for the
happiness and well-being of the worker through the supply of
non-economic incentives Administrators guided by this
philosophy of administration are characterized as much by
their high personal character as by their professional
expertise, by their broad social and political perspectives
in addition to their ability to plan ahead, and by their
capacity for reasoned judgment as well as by their knowledge
of technical skills. From the British philosophy of admin-
istration one learns "the importance of a balance between
2
science and ethics."
Administrative reform seeking such a balance does not
focus on external controls and economic incentives. By
^Rosamund M. Thomas, The British Philosophy of Admin -
istration (London: Longman Group Limited, 1978), p. 24.
2lbid., p. 242.
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emphasizing such approaches reformers may be introducing new
organizational rigidities and dysfunctions, such as subser-
vient behavior and risk avoidance. Perhaps more importantly,
they may "be undermining what seem to be dying embers of the
spirit of public service. The decline in morale and near-
elimination of the spirit of public service is a very
serious matter. it is perhaps a factor in the unrest in
the industrial and non-industrial civil service in Britain
and the employee dissatisfaction at all levels of government
in the United States.
An emphasis on hierarchical controls as exemplified by
management-by-objective techniques, economic incentives, and
security disincentives damages the balance necessary for
2responsible democratic government. "If there is a choice
between the liberal, tolerant mind, and efficiency," Herman
Finer argued in 1937, "then efficiency in the harsh and
aggressive sense is well lost." Both the Fulton and SES
-^Richard A. Chapman, "Training for Administrators in
British Central and Local Government," revised version of a
paper given in Trent Polytechnic, England, February 1981,
p. 11. One SES member in the Office of Personnel Management
shared his impression that the attitudes of new SES candi-
dates are different from older senior civil servants. The
new candidates, the interviewee suggested, are more concerned
about individual safety and not as concerned about the
rewards of public service as those who have been in govern-
ment service longer. Interview, Washington, D.C., 1981.
2see Frank P. Sherwood and William J. Page, Jr., "MBO
and Public Management, " in Contemporary Approaches to Public
Budgeting, ed. Fred A. Kramer (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1979), p. 139.
^Herman Finer, The British Civil Service (London: The
Fabian Society, 1937), p. 89.
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reformers were remiss, first, in assuming that conduct in
conformity with specialized professional education and
quantitative performance standards would be sufficient to
maintain democratic administrative values. Second, they
erred in failing to consider how their reforms would affect
administrators' attitudes and behavior toward their work and
the public at large.
The new wave of reformers will explore alternative
approaches to securing responsible administration. Perhaps
"the' hope of achieving a responsible bureaucracy lies,
rather, in developing internal controls, that is, the
emergence of an administrative hierarchy conscious of its
role under a democratic system and dedicated to the enhance-
ment of the system.""^ Civil servants who are as committed
to the search for community well-being as to professional
expertise become their own best taskmasters.
If these comments are on track, then it is possible
that the Fulton and Carter reforms of the senior civil
service have failed to contribute to responsible administra-
tion in a most fundamental way. The central moral question
for public administration was asked a century ago by Woodrow
Wilson, how shall the public administrator be motivated to
serve "not his superior alone but the community also, with
the best efforts of his talents and the soberest service of
loavid M. Levitan, "The Responsibility of Adminis
tive Officials in a Democratic Society," Political Scie
Quarterly 61, No. 4 (December 1946): 582.
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his conscience?"^ It appears that recent British and
American reform efforts have created administrative environ-
ments in which civil servants may be more motivated by
techniques to serve superiors and self-interest than by a
spirit of cooperation and sense of community purpose to
serve the wider public. In the contemporary democracies of
Britain and the United States acceptance of recommendations
for reform along these latter lines will require the
development of a favorable political consensus.
Iwoodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration,"
Political Science Quarterly 2, No. 2 (June 1887) :221.
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